In placing inordinate em|)hasis on olfensive action, the French forgot the principle that superiority in numbers at any point must be jjtiid for by adopting defensive positions elsewhere. The French also feared that their infantry, previously whipjjed uji to an enthusiasm for tittack, would be unable to stand on the defensive against the (ierman army, which they considered more highly trained than their own. 'Fhe result was that the French rushed forward, heedless of the con-secpiences. General, then Lieutenant, Spears observed:
The sense of the tragic futility of it will never (juite fade from the minds of tli(;se who saw these brav(‘ men, dashing across the open to the sound of drums and bugles. . . The gallant ofTit ers who led them were entii ely ignorant of the stopping pow er of modern firearms, and many of them thought it chic to die in white gloves.
If only the French had reinforced the Belgian defences, they might have been able to hold the Germans along the Namur-Antwei]) line of fortresses. Instead, the two armies which they threw across Lorraine were repulsed; and when they tried to break through the German centre in the Ardennes, the French were again defeated. Indeed, from 20 23 August, in the Battle of the Frontiers in Lorraine, the Ardennes, the Sambre, and at Mons the Allies were decisiv ely routed. 'Fhe French alone suffered well over
300,000 casualties, which included many of the bravest soldiers or those with greatest initiative. More than one officer in ten was already a casualty, and ;tt Flaxon on 19 August, the French 'Fwenty-sixth Division lost two-thirds of its officers. Without the promotion of many able men from the ranks, these losses would already have been irreparable.