It is precisely because no school of thought, no ideological force, decisively carried the field in nineteenth-century Mexico that unanimity and consensus were not possible.
Timothy Anna, 1993117
The elite lacked consensus on the direction the country should move in. During the early postindependence period, it formed factions that became known as federalists and centralists. Mexicans who had favored continued colonial rule generally advocated a monarchy after independence. When they failed to establish a monarchy, they became centralists. Those who had favored independence from Spain sought a republic after the end of Spanish rule. After the establishment of the republic, they advocated federalism.118
The centralists advocated a strong central government with Mexico City in control, as in colonial times. They felt the army and the Church should play major political roles. The centralists were generally supported by the military, which could count on receiving a large part of the revenues raised by centralist governments. Centralists also advocated developing industry, rather than purchasing manufactured goods aboard. As Lucas Alaman noted, “Manufacturing stimulates agriculture just as mining does, but in a more stable manner.”119
The federalists wanted to loosen the old system so they might advance more rapidly. State governments tended to be federalist, since they wanted power to be exercised at the state level, rather than at the national level. They wanted colonial institutions reformed and special privileges for the Church and the army abolished. Federalists turned their back on their Spanish heritage, claiming it should be put behind them. When in power, federalists often acted like centralists in an attempt to spread their notions nationwide. As with most of the interest groups of the time, federalism was based on broad, heterogeneous, shifting alliances. Often federalists were united only by a common enemy.120
By the middle of the century, the federalists and centralists had evolved into groups known, respectively, as liberals and conservatives. The term “liberal,” as used in nineteenth-century Mexico, meant limited government, a capitalist economy, and a low level of government regulation, especially of foreign trade.121
The free individual, unrestrained by government or corporate bodies and equal to his fellows under the law, was the liberal ideal. They felt a constitution should limit government authority and advocated the strengthening of state-controlled militias to break the regular army’s control over politics. With such limits, liberals felt, the individual would thrive after being freed from the constraints imposed by traditional corporate entities—the Church, the army, guilds, and Indian communities. Since the Church was the strongest of these entities, liberals targeted its wealth, judicial privileges, and control over education and the events of life itself—birth, marriage, and death. Similarly they felt that restrictions affecting the sale of property should be removed, including those imposed by the traditional Indian community.
In this atmosphere, they assumed free individuals could apply their initiative, using land placed on the market, to increase wealth. Liberals based their hopes on international trade, feeling that the country would best be served by an international division of labor. Under such a scheme, Mexico would export raw materials and agricultural products and import manufactured goods. Rather than redistributing wealth to the poor, as twentieth-century liberals often advocated, their nineteenth-century predecessors strove to create as many independent economic actors as possible, each competing on equal terms, in an attempt to maximize market efficiency. They felt this would lead to the liberal ideal—a nation of yeoman farmers and master craftsmen unhindered by restrictive laws.122
Liberalism was not a defined political party, but rather a broad shifting coalition of rural strongmen, state governments, old insurgents, new radicals, ideologues, and their mass bases. They shared a common desire to tame the three icons of the Plan of Iguala—the Church, the Spanish community, and the military.123
The conservatives continued the centralist tradition and were backed by hacendados, militarists, monarchists, and the Catholic hierarchy. They felt their social position reflected their better bloodlines and their natural superiority over those with non-European ancestors—the majority of the nation. They looked to Europe as a model for development, rather than to the United States.124
Conservatives advocated a strong military and the maintenance of Church privileges. They also felt that the government should play a major role in determining the course of economic development. Power, conservatives felt, should be in the hands of the prosperous class, the group they perceived as most able to manage the affairs of state. To keep power there, they advocated restricting access to the ballot box through such means as property requirements for voting.125
Remnants of the dominant class in colonial times formed the most important conservative group. Its members had major investments in central Mexican commerce and agriculture. They felt centralism would increase their political power, enabling them to protect their interests and manipulate markets. Former royalist officers allied with them to take advantage of their newly acquired political power.126
Liberalism was the more diverse of the two ideological currents, mixing a variety of beliefs, each with its own regional, class, and ethnic dimension. The category liberal became so broad that it came to embrace groups that were often in conflict.127
Although liberals and conservatives considered themselves as being at opposite ends of the political spectrum, they agreed on more than they disagreed. Leaders of both groups came from the urban middle and upper classes, roughly the top 20 percent of the income strata. Neither group sought to build a base among the rural majority. Although they were less elite-oriented than the conservatives, liberals still held the common citizen in low regard. For example, liberal Lorenzo de Zavala commented, “The proletarian class of citizen lacks even the capacity necessary to distinguish between the candidates it ought to nominate.” The elite saw the excesses of the French Revolution, as well as the looting of the Parian market, as examples of the political chaos that resulted from too much empowerment of the masses.128
The elite also agreed that the hacienda should remain intact. Most hacendados were conservatives, so conservatives not surprisingly supported the institution. Liberals were reluctant to force the subdivision of the hacienda, feeling market forces would best harmonize the interests of the individual and society. They failed to realize the contradiction in their own beliefs. They accepted the Jeffersonian dream of agrarian democracy. However, since they failed to force the partition of haciendas, little land was available for small farmers.129
Liberals and conservatives failed to agree on what nation to emulate. Conservatives looked to Spain and its Catholic heritage. In contrast, nineteenth-century liberals viewed the United States much as twentieth century Marxists viewed the Soviet Union, considering it as the land of progress and of the future.130
These ideological groupings, federalist, centralist, liberal, and conservative, were only the most prominent of the period. Other groups abounded, known as anarchists, aristocrats, and innovators, as well as groups named for their leaders, such as Santa Anna. None of these groups formed formal political parties and all were quite fluid. Individuals often moved from one political camp to another. Since they shared so many beliefs, individuals could change sides without losing credibility. Many formed alliances based, not upon ideology, but on personal networks of power (caciquismo), village or locality, corporate or peer group, or profession. This explains in part why some leaders, such as Santa Anna, could draw such a politically disparate following.131
World History
