Conclusion

Many persons and groups originally supported the Iranian revolution thinking it would mean freedom from the autocratic shah and from foreign control.

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Except for those who supported theocracy, Iranians were rather quickly disillusioned as clerical rule was established, oppositional parties and media were suppressed, strict Islamic law and censorship were enforced, universities were closed for three years as part of a so called Cultural Revolution and strict limits were put on pre existing women’s rights. In fields like education, health, rural development and some features of women’s lives, post revolutionary Iran has made some impressive advances more than most outsiders realise. A loosening of cultural restrictions and censorship from their early extremes took place after 1989, beginning under President Rafsanjan’i and particularly in the first few years of the reformist presidency of Khatam’i. Conservative forces, however, remained stronger than the president. They controlled the judiciary, the Guardian Council, much of the economy and top government bureaucracy; the military remains under the orders of the faqih, who is commander in chief. When conservatives saw reformist cultural and political trends as endangering their power, they began to crack down, especially on newspapers and media in 2000, although some advances in cultural and behavioural freedom continued as long as they did not pose a direct political threat. Many reformers turned against President Khatam’i, whose term ended in 2005. He was seen as either unwilling or unable to fight basically to implement the reforms demanded by the huge opposition and by the refor mist parliament elected in 2000 reforms that were vetoed by the Guardian Council. The Guardian Council disqualified so many reformist parliamentary candidates in 2004 that many boycotted the elections and conservatives won. The electoral victory of President Ahmadinejad in 2005 and his subsequent rule reinforced the conservative trend.

Current trends are towards cultural and behavioural severity and sporadic crackdowns, although much behaviour that would have been strictly pun ished in the 1980s continues, while problems of the economy and unemploy ment add to a continuing brain drain and widespread disillusionment. Young people, who were in the forefront of demonstrations, now mostly think demonstrations achieve only jail and injury. As a result, most prefer to push for their personal space in inter sex relations, finding and consuming foreign cultural items and also forbidden items like drugs and alcohol. On the other hand, many young people take extra classes in the arts, sports, electronics and other fields and become high achievers in school, but double digit unemploy ment after they graduate adds to the pessimism caused by the political and cultural situation. Current disillusionment and feelings of political impotence are not universal or permanent, but for the moment they remain the domi nant trend. The popular classes often support cultural conservatism but are

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Increasingly concerned with inflation, food shortages, corruption and the growing gap between the rich and the poor.

The government gets wide support on nuclear independence not only for energy needs, but national pride, as well as for what is seen as its international defence of Iran’s interests. Aggressive US statements regarding Iran mainly strengthen the government’s support, while detente could give freer rein to the opposition. Many on both sides in the Iran US struggle have distorted views of the other and of their own government’s role, and any resolution of disputes might require both to open themselves to a more complete picture of the other.

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