The leadership of Russia has officially confirmed the fact that the nest of terrorism has been crushed, that illegal armed groups have been neutralized, and militant leaders on whose conscience lay the grief and suffering of thousands of people have been destroyed, detained and brought to court.
- Ramzan Kadyrov, 2009
The Second Chechen War ended with a whimper rather than a bang. By March 2007, when Ramzan Kadyrov finally succeeded his father as Chechen president, large-scale combat operations had long since ended. Khattab, who had survived being blown up by a landmine and shot in the stomach with a heavy machine gun, had died in March 2002 when an FSB undercover agent passed him a letter that was steeped in poison. In February 2004 Yandarbiyev died in exile in Qatar, when a bomb blew up his car. The men convicted of his killing were eventually extradited to Russia - where they received a hero's welcome, apparently being GRU agents.
In March 2005 Maskhadov, long since by then a general with no army, was killed by federal forces in Tolstoy-Yurt. Shamil Basayev was killed by a Russian booby trap in July 2006. Doku Umarov, who took up the poisoned chalice of titular head of the resistance movement in 2006, proved a lacklustre figure whose talents beyond staying alive were limited. In 2007, he declared the formation of the Imarat Kavkaz (Caucasus Emirate), aiming to unite the nationalist and jihadist movements of the North Caucasus into a single common movement, but this never amounted to much on the ground. In 2014, even his capacity to survive was exhausted and he died in circumstances still unclear, but probably from an earlier wound.
The rebel movement was increasingly dispersed, demoralized and divided. The Chechen population was exhausted by years of brutal war and draconian security measures. Ramzan Kadyrov's government, buttressed by his personal force of Kadyrovtsy, seemed to have the situation in hand. Thus, on 16 April 2009, the National Antiterrorism Committee of the Russian government issued a statement that the decree 'declaring a counterterrorist operation in the territory of the [Chechen] republic' was being repealed, so as to create 'the conditions for the future normalization of the situation in the republic, its reconstruction and development of its socio-economic sphere'. Through this banal press release, the Russian government in effect declared victory.
Russian forces in Chechnya had been reduced to around 10,000 soldiers, in the MVD VV's 46th Independent Special Designation Brigade and the Armed Forces' 42nd Motor Rifle Brigade. They were supported by the MVD VV's 34th Special Designation Detachment, a small counterterrorist commando unit, as well as the MVD VV's 352nd Independent Reconnaissance Battalion and the MVD VV's 140th Artillery Regiment. The bulk of forces within Chechnya were Chechen MVD forces, built on the basis of the Kadyrovtsy: the 141st 'Akhmad Kadyrov' Special Purpose Police Regiment in Grozny, the 249th Independent Special Motorized VV Battalion 'Yug' (South) in Vedeno (formerly known as Neftepolk, the 'Oil Regiment'), the 424th Independent Special Designation Brigade and 359th Independent Special Police Motorized Battalion in Grozny and the 360th (Shelkovskaya), 743rd (Vedeno) and 744th (Nozhay-Yurt) Independent VV battalions. While these technically are subordinated to the North Caucasus VV District headquarters in Rostov-on-Don in southern Russia, in practice it is widely acknowledged that their primary loyalty is likely to be to Grozny and Kadyrov.
By contrast, the rebels were down to no more than a few hundred fighters, largely stranded in the highlands, with perhaps 500 trying to integrate back into civilian life, whether back with their families or hidden amid the population of displaced persons.
In theory, they could be considered sleepers, ready to return to the fray when the time was right, but in practice most appear to be hoping or determined to turn their backs on the fight. Doku Umarov, who became leader of the remaining Chechen rebels in 2006 and self-proclaimed 'Emir of the Caucasus Emirate' in 2007, has not shown himself the kind of political leader with the charisma or strategy to keep and enthuse them, and their numbers have fallen every year. He fought in the First Chechen War, initially under
Below: In a triumphalist gesture, the Russians held a traditional Victory Day parade - commemorating the defeat of Nazi Germany - in Grozny’s Dinamo stadium on 9 May 2000. Here, an elderly Chechen woman weeps as pro-Russian Chechen militia watch the parade. (Stringer/EPA)
Ruslan Gelayev and then in his own unit, which he called Borz ('Wolf'). He proved an effective field commander and Maskhadov later appointed him as head of the Chechen Security Council. One of his primary roles in the inter-war period was trying to resolve differences between factions and, especially, the nationalists and the jihadists. Nevertheless, he was dogged by allegations of involvement in the kidnap 'industry' - he came from the same teip as Arbi Barayev - and was eventually forced to step down in 1999. This appears to have embittered him, as from then he steadily drifted into the jihadist camp. He fought during the siege of Grozny in 1999-2000, sustaining a head wound and being evacuated from the city before it fell. He continued to fight, but had by this time gravitated towards Shamil Basayev's camp and also demonstrated a willingness to launch and plan terrorist attacks. When he became 'president of the ChRI' in 2006 following the death of his
Opposite: Pro-Russian Chechen troops at Grozny’s Severny airport in 2004, before it reopened to civil aviation. Behind them is a Mi-17 assault helicopter from the 487th Separate Helicopter Regiment.
(© Maria Golovnina/Reuters/Corbis)
Predecessor, Adul-Khalim Sadulayev, he made Basayev his vice president.
His proclamation of the IK reflected not just his own jihadist view that the struggle in Chechnya was part of a wider one to drive the Russians out of the North Caucasus; it was also a product of the way that the jamaats or insurgent groups outside Chechnya were even by then more active and enthusiastic than his own. He already had good links with the jamaats of Kabardino-Balkaria and this was an attempt to try to use those contacts to bolster his own authority and also bring the various insurgent movements together. In that, it has failed and the IK has no meaningful control over the groups nominally under its umbrella.
Instead, Umarov has had to turn to terrorism in a bid to make an impact, not least when his authority is under threat. Although he has at some times declared a moratorium on civilian attacks, they tend to be propaganda than reality. In 2008, he revived the Al-Riyadus Martyrs' Brigade, a unit specifically tasked with recruiting and preparing suicide bombers. After all, the rebel campaign has become almost entirely one of terrorism. Furthermore, most of their 'spectaculars', discussed below, took place outside Chechnya itself, such as the 2009 bombing of the Nevsky Express highspeed train from Moscow to St Petersburg, which killed 27 people, or the 2011 suicide bombing at Moscow's Domodedovo airport, which left 37 dead. These reflected the Chechens' ability to find a handful of willing bombers, as well as their links with other North Caucasus jihadists. However, their operational capacities inside Chechnya itself had become severely limited. In August 2010, as much as anything else because of internal politics (facing a leadership challenge, Umarov needed to demonstrate that he could still act), insurgents launched a suicide operation against Kadyrov's home village of Tsentoroi. Two months later, three rebels launched a suicide attack on the Chechen parliament building in Grozny, killing two security guards and a parliamentary officer. On one level, these attacks were relatively ineffective, actually leading to more rebel casualties than among the security forces.
Yet while their dependence on suicide tactics was a sign of the rebels' inability to penetrate the security cordons any other way, it was also evidence that they are still able to find people willing to die for the chance to strike a blow against the Kadyrov regime and his Russian backers.
Conclusion and consequences
World History
