Mesopotamia: The Collapse of the Akkadian Empire (c. 2350-2200 BC)
Between c. 3000 and 2350 BC, the ancient Mesopotamian city-states emerged in what is now Iraq, eastern Syria, and southeastern Turkey. Each of these city-states had a central hub which was signified by a walled, urban community. Although the various city-states were politically independent, they shared an economy based on grain farming, focused on barley and wheat, and the herding of sheep, goats, pigs, and cattle. In the latter part of the third millennium BC, Sargon the Great set out to unify the competing city-states under his rule. His Akkadian Empire emerged in the alluvial plain between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, and it linked northern Mesopotamia, with its rain-fed fields, and southern Mesopotamia, and its extensive irrigation systems. Sargon began his conquest from the city-state of Kish, and eventually established a new capital at Akkade. Sargon’s rule put an end to the endemic warfare between the various city-states in the region - at least for a while.
Sargon’s control over the other city-states was hegemonic in nature, although he also installed his own officials to administer alongside the local rulers. Sargon’s officials were specifically charged with making sure that the overarching hegemonic city-state received its share of the surplus produced by the various tributary city-states he controlled. In order to depict his royal qualities, Sargon cultivated a variety of new artistic traditions, including the creation of cylinder seals. Naram-Sin, Sargon’s grandson, would manipulate the ideology further, when he began to use the semantic classifier ‘divinity’ to suggest that he was different than normal humans, and that his claim to the office of king was based on divine authority. Nevertheless, regardless of the many political and ideological changes that had been initiated to justify, and legitimize, the new world order, the Akkadian Empire collapsed shortly after the death of Naram-Sin.
There are various theories as to what caused the Akkadian collapse. Some have argued that the Akkadian Empire was unstable from the outset. This instability was particularly evident during the transition period from one ruler to the next. Such periods were rife with factional competition. Even when the hegemonic empire was at its strongest, conflicts between the King’s officials and their local counterparts over land allocations, and the redistribution of surplus resources and labor, were never-ending. A second problem emerged because the empire likely extended itself too far in efforts to gain more territory. Specifically, the costs of funding both the conquest wars, and the administrative apparatus that was required to maintain the new territories, put great strain on the domestic economy. Unable to mediate these two areas of conflict, the Akkadian Empire collapsed. Ultimately, the costs associated with political unification, and military expansion, were too great. The traditional rulers eventually pulled away, and the various city-states regained their autonomy.
Thus, from this perspective, the collapse was caused by a combination of insurmountable economic and political problems.
An alternative explanation posits an ecological explanation for the collapse. This model suggests that the Akkadian Empire rose during a period of wetter conditions. In contrast, the onset of the collapse coincided with a sudden shift to a more arid climate. Specifically, there is evidence to suggest that a 300-year dry-period began in and around 2150 BC. Even though water-management and food-storage strategies had been adopted by the Akkadians, these, apparently, could not stave off the collapse. In summary, the ecological model implies that a sudden climatic shift, and the onset of a multicentury drought, may have caused the collapse. The Mesopotamians were not at fault; they were simply unable to respond effectively to climatic changes over which they had no control.
A related theory argues that the Mesopotamian economic system was inherently unstable. This is because civilizations that emerged in this region were reliant on water storage and irrigation because rainfall was generally low, and because the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers are at their lowest between August and October - when the crops most needed water. Initially, water storage and irrigation solved these problems, but only in the short-term. Given the high evaporation rate, the salt content of the irrigated lands soon rose. In addition, waterlogging was prevalent due to the low permeability of the soils, and the slow rate of drainage in the flat lands. The only solution to this problem is long periods of fallow and the cessation of irrigation. But, the structure of Mesopotamian society did not allow for this. In fact, the problem was exacerbated over time due to rising populations, the need to feed the growing state apparatus (i. e., bureaucrats, soldiers), the costs of elite construction programs, and increasing competition between the various city-states. This meant that intensive agricultural production only increased, leaving no room for an efficient fallow system because the short-term needs of the state outweighed the longterm damage being done to the environment.
In summary, this last model suggests that, rather than making useful changes on the societal scale to deal with their environmental and economic issues, the elite sought old answers to new problems (e. g., larger temples, more grandiose rituals and ceremonies, increased irrigation, shorter fallow periods, and misappropriation of surplus). In the end, they tried to intensify production, which only hastened the decline. As a result, this model implies that the people of southern Mesopotamia were clearly responsible for their collapse.
South Asia: The Rise and Fall of the Indus Civilization (2600-1900 BC)
Indus civilization emerged in what is now western Pakistan, along the Indus and Ghaggar-Hakra Rivers, and the adjacent region now comprising northwestern India. In this macro-region the subsistence economy was based on the growing of wheat and barley, and the herding of goats, sheep, and some ‘humped’ cattle. The first signs of incipient urbanism make there appearance here during the Integration Era - or what is also referred to as the Mature Harappan Phase (2600-1900 BC). At this time we not only see the emergence of true cities, but also a whole range of satellite communities. Writing also becomes more prevalent, a taxation system appears to have been introduced, and there is a clear social hierarchy. It was also during the Integration Era that we see a shift away from regionalism, to a greater degree of macro-regional homogeneity. The material culture that supports this interpretation includes unifying symbols on ritual items, painted pottery, and ornaments, as well as standardized weights and measures, and the adoption of similar urban plans. All of this implies that the various cities were unified on a cultural level - although there is no evidence that they were politically unified.
Indications are that there were at least five main Indus cities: Harappa, Mohenjo-Daro, Ganweriwala, Dholavira, and Rakhigarhi. These cities were comprised of large mound complexes enclosed by walls, and surrounded by extensive, organized settlement. Some view the central mound complexes as having had an administrative orientation - others disagree as to their function. There is also little consensus as to the nature of Indus Valley political organization. However, most support the idea that they were organized as a series of independent city-states.
After a relatively short period of prosperity, these various city-states began to encounter problems that eventually led to a return to regionalism, and the breakdown of the economic and political structures that developed during the Integration Era. Specifically, by 1900 BC Indus civilization witnessed a period of significant balkanization that led to the reemergence of smaller communities, and their local leaders, as key power-brokers. The unifying artifacts of the previous period also disappeared, and the connections between the various regions diminished dramatically. As part of the decline, seals and writing fell out of use, as did the taxation system, and the system of standardized measures and weights. Further cultural changes are signified by changes in ritual objects and mortuary practices. Finally, the city-states themselves witnessed varying degrees of abandonment.
Mohenjo-Daro was virtually abandoned in 1900 BC. Harappa was not totally abandoned, but its population did shrink dramatically - it was clearly not a ‘city’ anymore. Ganweriwala, Dholavira, and Rakhi-garhi also declined to the extent that they could no longer be considered cities. There were also population decreases and abandonment in the smaller settlements throughout the macro-region.
Some prefer not to call what happened in the Indus Valley at the start of the second millennium BC a ‘collapse’. However, given the aforementioned evidence, what happened clearly fits the definition of ‘collapse’ as ‘‘the loss - sometimes quite abruptly - of a significant degree of extant sociopolitical complexity’’. What remains to be determined, therefore, is not whether this was a ‘collapse’ or not, but rather what caused the demise of the Indus city-states.
One environmental explanation for the collapse suggests that: (1) the trade networks and political alliances were vulnerable to environmental changes and downturns in agricultural production; (2) the Indus River began to change its course repeatedly, flooding many settlements, and burying some under massive amounts of silt; and (3) the frequent floods and changes to the river courses wreaked havoc upon the agricultural system, and hence the economic foundations of the Indus states were negatively impacted.
A related economic model contends that - as was the case in Mesopotamia - agricultural intensification through irrigation was required to generate the surpluses needed to feed the burgeoning support populations, bureaucrats, craft specialists, soldiers, priests, and elite who comprised each city-state. Because the Indus Valley was arid, the soils were impermeable and prone to waterlogging. Irrigation thus served to raise the water table which, due to the high evaporation rate, led to increased salt content in the soils. Significantly, there is again evidence that the Indus Valley civilization emerged during a period of favorable, wetter climatic conditions. However, a period of dryer climate began shortly thereafter, around 2200 BC. This would have exacerbated the salinity problem. In the end, the damage done to the field systems by the rising salt levels inevitably led to a decline in crop yields, and the eventual demise of the city-states.
Finally, a purely ideological explanation for the collapse has also been put forth. This model suggests that the Indus Valley centers were based on a shared and harmonious ideology that was ‘too perfect’. That is, because it was too harmonious, and without the types of conflict and negotiation that characterize long-lived civilizations, the Indus ideology was also inherently static, and thus vulnerable to any internal or external change.
Mesoamerica: The Collapse of the Classic Maya City-States (250-900 AD)
The first ancient Maya city-states emerged in the Late Preclassic period (c. 400 BC-250 AD), in what is today eastern Mexico, Guatemala, Belize, El Salvador, and western Honduras. These communities were initially based on slash-and-burn, or ‘swidden’, agriculture, with a particular emphasis on maize, beans, and squash. Over time, however, more intensive farming methods were adopted - such as terrace agriculture. Other cultural characteristics included: (1) the construction of monumental architecture, and large, royal court complexes; (2) participation in long-distance exchange networks; (3) a complex writing system; (4) an elaborate calendar system; and (5) the creation of a myriad of art forms in stone, ceramic, shell, and bone.
The onset of the Classic period (c. 250-900 AD) witnessed the rapid expansion of the Maya city-states in terms of both their size, and overall numbers. This created a political landscape comprised of a myriad of comparatively small, self-governing, city-states which were at various times incorporated into larger, hege-monically organized, city-states or ‘leagues’, each centered on a single capital. Within these hegemonic leagues dependent, or ‘tributary’, city-states likely continued to be self-governing except for when it came to defense or foreign policy, and they usually had to pay tribute to the overlord of the hegemonic city-state and contribute troops and supplies in times of war.
After many centuries of apparent economic, social, and political achievement, many of the city-states went into a decline that has long been referred to as the ‘Maya collapse’. Most Mayanists agree that the collapse was not an abrupt political fragmentation that impacted all of the city-states in the southern lowlands simultaneously. Rather, it was a protracted process that played itself out over three centuries, beginning around 750 AD, and ending approximately 1050 AD. For some city-states the collapse was both rapid, and final. For others, and for support populations in general, the decline was often more gradual.
The characteristics of the collapse include: (1) a decline in the erection of monuments, along with their associated dynastic texts and iconography of rulership; (2) the demise of polychrome ceramic production; (3) the abandonment of many forms of in-scriptional art; (4) the termination of elite building programs, in some cases quite abrubtly - in midconstruction; (5) a cessation in the construction of elaborate tombs; (6) a dramatic alteration in the form of governance; and, (7) significant migrations and population losses. Although a few dissenters remain, most scholars view the collapse as a widespread sociopolitical and socioeconomic transformation that was most detrimental to the elite sector of ancient Maya society. In other words, what really ‘collapsed’ in the southern lowlands was the Classic period-style kingship institution and all of its constituent components.
A number of theories have been offered as explanations for the collapse. One of the more widely accepted environmental models for the collapse is based on the idea that the Maya city-states succumbed to drought - when their crops failed, so too did their economic and political systems. Support for this model is tied to the fact that the period between 800 and 1000 AD was likely the driest time span in the mid - to Late Holocene Epoch. Even more importantly, some researchers have been able to show that, within this dry period, peak periods of aridity - or multiyear droughts - were likely centered on 760, 810, 860, and 910 AD. These dates articulate nicely with our current understanding of the collapse chronology. The consistent results, deriving as they do from divergent data sets, do suggest that drought was likely a key component in the collapse sequence.
Diametrically opposed to the drought theory are models that see the collapse as an ideologically determined phenomenon. Some of these theories revolve around the idea that prophecies based on cycles of death and regeneration foretold of the collapse (i. e., the world came to an end at the termination of a specific calendar cycle). An alternative theory views the collapse as a result of a calendrically prescribed shift in the May ‘seat’ (i. e., locations of power that shifted from one center to another based on the 256 year May cycle) from Tikal to another center. This shift appears as a collapse in the area around Tikal, but in reality, it actually reflects the changing fortunes of this center based on the transfer of the ‘seat’ from it to its successor.
A more complex theory posits that the Maya collapse was tied to three dynamic, and interconnected factors (presented in their order of importance): (1) population growth led to environmental damage due to intensive and extensive land-use - this led to over-exploitation of other resources, declining per capita income, and famine (droughts, etc., would exacerbate this); (2) increased competition for land and other resources - this led to a period of powersharing, and an expansion of warfare; and (3) the failure of the elite ritual program - this manifested itself in inappropriate elite response to problems, and the rejection of the institution of kingship, along with the ideology that supported it. It is argued that these factors, in combination, led to the significant political truncation that occurred at most centers early on in the collapse sequence. This ‘collapse’ did not, however, coincide with the immediate abandonment of the various royal court complexes, or the surrounding regions. In fact, although individual ruling houses may have met their demise, many noble families continued to exist (especially those not closely connected to the ruling line, or those who had sufficiently insulated themselves for the downfall), and many even prospered for a time.
World History
