Lest one takes the aforementioned points of consensus as indicative of the fact that scholars are in general agreement when it comes to the subject of collapse, it is crucial to point out that there are many more points of contention. These are discussed in detail below.
How Significant Were Collapse Events?
On one level, there is considerable debate as to how significant collapses were. Traditionally, collapses have been viewed as devastating events which lead to rapid socioeconomic, sociopolitical, ideological, and demographic degeneration that played itself out on a regional, or sometimes even a wider, scale. Recently, however, scholars working in many parts of the world have questioned the validity of such apocalyptic scenarios. These researchers make the important point that, even when states ‘collapse’, not all economic, social, or political institutions are affected equally - some of the building blocks for a new state often remain after the ‘fall’. In addition, there is great variability with respect to the degree of demographic decline that coincides with a collapse. For these reasons, some researchers shun the term collapse altogether in favor of less loaded labels, such as transformation, transition, and realignment. The point being, when discussing the developmental cycle of a particular early state, the terminology one uses is crucial. The definition employed herein, which views a collapse as ‘‘the loss - sometimes quite abruptly - of a significant degree of extant sociopolitical complexity’’, seems to apply in most instances. But, it is still incumbent upon the researcher to make a clear distinction between whether a state simply went into decline, or whether it ceased to exist altogether.
What Is Deemed to Have Collapsed?
Another point of contention also emerges from the need to be clear about what has collapsed. Specifically, it has been argued that archaeologists need to be more precise with regard to whether a society, civilization, empire, or state has collapsed. The collapse of a civilization refers exclusively to the decline of a ‘great cultural tradition’. In other words, it implies the collapse of a culture area encompassing a number of empires and/or states. More common is the collapse of an empire, which refers to the demise of a long-lasting sociopolitical federation encompassing a number of previously independent states. Even more frequent is the collapse of a state, which, as one might expect, involves the fragmentation, or balkanization, of a single state. Finally, the most ambiguous concept is that of the collapse of a society. Nevertheless, it remains a useful notion if one considers the fact that the demise of a ‘society’ is different from the ‘collapse’ of a civilization, or the ‘political fragmentation’ of a state. After all, social breakdowns can occur without the political breakdown of a state, and vice versa.
Why Did Some Early States Collapse?
Without a doubt, the area of greatest debate within the realm of collapse studies continues to revolve around the question: Why did some early states collapse? A myriad of data sets, and a plethora of theoretical frameworks, have been marshaled to answer this question. At this juncture, there is little consensus as to what the key causative factors were. However, we are getting closer to developing a general model for collapse that can guide our thinking as we evaluate specific case studies. In general terms, explanations for collapse tend to fall into two broad categories: external and internal reasons. External explanations focus on causative factors that are environmental and/or inter-societal in origin. In contrast, internal explanations emphasize causative factors that originate within the economic, political, or ideological spheres of the society, civilization, empire, or state that is deemed to have collapsed.
External reasons: ecological and environmental factors In discussing external reasons for collapse, one must emphasize causative factors that were, for the most part, beyond the control of the entity that has collapsed (e. g., droughts, or invasions). One ecological disaster that has been postulated to have caused collapse is epidemic diseases, but evidence for this is limited at best. Some of the other environmental, and/or ecological, factors that have been suggested to have played a role in the collapse of early states include natural catastrophes, such as volcanoes, earthquakes, and hurricanes. One problem with these explanations has always been that, although some centers may have been affected by these calamities, there is little evidence to suggest that they would have devastated a wide enough area to stimulate a regional collapse. In addition, it has been pointed out by some that catastrophes happen all the time and states have always found ways to deal with them.
The most convincing environmental explanation for collapse continues to be the mega-drought hypothesis. A number of researchers have employed archaeological and palaeoclimatic data to suggest that increased aridity and long-term droughts caused many of the collapses that have been documented throughout the world during the Holocene. Of significance here is that, although inter-annual and decadal droughts are not necessarily always devastating, multidecadal and multicentury droughts are clearly much more difficult to contend with. Also crucial to this explanation is the fact that the shift into and out of these drier periods may be quite abrupt - occurring over less than a decade.
The drought-induced collapse models vary in their expectations. Some see droughts as bringing an abrupt, and cruel end to a society - people died of famine and thirst because of a climatic change that they had no control over. Others give people more credit, arguing that, faced with uncontrollable drought, societies consciously shifted to less complex forms of sociopolitical and socioeconomic organization, and abandoned large, urban centers in favor of smaller settlements that were easier to support in the new conditions brought on by the sudden climatic shifts. The key for most of the advocates of this model is that societies are neither powerless in the face of these shifts, nor do they exhibit unlimited adaptability in the face of these climatic changes. From this perspective, collapses were actually adaptive responses to stresses that were impossible to overcome because social, technological, and subsistence innovations could not be developed quickly enough to counter the pace and degree of the climatic shifts. In the end, the mega-drought hypothesis clearly has some efficacy, particularly if it is combined as part of a multicausal model. If, however, it is employed as a single-causal explanation for all collapses, it must be considered both deterministic and overly simplistic.
External reasons: inter-societal factors The second external model suggests that conflicts with another complex society can lead to the collapse of one, or both, of the states. An alternative model suggests that dominant states can even be overthrown by a weaker one (e. g., a ‘barbarian invasion’). There are a number of problems with such models. For one, state level conflicts more often than not lead to periods of centralization and decentralization, rather than true collapses. In addition, where one state is able to get the upper hand in a conflict, it is often because the other state has already entered a period of decline (i. e., the subsequent invasion is a ‘result’ of the collapse, rather than its cause). Finally, if a state is invaded when it is still comparatively strong, the tendency is for the invading state to amalgamate the conquered one. Thus, collapse is technically avoided.
Internal reasons: economic factors In terms of internal causative factors, economic problems have long been touted as explanations for the collapse of early states. There are, in fact, many variations on the economic disaster model, but most follow a similar pattern. To begin with, it is suggested that the emergence of settled communities, and the concomitant increase in populations, inevitably led to greater strain on natural resources, and the environment in general. Key here is that an agricultural economy, which has almost always been a prerequisite for the emergence of large communities - and eventually states - requires clearing of large sections of the landscape, and the creation of artificial ecosystems. These artificial habitats almost always work against the checks and balances of the natural ecosystem; there are fewer plant types, less ground cover, greater levels of soil erosion, and ongoing depletion of nutrients. Agricultural economies invariably strip the land of resources, and unless fertilizers are used, or fallow systems employed effectively, landscapes are quickly stripped of their ability to support plant growth. Irrigation is even more damaging because this mode of agriculture creates an even more artificial environment.
Central to this model is the fact that, when resources are abundant, and the state is in expansion mode, it is not only the number of producing households that grows, but also the elite segment of society. This is crucial because unchecked elite growth will quickly tax the system as progressively greater percentages of the production surplus will be appropriated to support elite initiatives, and the overall state apparatus. As a result, greater levels of agricultural intensification will be required, which will initially lead to higher yields. But, from a negative perspective, it will also further population growth, and eventually require the expansion into new, but less productive lands. If this process continues, elite demands on the agricultural economy will inevitably increase the degree of environmental damage, outstrip the productive capabilities of the agrarian economy, and hasten collapse.
With respect to the explanatory potential of this model, it is noteworthy that environmental degradation has been demonstrated to have occurred as part of a number of collapse sequences. Nevertheless, it is often difficult to determine whether it is a ‘cause’ or an ‘effect’. In fact, although some argue that unchecked population growth is the primary cause for the collapse of early agrarian states, it is likely more accurate to say that population growth leads to political instability because the agricultural economy can no longer support the state apparatus at its present level of complexity. This is because state revenues often start declining even though its expenditures are still increasing.
Internal reasons: sociopolitical factors The various sociopolitical models for collapse are firmly grounded in the notion that states are inherently unstable because they are rife with conflicting relationships. One area of perpetual conflict exists within the ranks of the nobility. Among these societal elites the rulers often come into conflict with the rest of the nobility, and the rest of the nobility are invariably at odds with each other, because the various members of the upper class strive for greater wealth and prestige through conflicting claims to the state’s surplus agricultural yields, labor, raw materials, and manufactured goods. The palace intrigue that customarily ensues has been well documented by almost every book ever written about historic states.
Another point of perpetual conflict emerges between the rulers and their support population. This is because the rulers attempt to centralize political power within the institutions they have direct control over, whereas the rest of the population strives to maintain political power within their more traditional, localized political institutions. Thus, the ruler and his/her centralized bureaucracy are often in conflicting relationships with the more established nobles, farmers, and craft specialists who inhabit the rural zones of the state. To continue to grow, or for that matter exist, the center must extract surplus produce and labor from their support population, and they need to justify the extraction of these resources because these are goods and services that could be put to good use by the various social units inhabiting the rural areas falling within the state’s territorial ambit.
To justify the appropriation, the state provides defense, dispute-solving mechanisms, access to trade networks, greater wealth through the expansion of territorial claims, and special connections to the gods. The elite claims to surplus are also aided by a propaganda machine that strives to promote collective state identity. As long as the support population considers the return for the resources that are extracted from them to be acceptable, the state will remain relatively stable. Nevertheless, the more traditional organizational structures of the support population are never fully controlled by the state, and thus there is always a level of conflict and contradiction between the two. This is another reason why the state is almost always in a state of flux: when the wants and needs of the more stable institutions of the support population are no longer being met, either because they are being ignored by the state, the state has entered a mode wherein it is attempting to maximize its extraction strategies at the expense of other sectors of society, or because the state can no longer provide the services expected of it, the various leaders within the support population may be less forthcoming with respect to providing goods and services. When the state can no longer extract the resources it needs to sustain its various institutions, collapse will occur. In the end, the institutions of the support population will outlast the less well-established institutions of the state because the former are based on more stable, and traditional, kinship-based economic and social relationships.
In summary, the political models for collapse seem to have a high degree of explanatory potential. However, it is once again advisable to consider political breakdown as one component of a multicausal explanation, because it is clear that economic and ideological factors are also at play in this model.
Internal reasons: ideological factors Collapse models based on ideological factors are not only the most variable, but also the least data driven. Some of the more popular models suggest that early states collapsed because: (1) the ‘creative spirit’ of the state starts to break down, and the majority of the population begin to feel disconnected with the elite minority, which leads to disunity; (2) the shared ideological beliefs that once held a populace together begin to dissipate; or (3) states are governed by prophecies and/or cyclical, preordained periods of growth and decline.
One of the more eloquent models for ideological collapse suggests that societies, and civilizations, are more stable when they are built upon internal conflicts and contradictions that can never be satisfactorily overcome. States with such internal rifts tend to last longer, on the order of milleniums, because the constant conflict, negotiation, and temporary compromises breathe continual life into the various relationships that recreate the society on a daily basis. In contrast, societies, and/or civilizations, that are grounded in a harmonious ideology are ‘too perfect’, and hence too static, and thus vulnerable to any internal or external change. Such organizations, whether they are societies, civilizations, or states, tend to have shorter life-spans - on the order of centuries - because they are predisposed to collapse.
The problem with all of these theories is that they are very difficult to prove. That is not to say that ideological factors did not figure prominently in the various examples of collapse. Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that a once successful civilization simply ‘thought’ itself into ruins. There must have been some tangible, economic, social, and/or political factors involved as well.
Collapse as a Complex Phenomenon
Most contemporary scholars agree that it is unlikely that any collapse was a single causal event. At the same time, it is equally problematic to fall back on the idea that collapses occurred because a lot of things went bad all at once; we must seek a middle ground between these two approaches if we are going to learn from the past. Equally important is the fact that how a society responds to crisis will reflect its unique economic, social, political, ideological, and cultural institutions. Individual collapse sequences are historically contingent - as will be demonstrated in the following discussion. Nevertheless, from a scholarly perspective, it is still useful to try to develop more inclusive models that can ‘guide’ our thinking about collapse in all instances, regardless of the unique details that one must contend with when dealing with individual collapse sequences. This topic will be addressed in the final section of this treatise.
World History
