The ethnographic literature for autonomous village societies describes cases of male (and some female) aggrandizers, individuals whose scheming, charisma, and hard work aid them in building and manipulating larger social networks than less prominent individuals. Such individuals are turned to for conflict resolution, and their persuasive power is critical for increasing local production to stage important feasting events. Such ‘big men’ also provide critical leadership in times of intercommunity conflict and have stronger regional exchange ties than less prominent men. Certain of these men are polygynous, possess specific titles and symbols connoting their prestige, and are credited with enhanced ties to the supernatural. These are all features of leadership seen in chief-doms, but ‘big men’ in egalitarian societies are not able to pass their prestige on to their children, and in cases where titles are inherited they are not linked to offices with real political power.
Chiefdoms differ from autonomous villages in terms of their territorial extent and the kind of internal differentiation present within a given community or polity. A chiefdom is thus a regional polity in which multiple villages are administered by the emerging chiefly elite at a paramount settlement. Chiefdoms are characterized by hereditary inequality, which may be expressed socially through rules of ranking or by outright stratification. Labor specialization is more pronounced in chiefdoms, with attached craft specialists and retainers surrounding the elite. Whereas a ‘big man’ earns status through hard work, a chief is released from subsistence labor by virtue of perceived genealogical superiority, supernatural ties, and access to a fund of coercive power.
Economically, a chiefdom should have some degree of resource intensification. Intensive agriculture stands out as the most effective means of promoting a centralized political economy, differential access to productive resources, and the production of stored surpluses to fund specialized labor (or buffer against production variability). Pastoralism and certain wild resources can provide intensive resource bases, but these tend to support only modest (i. e., nonstate) levels of complexity in the absence of agriculture. Redistribution of the polity’s products was once thought to be the basis of the emergence of chiefly economic power, but archaeological and ethno-historic research indicates that chiefdoms tend to promote local economic self-sufficiency, drawing tribute in labor or kind to support the chiefly elite and their retainers and attached specialists.
Emergence of the Chiefdom
Coercion-based approaches to complexity assert that villages and individuals will not permanently cede their autonomy voluntarily; chiefdoms are thus expected to develop in circumstances where residential mobility is constrained (through either environmental or population circumscription) and where intra - and intercommunity conflicts result in proven warriors being vested with temporary powers that ultimately become institutionalized. Warfare has the potential to promote an emergent warrior elite, but not simply by placing power in the hands of skilled fighters. Male and female prisoners taken in intercommunity conflicts often become slaves, creating an emergent underclass, as well as households with a disproportionate number of adult laborers. Prominent men in egalitarian societies are more likely to practice polygyny and take male and female prisoners to add to their households - few authors have pointed this out, but such developments would tend to differentiate domestic units within a community and to favor the emergence of specialized craft production and a regional prestige goods economy. Captives and secondary wives could work to meet subsistence requirements and to produce surpluses for feasts - without the need to be reciprocated - leaving ambitious men and women to invest in acquiring exotic goods or producing laborintensive prestige items from nonlocal materials.
As discussed above, cooperation-oriented approaches to complexity focus not only on exchange networks, but also on leadership roles in the development of intensification projects within a community. Intensification changes the productive landscape, creating a resource hierarchy between permanently farmed patches of centrally/privately held lands and unimproved lands available to all community members for shifting cultivation. Charismatic leaders who organize the creation of such resources may appeal to community interests to mobilize labor, but probably benefit later with disproportionate access to these lands.
Dynamic Cycles in Chiefly Societies
The unspecialized nature of political offices in chiefdoms encourages an inherent instability. Because the chiefly office exists apart from its individual holders and is predicated upon social ranking, fierce competition exists between many eligible would-be chiefs for a limited number of generalized positions of power. A chief must outcompete rivals - including close relatives, as well as unrelated neighboring chiefs - without compartmentalizing sociopolitical control. This often leads to situations where a chief controls a limited set of resources or territory within which an attempt is made to amplify or maximize surplus production. Chiefs mobilize surpluses to underwrite competitive ritual displays, feasts, and acts of generosity, but the overexploitation of labor and natural resources can lead to social or ecological collapse. Individual personalities influence the trajectory of (in)stability; a capable chief will moderate managerial and extractive roles to meet evolving circumstances, while one who fails to achieve the right balance may be assassinated or ousted by rivals or disgruntled subalterns.
Paradoxically, chiefly competition yields conditions where local economic self-sufficiency is encouraged as a means of recognizing goals of regional cohesion and control. In stable chiefdoms, this may be resolved institutionally (and individually) through the sanctification of authority, vertical alliance building between paramount and subordinate chiefs, prestige good exchange, and periodic interpolity warfare.
The importance of individual agency in social stability is illustrated particularly well by periods of instability that occur at times of chiefly succession. In more stable chiefdoms, successors are usually appointed and prepared for office through the creation of political ties and instruction in ritual and esoteric knowledge. In larger chiefdoms, however, several prestigious individuals (local chiefs, close male relatives of the decedent) may take advantage of an interregnum to challenge the chief-designate for the paramountcy, and subordinates may attempt to assert local autonomy. In regions with competing paramount chiefdoms, other paramounts may capitalize on the vulnerability of a rival, attracting former supporters of that chiefdom, extending control over nearby areas, or simply consolidating control over current holdings.
Due to cycles of competition and the evolution of institutional structures, the organization of chiefly societies often fluctuates or cycles between strong, centralized, and weak, decentralized forms. Major upheavals and fluctuations in chiefly authority do not always result in regular system-wide changes in organizational hierarchy; alternately, short-term cycles stimulated by individual competition may influence the long-term trajectory of regional polities. Processes of short-term centralization may be marked by outward expansion of chiefly interests, accomplished as a strong paramount sends competitors into interpolity conflicts or channels them into peripheral leadership positions. If a neighboring group is also strong and centralized, marriage alliances might be sought between elite families; if weak and decentralized, a neighboring group might be targeted for conquest. During periods of centralization, tribute flows should be uninterrupted and prestige and long-distance exchange goods should be managed by the chiefly elite. Military conflict should be directed outward from the system, and core areas should be well integrated.
Periods of disintegration, on the other hand, should be characterized by deterioration of the core area, and if prolonged, territorial predation by neighboring polities. Marriage exchange partnerships will be interrupted, and peripheral areas may either contest central authority or shift allegiance to a neighboring chiefdom. As peripheral tributary and long-distance exchange relationships break down, the chiefly structure will be affected, and rebellions, assassinations, and coups will be more likely. Ideological devices may be co-opted by competitors and rules of social ranking suspended as internal military success decides contests for office - to the long-term detriment of the system. Short-term decentralization is most likely during periods of succession or environmental perturbation (e. g., cyclones, droughts, earthquakes). Over the long run, however, rules of chiefly succession and sanctity, competition with neighboring groups, and ecological factors may contribute to long-term cycles of centralization or decentralization.
Archaeological Correlates of Chiefdoms
Archaeologically, chiefdoms will be most effectively identified based on societal features not present in egalitarian societies, as well as by the absence of institutions seen in states and empires. A multitier regional settlement hierarchy provides evidence of vertical political integration lacking in egalitarian societies. Clear status differences should be identifiable at the site level, including differential investment in domestic architecture and burials. Elites should exhibit better health and access to exotic goods, even in childhood. Monumental religious architecture may be present in chiefly societies, although temples should not exhibit regional standardization.
World History
