In 1882 Britain invaded Egypt. British reasons for military intervention included the suppression of a nationalist revolt led by Colonel Ahmed Urabi, protection of the rights of Egypt’s legitimate ruler, Tawfiq, protection of the Suez Canal (and hence the route to India), and, perhaps most important, protection of British financial interests in Egypt. Though the occupation of Egypt was the result of long-term developments (including a mounting external debt and gradual separation from the Ottoman Empire), the immediate effect was the establishment of British control over the Egyptian administration. From 1882 to 1907, British control of Egypt manifested itself in the person of British agent and consul general, Sir Evelyn Baring (made Lord Cromer in 1891).
Though the nominal head of Egypt were the khedives Tawfiq (until 1892) and Abbas II, Cromer remained the effective ruler of Egypt until his resignation in 1907. Cromer’s rule was neither official nor direct; the Cromer administration is often referred to as the “veiled protectorate.” Based on his own philosophy of colonial rule, developed in part during his service in India, Cromer placed primary emphasis on the need for a strong, sound financial system in Egypt. In his view, native rulers were tyrants; British rule, therefore, brought much-needed reforms and fair government. Since Cromer believed that the basis of successful reform must be economic, his administration in Egypt concerned itself with strengthening the Egyptian economy through the improvement of irrigation and agriculture and the building of industry.
Egypt’s system of canals and irrigation had deteriorated markedly from Roman times until the French invasion in 1798, but during the nineteenth century Muhammad ‘Ali and his successors revitalized irrigation and agriculture by deepening canals, building dams, and expanding the cultivation of cotton. According to British officials, however, the irrigation system had been expanded on a less than scientific basis: canals had the wrong slope or capacity and were closed at improper times, channels were filled with silt, drainage was inadequate and confused, and the much-touted Nile barrages, begun by French engineers, had fallen far short of expectations. In 1884 a group of Anglo-Indian engineers, led by Colin Scott-Montcrieff, began reorganizing Egypt’s irrigation system. Dividing Egypt into five irrigation districts, Cromer’s engineers unblocked old canals, separated drainage from irrigation channels, cut new canals, and repaired the barrages. The result of the first year’s efforts was a 30,000 ton increase in the cotton crop. Further irrigation efforts followed: the eastern Delta Canal was dug, river banks in Upper Egypt were raised and canals there enlarged so as to ensure an adequate supply of river water for irrigation even in seasons of low Nile floods, and more barrages were built in the Delta and in Upper Egypt.
Irrigation policy was tied not only to finances but also to control over Sudan. Plans were afoot to build a dam at the first cataract of the Nile in 1894 at the time when Anglo-Egyptian forces were about to embark upon the reconquest of Sudan (following the Mahdist revolt and the death of General Charles George “Chinese” Gordon in 1885). In Cromer’s view, the new dam would help generate the income needed to retake and administer Sudan. Although the British government was hesitant to provide the funds for the dam, loans made by financier Sir Ernest Cassel allowed the dam to be built; it was completed in 1902. The successful reconquest of Sudan in 1898 afforded further irrigation possibilities; by 1904 British administrators had decided that the White Nile would provide for Egypt’s irrigation needs, while the Blue Nile would be geared toward providing for Sudanese agriculture (on the theory that whatever helped Egyptian agriculture generated further income that could be used to develop Sudan).
Although these changes in irrigation resulted in a dramatic increase in cultivated land, they came at a price. Soil quality diminished as soils were exhausted from continual use and perennial irrigation, pest problems increased, and a rising water table caused by continued inadequate drainage combined to reduce yields during Cromer’s administration. Despite the emphasis placed on irrigation as a way of increasing agricultural yields and hence national income, general agricultural policy under Cromer was not well developed. Cromer discouraged the formation of a governmental ministry or department of agriculture (the Ministry of Agriculture was not founded until 1914), and few efforts to improve agricultural techniques were undertaken. Agriculture was increasingly fun-neled toward the production of Egypt’s primary export crop—cotton—and away from cereal crops for domestic consumption. Overall, irrigation policy was well intended and designed to increase cultivatable land; its unfortunate effects on soils and the overall lack of a coherent supporting agricultural policy limited its long-term benefits.
As Egyptian agriculture was undergoing a transformation, industry was undergoing changes as well. Industry during the British occupation developed along two lines: industries related to agriculture and those producing luxury goods for the urban elite. Industries based on agriculture (e. g., the processing of cotton, sugar, and tobacco) flourished with a union of governmental and private firms dedicated to the creation of a modern export sector. With few exceptions, large-scale industry in Egypt during this period was owned and operated by Europeans, and the majority of debts and shares of industrial concerns were held outside Egypt. Despite the growth of such industries, most manufacturing in Egypt remained traditionally organized, laborintensive, and Egyptian-owned. At the same time, guilds were being replaced with small-scale wage labor, as the government either officially abolished guilds or simply began referring in its regulations to occupations without recognizing any guild structures. During Cromer’s time in Egypt, little attention was given to the development of heavy industry, and the government took steps to prevent the development of a modern textile industry. In short, industrial policy, like irrigation and agricultural policy, was formulated with an eye toward maximizing revenue for the British-led government and for foreign investors in Egypt.
Cromer retired from his post in 1907 following the “Dinshaway incident,” in which a British officer was killed in the village of Dinshaway and brutal sentences were imposed on the villagers in consequence. Reaction against the sentences swept through Egypt and Britain; pressure mounted for a more accommodating British policy in Egypt. Though Cromer had been out of Egypt during the sentencing, he nonetheless astutely realized that change was in the air and retired to England, where he spent his remaining time writing, serving in the House of Lords, advocating free trade, and presiding over the 1916 Dardanelles Convention. He died in 1917, his Egyptian post having been taken over by Sir Eldon Gorst.
Amy J. Johnson
Further Reading
Collins, J. G. The Egyptian Elite under Cromer, 1882-1907.
Berlin: K. Schwarz, 1983.
Marlowe, J. Cromer in Egypt. London: Elek, 1970.
Richards, A. Egypt’s Agricultural Development, 1800-1980.
Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982.
Zayn al-Din, Ismail Muhammad. al-Ziraah al-Misriyah fi ahd al-ihtilal al-Baritani, 1882-1914. Cairo: al-Hayah al-Misriyah al-Ammah lil-Kitab, 1995.
World History
