I'he cancellation of Operation Sealion opened the door to a German inasion of the Soviet Union, a prospect which Hitler had iewed with inereasing enthusiasm as the Battle of Britain dragged on with no vietory in sight, d hc notion eould not be considered seriously as long as there was any chanee that Goering might sueceed in his mission of humbling England, but when it became apparent that the Luftwall'e's efl'orts were in vain, the Fuehrer was quiek to revive the seheme to refoeus the thrust of Germany's ofTensive posture from England to Russia.
.s had been the ease so often in the past, Hitler's enthusiasm for a new military venture was not shared by his militar- advisers who remembered only too well the difhculties imposed by fighting a two front war from 1914 1918. That e. vperience had been a sobering one which none of the senior offieers wished to repeat. There was hardly an officer of any eonseciuence willing to take the risks involved in an invasion of the Soviet Union, and members of the General Staff were agreed almost to a man that such a scheme would result in a disaster which would dwarf the fate suffered by Napoleon’s armies a eentutA - earlier. Their personal pleas might not suffiee to dissuade the Fuehrer from sueh a venture, but he could hardly refute cold facts or ST) they thought.
The generals argued against an invasion of
Russia with eandor and vigor but their position, unfortunately, did not preail. Hitler had long been critical of his senior offieers’ conservation and bitter oer their ]jast opposition to his plans. Had they not opposed the invasions of Boland, the Low Countries, and I'rance? Had they not ]jriately predicted that these entures would bring only disaster? The suecess of these operations despite the opposition of the older generals had eonvinced Hitler that his judgement on military matters was superior to that of his advisers, who were tied to the past and fearful of initiating bold new programs. .Arguments against an invasion of Russia were dismissed as militarily and politically naive: Hitler would once again hae his way.
To those who predicted doom and disaster should Germany inade the Soiet Union, Hitler issued a stern rebuke. The generals were reminded that the,azi-Soviet detente was never meant to be permanent; it was a tem]Jorary e. xpedient, designed to buy time while Germany disposed of the Western powers. Once this was aceonqffished, it was only a question of which partner acted first to annul the agreement. Fhe Soviets had already indicated their intentions vis-a-is Germany by their oecupation and annexation of Eithnania, and their territorial demands in Rumania. If Germany did not act quickly, .Stalin’s forces would be well entrenched on the eastern border
Opposite: Russians pai. irlr oil Red Square IxToic inov int; up to llie Ironl. Left: N. i/1 troops paddle .irross (lie Russian holder riiis is one of the lirsi pit lures ol (he iin. isioii o( Russi. i, j j June (() ] l,
Reoccupied by Russions during counlerottock, 6Dec 1941 April 1942
Further odvonce in the South 28 June-18 Nov 1942
Regaining some of the ground lost in 41/42 winter campaign)
OpposiCe top; .Sliik. is oti :i I. iitUs. tile base lit liulirana. Bottom; Miller's I’aii/eis inrC with sm c ess. liter success ill the lirst weeks iil ()|>eraliiiii M. irb. iiossa. Left; (ieim. m proirress Inw. ircis Moscow w. is, is swill as chi' iiilaiitrs ciiulcl iii. irc It.
Within easy striking distance of the heartland of the country. Those who refused to recogni/e tliis were blind to reality; their blindness could not and would not be tolerated. In the end, the generals were left with no alternatie but to follow Hitler’s direction.
World History
