A Partnership of Brothers
In April 1805, an event occurred that would have far-reaching consequences for Tecumseh and his resistance efforts. His erstwhile ne’er-do-well brother, Lalawethika—something of a joke among his fellow Shawnees with his corpulence, alcoholism, eye blinded by an accident with an arrow, and lack of distinction as a warrior—had a vision. In Lalawethika’s trance, he received a view of what must be done to create a better world. It was one of many revitalization visions that American Indians—not all of them previously accepted as shamans, or holy men—experienced in the nineteenth century, including the Paiute Wovoka’s vision that led ultimately to the Ghost Dance among the Lakotas, the death of Sitting Bull, and the massacre at Wounded Knee. Certainly there was nothing in Lalawethika’s earlier life to stamp him as an individual likely to receive any sacred messages.
Nonetheless, Lalawethika had a vision to share, and it resonated mightily with a people wondering which direction they could take to stem the tide of Euro-American expansion. According to Lalawethika, he had been transported to a spirit world at the command of the Master of Life. There, on a mountaintop, he had gazed at a paradise teeming with game and fertile lands where the souls of good Shawnees would dwell forever. Sinful Shawnees would instead burn in a giant wigwam, an image not much different from the Christian concept of hell. But how to merit this paradise? The answer, according to the vision, was to adhere to the traditional ways in behavior, clothing, and food. Shawnees must renounce the productions of the Euro-Americans, principally residents of the new American nation, who—unlike the Shawnees, British, and French—were born not of the Master of Life but of the Evil Spirit; such dualism was again evocative of Christian concepts, particularly the moral dualism associated with God and Satan. As in the early Puritan settlements, Lalawethika’s new social and religious vision posited the existence of witches doing the Evil Spirit’s work. Ultimately, this teaching would lead to identification of supposed witches among some Indian tribes that adopted Lalawethika’s teachings and four executions carried out by the Delawares.
According to Lalawethika, the Master of Life called upon the Shawnees and other native peoples to avoid alcohol and sexual promiscuity, eschew personal ownership of the land, acquire wealth only to share it with others, abandon their medicine bundles as now unnecessary (a radical concept that must have been extremely difficult), and participate in new songs and dances mandated in the vision. They also were to venerate and keep close at hand a sacred string of beans supposedly made from this new prophet’s flesh—an object that evokes still more Christian images, especially the Catholic concepts of the rosary and the Eucharist.
Adherence to this vision, according to Lalawethika, would lead to the EuroAmerican conquerors eventually being covered over by the earth. Like other native revitalization visions, there was something of a time machine element to the future. Essentially, the world would be turned back to what it had been before the coming of the Euro-Americans, although Lalawethika did not seem to recognize, as he explained his distinctions regarding people’s origins, that ultimately the American soldiers and colonists had come from the same place as the British.
In addition, Lalawethika informed his adherents that he had been given a new name—Tenskwatawa, which means “Open Door.” He now was the doorway into the future, which would simultaneously be a journey into the past.6
Tecumseh apparently believed at least some of his brother’s vision. Of course, as perhaps the finest political strategist of all American Indians, he must have also understood the political ramifications of the vision—how it could help him to unite tribes in a pan-Indian alliance necessary to preserve Shawnee land. Accordingly, Tecumseh accompanied Tenskwatawa to Greenville, the site of the infamous Greenville Treaty agreement, where the man now often referred to as the Prophet established a new village.
William Henry Harrison, the governor of Indiana Territory, which had been separated from the Northwest Territory in 1800, claimed that Tenskwatawa was a liar and a charlatan. Harrison, like many other U. S. figures, shared a general suspicion and fear of revitalization movements that might inspire continued resistance among the native peoples. Addressing the Delawares, Harrison denounced Tenskwatawa and suggested that they test the Prophet by asking him to make the sun stand still, the moon to change its course, or the dead to return. In fact, astronomers had ascertained that a solar eclipse would occur on June 16, 1806—a projection that Tenskwatawa apparently had learned about when the scientists visited Ohio. He rose to Harrison’s challenge and said that he would make the sun darken (that is, stand still). When the sun did go dark, Tenskwatawa appeared to possess the ability not only to predict the future but also to work miracles. Thus, while hoping to undermine the Prophet’s standing and influence, Harrison unwittingly contributed to solidifying his reputation.
Tecumseh now had an important partner—his brother the Prophet—in what would become the final attempt to preserve Shawnee land and the Shawnee way of life. Many other Shawnees, however, chose accommodation with the U. S. government and rejected the path advocated by Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa, fearing that the new movement would engulf them in renewed conflict. Among the leaders of the opposition to the brothers was Black Hoof (Catahecassa), who moved to a new village, Wapakoneta, on the Auglaize River, to cooperate in an experimental agricultural community supported by the Quakers. During the early years of the nineteenth century, many of the area tribes signed treaties yielding large chunks of their land to the U. S. government. The chiefs signing those treaties, however, did not represent the will of all of their people. Young warriors especially gravitated to Greenville to adopt the Prophet’s vision and accept Tecumseh’s political leadership.
In 1807, Governor Edward Tiffin of Ohio, which had become a separate territory in 1799, demanded a conference with local Indians in response to the killing of several farmers. The gathering occurred in June at Springfield on the Mad River in west-central Ohio. Tecumseh attended the parley, seeking to convince authorities that he was committed to peace, as part of an effort to ensure that he would not be pulled into large-scale war before he was ready. Knowing that his own men had not killed the farmers, he blamed Black Hoof—an accusation that almost brought the two Shawnee factions into combat right then. The situation was defused, and it turned out that, in fact, Potawatomis were responsible for the deaths.
The Springfield conference elicited no agreements from Tecumseh, and increased tensions between Britain and the United States made Indian loyalty a major political and military issue. Thomas Kirker, who had become acting governor of Ohio Territory in March 1807 when Tiffin resigned to become a United States senator, was especially concerned about the growing impact of Tenskwatawa’s vision and called for another conference, this one at Greenville. Tecumseh did not participate, but he did escort the U. S. officials
Back to Chillicothe in September. There, he gave a three-hour address that included an extensive history lesson on past treaties and an analysis of the current situation. He acknowledged present realities, affirmed that he would not try to force settlers from their homes on former Shawnee land, but vowed to permit no more loss of land north of the Ohio River. The speech reportedly was extremely effective, and Governor Kirker concluded that Tecumseh’s intentions were essentially peaceful. According to R. David Edmunds, the speech marked a shift within the Shawnee community at Greenville away from the expectation of a religious revitalization solution to a political approach to halt encroachments on their land.
Building an Indian Confederacy
Tecumseh now turned his attention toward forming an alliance of Indian peoples that would be strong enough to resist the United States. This endeavor was especially difficult because it challenged traditional tribal independence and, even within tribal groups, the practice of leading by consensus rather than by dictates handed down by individual chiefs. Main Poc, a prominent Potawat-omi war chief, for example, was highly skeptical of Tecumseh’s plan. Main Poc was also viewed as a shaman because he was born with no fingers on his left hand (a disability interpreted as a sign of the Great Spirit’s favor). He invited the brothers to Potawatomi land in eastern Indiana where the Tippecanoe River meets the Wabash. With the Greenville location surrounded by Euro-American and Indian adversaries and largely depleted of game, Tecumseh agreed. In April 1808, Tecumseh, the Prophet, and their followers left Ohio behind and moved westward to establish a new village known as Prophetstown on the Wabash approximately 2.5 miles from the mouth of the Tippecanoe.
As Prophetstown was being constructed, Tecumseh traveled to Fort Malden near Amherstburg in Canada across the border from southeastern Michigan. He met with Canada’s Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs William Claus on June 13. Each party had its own agenda. The British anticipated a possible war with the United States and needed Indian allies to provide a military buffer between the United States and Canada as well as combatants in case of an attempted invasion from the south. Tecumseh’s interests lay not with defending Canada, but rather with protecting Indian land from further confiscation.
Claus agreed to supply Prophetstown with food and ammunition, but neither he nor Tecumseh wanted any precipitous fighting to break out. Canada did not want Indian-U. S. conflicts to thrust it into a war; Tecumseh assured the British that his intentions were strictly defensive. With each side having felt out the other’s intentions, Tecumseh returned to his new Indiana home in July.
No sooner had he returned to Prophetstown than he set about recruiting various Indian groups to join his planned confederacy. He met with the Senecas and Wyandots in Ohio but encountered strong resistance to his plans by prominent chiefs, including Tarhe of the Wyandonts. It was a difficult time for the Shawnee leader: Not only was he struggling to extend his confederacy,
But his people suffered through a difficult, hungry winter in 1808-1809 and a serious outbreak of illness. Many who had come to Prophetstown—among them Chippewas and Ottawas—returned to their previous homes in the spring.
Tecumseh headed west in April 1809 to recruit confederacy members among the Sauks, Foxes, and Winnebagos in Illinois. Meanwhile, Tenskwa-tawa traveled to Fort Wayne to meet with John Johnson, the new Indian agent there, and to Vincennes to confer with Governor Harrison. These attempts to allay the fears of U. S. officials concerning an Indian uprising apparently had little effect, and Harrison moved forward on agreements with the Miamis, Delawares, and Potawatomis in an attempt to isolate the recalcitrant Shawnees. Harrison tried to keep his efforts hidden from Tecumseh, although at some point prior to the signing of the Treaty of Fort Wayne on September 30, 1809, he learned what was under way.
The agreement was signed by chiefs who were carefully selected for their loyalty to the United States and, at least in some cases, whose cooperation was induced with bribes. Its unpopularity drove many of these chiefs’ followers to Tecumseh, who could readily offer an “I told you so” message to those who felt betrayed by their overly compliant leaders. Edmunds sees the treaty as another major turning point in the shift from Tenskwatawa’s visions to Tecumseh’s leadership—from revitalization visions to political and military strategizing.
The spring of 1810 brought to Prophetstown growing numbers of recruits, including Kickapoos, Miamis, Delawares, Sauks, Foxes, and Potawatomis. Even the hold that Tarhe and other pro-U. S. chiefs held over the Wyandots began to slip, and many of their warriors joined the growing force under Tecumseh.
Tecumseh and William Henry Harrison
Governor Harrison sent emissaries to meet with Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa in the summer of 1810. One of the messengers, Joseph Barron, urged Shawnee representatives to visit Washington, D. C., to meet with President James Madison. The Prophet threatened Barron with death, but Tecumseh took charge of Barron’s safety, even having Barron sleep in his own lodge to ensure that no harm came to him. Tecumseh finally agreed to meet with Harrison at Vincennes, the capital of Indiana Territory from 1800 until 1813.
Tecumseh arrived at Vincennes on August 12 and met with the governor for several days. It was Harrison’s first meeting with Tecumseh, and he was greatly impressed with his guest’s intelligence and leadership qualities. At one point, Tecumseh’s Shawnees and Harrison’s soldiers almost came to blows, a confrontation that likely would have left both leaders dead. Despite the nearly disastrous incident, Harrison reported to Secretary of War William Eustis that Tecumseh was the principal leader of the Indians resisting the United States, the “Moses” of his people.
The meeting seemed to allay Harrison’s fears of an imminent military confrontation with Tecumseh. While the Shawnees were experiencing a relatively
Calm autumn, Tecumseh again visited Canada and conferred with a long-time supporter, Indian agent Matthew Elliott, whose marriage to a Shawnee may have contributed to his loyalty. Tecumseh wanted a continued flow of supplies and ammunition, and Elliott tried hard to comply with his requests, even though his efforts to meet Shawnee needs sometimes exceeded official British policy. During the harsh winter of 1810-1811, Elliott helped to make sure that pack trains made regular trips south to Prophetstown.
Then, in the spring of 1811, the lull was shattered through no fault of Tecumseh, who tried diligently to keep his followers from starting a war. Main Poc’s Potawatomis attacked Illinois settlements. Harrison apparently knew that Tecumseh and the Prophet were not involved, but he nonetheless sent intermediaries to Prophetstown. An incident in June contributed to Harrison’s suspicions when, with Tecumseh in Michigan, Tenskwatawa directed the seizure of a cargo of salt intended for distribution to several tribes.
Harrison somewhat irrationally accused Tecumseh of plotting his murder, an accusation for which no evidence apparently existed and which was not Tecumseh’s intention. Despite this inflammatory claim, he also invited the two brothers to visit President Madison in Washington, D. C., and to come to Vincennes to meet with him. Tecumseh had recruited many of the tribes from the former Northwest Territory to his confederacy but was still unready for military action. He was unwilling to journey to Washington at the time, but was willing to meet with Harrison in Vincennes so long as he did not convey a sense of weakness by appearing to be acquiescing to a summons.
Tecumseh’s compromise was to go to Vincennes, but with a large supporting cast of warriors befitting his position. Harrison feared conflict and had some 800 soldiers awaiting Tecumseh, although the Shawnee’s large contingent was a public relations maneuver rather than a prelude to combat. Tecumseh arrived on July 27,1811, and the meetings lasted for almost a week. Tecumseh, always politically astute, did not rule out going to Washington in the future, thereby buying more time to enlarge his confederacy.
Tecumseh may, indeed, have been willing to visit Washington if events had worked out as he wished. He certainly tried consistently to keep his options open, but was, if anything, perhaps too truthful. He admitted to Harrison that after their meetings concluded, he was going farther south to recruit more members for his confederacy. Perhaps he hoped that Harrison would understand the difference between a political alliance that if necessary could be used militarily and a strictly military alliance. What Tecumseh was attempting to fashion, after all, was not radically different from the sorts of unions that the colonies had entered into, and that now constituted the states of the United States of America.
Shaking the Earth
Whatever Tecumseh’s motivation, informing Harrison of his plans proved to be a mistake. Tecumseh journeyed to Alabama, Mississippi, and Georgia to meet with Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Creeks but enjoyed substantive success
Only with the last group. Especially important was his arrival on September 19, 1811, at the Creek town of Tuckabatchee, located where the Coosa and Tallapoosa Rivers form the Alabama River in present-day Elmore County, Alabama.
Also present at Tuckabatchee was Indian agent Benjamin Hawkins, who was trying to gauge the level of support for Tecumseh. Tecumseh tried to wait Hawkins out so he could recruit without the agent listening. Hawkins inadvertently contributed to Tecumseh’s success when he announced that a federal road would be constructed across Creek land. Even with monetary inducements from tolls and gifts, the Creeks only reluctantly agreed to a deal that they felt was being forced on them. Hawkins finally left on September 28; the Creeks, angry at being pushed into an agreement they did not want, then listened sympathetically to Tecumseh’s call for a confederation of Indian peoples.
Tecumseh spoke eloquently, skillfully drawing upon history as it affected his listeners and recapitulating their current situation. Others in his party, especially Seekaboo, pushed Tenskwatawa’s revitalization vision. Ultimately, those who accepted the vision came to be known as “Red Sticks” because of the red war clubs they used in forming war parties. Supposedly merely shaking the red sticks at an enemy would sink him into boggy ground and make him helpless.
The most dramatic element in this multipronged recruiting pitch was Tecumseh’s use of signs. A comet that coincided with Tecumseh’s visit to the Creeks recalled vividly his birth and name. In addition, Tecumseh may have predicted an earthquake. He reportedly promised that when he was ready to strike at the oppressors, he would stamp his foot and the whole earth would shake. Whether he actually made this prophecy is uncertain; the story may have been added after the fact. In either case, earthquakes did occur early in the morning of December 16,1811, not long after Tecumseh had left the South for his return to Indiana.
Known as the New Madrid earthquakes because the epicenter was near New Madrid, Missouri, the tremors were the most severe recorded in the United States as of that time. The shocks came in waves, beginning early in the morning of December 16 and recurring throughout January and February, totaling close to 1,900 aftershocks by March 15. For a people steeped in a culture that readily accepted natural phenomena as reflective of a spiritual reality, many people, especially among the Creeks, saw in the earthquakes a convincing expression of Tecumseh’s power.7
Attack on Prophetstown
Harrison, fully recognizing Tecumseh’s political skill and wanting to destroy the confederacy before its leader returned, had taken advantage of Tecumseh’s absence to move on Prophetstown. In a letter to Secretary of War William Eustis on September 8, 1811, Harrison wrote:
The implicit obedience and respect which the followers of Tecumseh pay to him is really astonishing and more than any other circumstance bespeaks him one of
Those uncommon geniuses, which spring up occasionally to produce revolutions and overturn the established order of things. If it were not for the vicinity of the United States, he would perhaps be the founder of an Empire that would rival in glory that of Mexico or Peru. No difficulties deter him. His activity and industry supply the want of letters.8
Certainly part of Harrison’s admiration for his adversary, as Robert M. Owens has pointed out, came from Tecumseh’s actions being far more politically comprehensible to him than the vision-based behavior of the Prophet.9
After a positive response from Eustis regarding Harrison’s plans, he assembled a force of approximately 1,000 men, including both regular troops and militia from Indiana and Kentucky. The soldiers started north on September 26. On the way, Harrison constructed Fort Harrison at the current site of Terre Haute, Indiana, and dispatched a perfunctory offer to Tenskwatawa to disband his group of warriors as a way to avoid conflict. He continued forward at the end of October, built Fort Boyd as a supply post, and came within 12 miles of Prophetstown by November 5.
Tenskwatawa had been ordered by his brother to avoid any military confrontations with the U. S. government but seemed unsure how to respond to the advancing army. On November 6, he offered to meet with Harrison, who halted long enough to comply but took precautions against a surprise attack, which Tenskwatawa was, in fact, planning. The Prophet assured the Prophets-town warriors that they would be invincible to bullets and apparently intended to have Shawnees sneak into the enemy camp and kill Harrison. However, early in the morning of November 7, sentries spotted the infiltrators and raised an alarm. Nonetheless, two of the Prophet’s men got close to Harrison—but then mistook his aide, Colonel Abraham Owen, for the governor, killing the aide instead.
Heavy fighting caused heavy casualties on both sides. After roughly two hours, the Indians withdrew, giving Harrison the field and the right to declare victory in the Battle of Tippecanoe. The victory, in turn, offered Harrison a memorable slogan for his successful presidential campaign in 1840, when he and his running mate, John Tyler, ran as “Tippecanoe and Tyler, Too.”
The battle marked the downfall of Tenskwatawa. Survivors angrily denounced him for his false promises, and many warriors abandoned the confederacy that Tecumseh had worked so hard to assemble. Knowing that Harrison would soon arrive at Prophetstown, the residents abandoned the village, leaving the advancing army to burn down the homes and destroy the food that had been left behind. Had Tenskwatawa not been Tecumseh’s brother, he probably would have been killed by his former followers.
What awaited Tecumseh on his return to the area in January 1812 was not just a destroyed village, but a shattered confederacy. He bitterly upbraided his brother and threatened to kill him if he again jeopardized his efforts. The defeat also emboldened Tecumseh’s Indian opponents, some of whom plotted to kill him but were unable to execute their plans.
THE WAR OF 1812 Moving Toward War
Tecumseh again set about putting his considerable leadership skills to work. He sought to keep Harrison at bay by promising to visit Washington after the corn was planted. He also sent a delegation to Vincennes to tell Harrison that the group had broken with Tecumseh, even drawing a different interpretation from the earthquakes, which the emissaries said signified that the Indians should make peace with the United States. Harrison was deceived, reporting to the Secretary of War that the Indians now desired peace—and perhaps wanting too much to believe that his military victory had achieved far more than it really had.
With Tecumseh’s own personal reputation still intact and shored up by the ongoing earthquakes (despite what he had counseled his followers to tell Harrison), he began to draw more supporters to his side. The British, for their part, realized that war was now imminent and continued to woo the Shawnees. In addition, Tecumseh, who had established a temporary residence approximately 15 miles from Prophetstown, returned to the site of the former village and continued trying to delude Harrison about his intentions.
Tecumseh attended a conference with U. S. officials in May 1812 on the Mississinewa River in Indiana. Isadore Chaine of the Wyandots visited Tecumseh, ostensibly to tell him that he should no longer fight the United States, but actually to convey from the British a black wampum belt representing war. Tecumseh spoke at the gathering, denouncing the attack on Harrison at Tippecanoe as well as recent raids by Main Poc’s Potawatomis. He further asserted that if he had been home, there would have been no battle with Harrison. All of this was undoubtedly true, but for reasons other than what Tecumseh probably hoped Harrison would infer. Tecumseh certainly preferred to achieve his goals politically, but he also knew that war was likely. He simply wanted to enter it, if necessary, on his terms.
Tecumseh left for a return trip to Amherstburg in Canada during June, arriving there at the beginning of July. Meanwhile, the United States continued moving inexorably toward war with Great Britain. U. S. war strategy had been formulated in the spring of 1812 to include a three-pronged attack on Canadian forces focused on Detroit, Niagara, and Lake Champlain. The army of the West was placed under William Hull, the governor of Michigan Territory and since April 1812 also a brigadier general. President Madison sent Congress a message supporting war on June 1. The House of Representatives voted in favor of war on June 4, and the Senate followed suit on June 17. The House agreed the next day to amendments added by the Senate, and Madison formally signed the declaration.
Battle of Brownstown
As Tecumseh made his way to Canada, Hull led reinforcements to Detroit, arriving on July 6. Six days later, Hull crossed the Detroit River and captured Sandwich (site of the present-day city of Windsor, Ontario), located north of Fort Malden. Tecumseh attempted to hold together his alliance, but many Wyandots vacillated, first joining Tecumseh and the British, and then switching back to the United States after Hull’s victory at Sandwich. After the British in turn captured Fort Michilimackinac, many switched sides yet again, returning to support the British.
With Hull in need of supplies, a pack train under Captain Henry Brush started from Ohio to Michigan, and Hull sent Major Thomas Van Horne with 150 soldiers to meet it. Tecumseh, who was at Brownstown, Michigan, south of Detroit at the time, learned of Hull’s orders when a dispatch rider was captured. Tecumseh expected to be reinforced by approximately 100 British soldiers under the command of Brevet Major Adam Muir. However, on August 5, despite Muir’s failure to arrive, Tecumseh led an attack that sent Van Horne’s troops fleeing in panic and inflicted major casualties on the Americans, including 19 killed, in what has been called the Battle of Brownstown.
Hull took most of his force back across the Detroit River to Detroit. He then dispatched, under Lieutenant Colonel James Miller, another relief force to Brush, whose supply train remained at the River Raisin in southern Michigan. Colonel Henry Proctor (who would be promoted to brigadier general the following year after a major victory at the same river) sent more British troops and Indians to Muir at Brownstown. On August 9, Muir led his troops, with Tecumseh in charge of the Indian allies, to a Wyandot village called Monguagon, located five miles north of Brownstown. Some of Muir’s men mistakenly fired on Potawatomis, thinking they were Miller’s men. In addition, a British bugler sounded the call to advance, but it was misinterpreted as ordering a retreat.
Tecumseh, however, remained at his post with his Shawnees in a cornfield, and ordered a withdrawal only after realizing that the British had withdrawn. Tecumseh was wounded, apparently painfully but not especially seriously. The wound has been reported variously as a leg wound caused by buckshot or a neck wound. It is also possible that Tecumseh actually suffered the wound during the earlier Battle of Brownstown. The Americans claimed victory, although they had suffered even more fatalities than the British-Indian force (about 18 Americans killed compared to 15 British-Indian deaths).10
Attack on Detroit
Major General Isaac Brock arrived at Fort Malden in the middle of August 1812 to assume command of operations in the west. He and Tecumseh immediately established considerable rapport and respect for each other. When Brock decided to attack Detroit, Tecumseh strongly seconded the decision, appreciating the new commander’s decisiveness. Tecumseh is reported to have remarked of Brock admiringly, “This is a man!”11 Both men exuded
Wampum
The description of Tecumseh provided by Captain John Glegg includes a medallion of King George III attached to a multicolored wampum string that the Shawnee leader wore around his neck. When Isadore Chaine of the Wyandots visited Tecumseh in 1812, he brought a black wampum belt from the British to signify that the British and Shawnees should ally themselves against the United States in case of war.
Rather than a form of Indian currency, as is often thought, wampum was pri-marilya medium for what today we would call official documents—treaties, contracts, and records of transactions, usually of a public nature. The word wampum comes from a Narragansett word for white shell beads. Wampum consisted of pieces of shells and later beads acquired from Euro-American traders. Originally, the beads were either white or purple-black. Holes were drilled through the beads with a flint drill rolled between the hands, which permitted the beads to be strung. Several wampum strings were often woven together into belts, usually three to four feet long and four or five inches wide. The belts usually consisted of multiple colors with designs (human figures, geometric patterns, and other images). The colors and figures were symbolic, making their narrative easily read by those who understood the language of wampum belts. Indian leaders often spoke while accompanied by a wampum belt to which they would refer. Belts also were used to convey tribal history and traditions.
Both durable and easily transported, the belts were practical and often quite beautiful. The latter quality made them attractive to traders and collectors of Indian artifacts and, therefore, quite valuable monetarily. The value that Euro-Americans often placed on wampum belts did lead to their use in trading at times, but that remained a secondary purpose.
Leadership, and an aide to Brock, Captain John Glegg, recorded a detailed description of the Shawnee leader that conveys not only Tecumseh’s appearance but also his character:
Tecumseh’s appearance was very prepossessing; his figure light and finely proportioned; his age I imagined to be about five and thirty [actually about forty-four]; in height, five feet nine or ten inches; his complexion, light copper; countenance, oval, with bright hazel eyes beaming cheerfulness, energy and decision. Three small silver crowns, or coronets, were suspended from the lower cartilage of his aquiline nose; and a large silver medallion of George the Third, which I believe his ancestor had received from Lord Dorchester, when governor-general of Canada, was attached to a mixed coloured wampum string, and hung around his neck. His dress consisted of a plain, neat uniform, tanned deer-skin jacket, with long trousers of the same material, the seams of both being covered with neatly cut fringe; and he had on his feet leather moccasins, much ornamented with work made from the dyed quills of the porcupine.12
Hull deserted Sandwich on August 11, taking his troops across the river to Detroit. Brock formally requested Hull’s surrender on August 15, but Hull refused to capitulate. As the British began bombarding American positions, Tecumseh drew a map of Detroit and its surroundings for Brock. The plan was for Tecumseh to lead his warriors across the river during the night, surround Detroit, and attack the town the following morning while the British marched on the fort. Hull was facing a force of about 1,100 British and 600 Indians; he had about 1,000 of his own men after sending 400 of his troops to the River Raisin under Lewis Cass and Duncan McArthur to meet Brush, who was still there. The mission may have been designed to get the two officers out of the way, as they strongly objected to Hull’s refusal to attack Fort Malden and Hull’s overall lack of leadership.13
Much to Brock’s surprise, Hull surrendered on August 16, lowering the American flag in the early afternoon. Many of his men had deserted when the British began their advance, and Hull may have wanted to ensure the safety of the women and children under his protection. Cass and McArthur, who had failed to reach Brush, were on their way back to Detroit when the surrender occurred and had no recourse but to join in the surrender. In all, Hull surrendered approximately 2,200 men, 39 large guns, 3,000 rifles and muskets, and extensive ammunition and supplies. All of Michigan Territory was now under the control of the British, and Tecumseh had helped to save Canada, albeit only temporarily.
Indian and British efforts in the immediate aftermath of the victory at Detroit had mixed results. U. S. forces abandoned Fort Dearborn, site of the future city of Chicago, on August 15 in the face of hostilities by Potawatomis and were attacked two miles away from the fort. They suffered heavy casualties, and those soldiers who were not killed outright were taken prisoner. Potawatomis then attacked Fort Wayne on September 5 and sent for reinforcements. Tecumseh tried to persuade the British to provide help. Finally, he succeeded and headed for Fort Wayne with 600 warriors while 250 British under Muir also set out. However, William Henry Harrison arrived at Fort Wayne with more than 2,200 men on September 13; by the time Tecumseh reached the fort, the attackers had been repelled.14
The British, who were camped on the Maumee River on September 25, learned that most of Harrison’s army under General James Winchester was approaching. Muir hesitated, embarked on several small-scale retreats, and finally took his soldiers back to Detroit. When various Indian groups also departed, including the Ottawas and Chippewas, Tecumseh was forced to follow suit. Tecumseh was disappointed by the indecision and vacillation, and must have longed for General Brock; Brock had departed for the Niagara area, leaving Henry Procter in command in the Detroit area. On October 13, Brock was killed in battle while trying to rally his men for a counterattack against a large U. S. force that had crossed the Niagara River and taken Queenston Heights.
Tenskwatawa had remained at Prophetstown when Tecumseh rejoined the British. When the Prophet learned of the Indian successes, he planned an
Attack on Fort Harrison. This effort, which was primarily carried out by Kickapoos and Winnebagos, was defeated by Captain Zachary Taylor— another future President of the United States who would use his Indian-fighting career to help further his political ambitions. Tenskwatawa and his dwindling number of followers then moved farther northwest in Indiana and, in December, into Canada. The two brothers reunited and spent the winter of 1812-1813 back in Indiana, taking no role in the British victory by Colonel Procter and the Wyandot chief Roundhead over General Winchester at the Battle of Frenchtown on the River Raisin in January 1813. Tecumseh, however, continued recruiting in Indiana and Illinois for his Indian confederacy. Despite the earlier setbacks, he saw the confederacy, in alliance with the British, as the last, best way to retain Shawnee land in the upper Midwest.
Tecumseh's Treatment of Prisoners
In March 1813, Tecumseh started toward Amherstburg with his followers, not realizing that before long he would wage the final battle of his life and make one last unsuccessful effort to resist the mighty tide of U. S. expansionism in the Ohio Valley. The man who would ultimately defeat him, his old adversary William Henry Harrison, was busy that spring constructing a new fort, Fort Meigs, near present-day Maumee south of Toledo in northern Ohio. The fort was a handy jumping-off point for liberating Detroit and invading Canada, and Procter realized that it was a target he had to attack.
On April 24, a joint British and Indian force under Procter and Tecumseh left Amherstburg to destroy Fort Meigs. By May 1, Procter, now a brigadier general, had his artillery in position. Harrison, however, had constructed earthen walls inside the fort to reinforce the wooden stockade. Consequently, the artillery barrage had little effect. Because Harrison knew that reinforcements were on the way, he rejected Procter’s ultimatum to surrender.
One contingent of the reinforcements, some 800 men strong, under Lieutenant Colonel William Dudley, landed across the Maumee River from Fort Meigs on May 5. Dudley captured one of Procter’s two batteries but committed a serious blunder by pursuing the fleeing Indians. As Dudley’s men moved deeper into the woods, they encountered a large force under Tecumseh and quickly attempted to retreat. While British were retaking the battery, approximately 550 of Dudley’s 800 men were either killed (including Dudley) or captured.
The prisoners were taken to Fort Miami, an abandoned British post, and forced to run the gauntlet between two lines of Indians. Some of Dudley’s men died in the process, and others were killed after they survived the terrifying run. All of this activity occurred unbeknownst to Tecumseh, who was conferring with Major Adam Muir at the recaptured battery. When Tecumseh learned what was happening, he rode quickly to the torture site, stopped the Indians from harming any more prisoners, and sharply upbraided Procter and the other officers for not protecting the prisoners.
Tecumseh’s rescue of the prisoners contributed enormously to the Shawnee leader’s reputation, not only in the immediate aftermath of the battle, but also down through the years. John Sugden discusses the incident in detail and remarks that “perhaps more than any other incident in Tecumseh’s life this one lingered in the memory.” He adds, “Tecumseh’s defense of the American prisoners became a cornerstone of his legend, the ultimate proof of his inherent nobility....”15
Writing within 30 years after the incident, Benjamin Drake offers an account of a British officer present during Tecumseh’s arrival at Fort Miami relayed through a correspondent of Drake’s. The account is likely romanticized but offers the prevailing view of Tecumseh’s behavior:
Whilst this blood-thirsty carnage was raging, a thundering voice was heard in the rear, in the Indian tongue, when, turning round, he saw Tecumseh coming with all the rapidity his horse could carry him, until he drew near to where two Indians had an American, and were in the act of killing him. He sprang from his horse, caught one by the throat and the other by the breast, and threw them to the ground; drawing his tomahawk and scalping knife, he ran in between the Americans and Indians, brandishing them with the fury of a mad man, and daring any one of the hundreds that surrounded him, to attempt to murder another American.16
Despite Dudley’s catastrophic defeat, the combined force could not capture Fort Meigs. Procter, much to Tecumseh’s disappointment, ordered his men back to Canada on May 9. Driving the U. S. military out of the upper Midwest was far more important to Tecumseh than defending Canada. Nonetheless, he maintained his alliance with the British despite serious misgivings about Procter’s decision-making and leadership capabilities.
Acceding to Tecumseh’s wishes, Procter agreed to another attack on Fort Meigs in July. The British made little use of artillery, however, and did not try to storm the fort. A stratagem by Tecumseh, although creatively conceived, failed. His plan was to simulate a battle against advancing U. S. reinforcements that would lure the soldiers in the fort, now under the command of General Green Clay, out into the open to help the fictitious troops. Clay, however, knew that no reinforcements were scheduled to arrive and suspected a trick.
When the second attempt to capture Fort Meigs failed, Procter agreed to attack Fort Stephenson on the Sandusky River. Procter launched the attack on August 2, but again his artillery was not able to batter down the fort’s walls. During the early evening, the British began a frontal attack, but the fort’s single cannon, aimed at the attackers who were attempting to scale the surrounding moat, caused heavy British casualties. Tecumseh viewed the attack as suicidal and did not have his men participate. The British began their journey back to Canada the next day, and many members of Tecumseh’s confederacy—which included Sauk, Fox, Menominee, and Chippewa warriors, including the great Sauk warrior Black Hawk (who had also participated in the attacks on Fort Meigs)—departed for their home villages.
The Final Battle
After U. S. ships under Captain Oliver Perry destroyed Captain Robert Barclay’s British fleet on Lake Erie, and with Harrison preparing to invade Canada, Procter decided to withdraw from Amherstburg, abandon Detroit, and take his army to the Niagara area. Learning of these plans on September 18, 1813, Tecumseh strongly opposed Procter and argued for staying and fighting. Because it was not Canada that drew Tecumseh into the war but his own homeland, the prospect of retreating into Canada held little appeal for him. A few days later, Procter explained in a face-to-face meeting with Tecum-seh that recent reversals gave him little choice. At that point, Tecumseh reluctantly agreed to accompany him up the Thames River, in southeast Ontario above Lake Erie. In the final analysis, he knew that the Shawnees’ only hope still lay with the British ultimately winning their battle with the Americans.
In late September, Procter burned the Amherstburg shipyards, Fort Malden, and anything else that might be useful to Harrison. Some Indian allies, including the Potawatomi chief Main Poc, left the British side to return to Michigan. Those remaining with Tecumseh numbered approximately 3,000, including men, women, and children. Despite the departures, Tecumseh’s confederacy had continued to hold together reasonably well given the circumstances, and included Kickapoo, Potawatomi, Winnebago, and Wyandot representatives in addition to Shawnees. Most continued with Procter up the Thames toward Chatham, although en route about half of the 3,000 abandoned the British.
Tecumseh, who had stayed behind in Amherstburg to watch the movement of Harrison’s forces, arrived at Chatham on October 2. The next day, Procter led a further retreat toward the Indian village of Moraviantown. Tecumseh waged a delaying tactic, destroying bridges along the route Harrison was following. At McGregor’s Creek, as the British approached Chatham on October 4, Tecumseh’s warriors fired on the advancing army, but artillery fire drove them away. In the exchange, Tecumseh suffered a slight wound to his left arm.
That night, Tecumseh led his war party to the British camp near Moravian-town. Tecumseh reportedly believed that he was on the verge of defeat and seemed to anticipate his own imminent death. Various accounts note his distribution of personal items such as his pistols; a sword to be conveyed to his son, Paukeesaa, who was then about 17 and had not yet distinguished himself as a warrior; and, to Black Hawk, a tomahawk that he had received from his brother Chiksika.
The next morning, October 5, Tecumseh planned strategy with Procter and arranged to evacuate the women and children in his party. In the afternoon, with Harrison’s troops approaching, Procter organized his British soldiers in two lines across the road approximately two miles west of Moraviantown north of the Thames. Tecumseh and his men positioned themselves to the right of the British troops in the thickets. The river protected Procter’s left flank.
Harrison arrived in the middle of the afternoon and attacked the British forces. Although the British had one cannon, they did not discharge it. The
Infantry fired about two volleys, and then the British fled, their resistance lasting only a few minutes. Procter quickly left his men to their own fate and rode off, pausing long enough at Moraviantown to have a quick drink without dismounting and then galloping off into infamy. He was court-martialed in Montreal in December 1814, publicly reprimanded, and suspended without pay for six months. The charges were detailed and quite specific, but ultimately came down to incompetence in planning and executing the battle. His military career was over, and he died in 1822 in England.17
Tecumseh, however, was ready to fight. Although his once-grand confederacy had shrunk to about 500 men, it still included a remarkable range of warriors: Creeks, Delawares, Foxes, Sauks, Kickapoos, Winnebagos, Wyandots, Potawatomies, Ottawas, Ojibways, and his own Shawnees. Tenskwatawa was present but did not engage in the fighting, confining himself to exhorting others. He survived the conflict to live an increasingly anonymous life, dying in 1836.
Tecumseh and his warriors succeeded initially in driving back Harrison’s infantry. With the quick defeat of the British, however, the full brunt of the army could be directed against the Indians. Mounted militia under Colonel Richard Johnson crowded close to the brush from which the Indians were firing. Tecumseh fought bravely, firing his musket and encouraging his men. Finally, one soldier found his mark, shooting Tecumseh in the chest.
The identity of the man who killed Tecumseh remains uncertain, although Johnson accepted (if he did not directly claim) that distinction during his political career, running under the nickname “Old Tecumseh” in his Congressional and vice-presidential campaigns in the 1820s and 1830s. Johnson reached the apex of his career as President Martin Van Buren’s vice president in 1837. Allan Eckert offers a detailed and reasonably persuasive argument that a private named David King was the man who shot Tecumseh, but the identity of the shooter probably will never be known with absolute certainty.18
Another enduring mystery surrounding Tecumseh’s death is what happened to his body. Many slain Indians were mutilated, but whether Tecumseh suffered that fate is not definitely known. Nor has anyone been able to identify absolutely the great Shawnee leader’s burial place. Sugden asserts that soldiers scalped the corpse and ripped strips of skin from the body. The famous politician Henry Clay was said to have exhibited a strip of Tecumseh’s skin in Washington. Eckert notes that Simon Kenton claimed to have deliberately identified the wrong body as Tecumseh in an effort to spare him the indignity of mutilation. He comes to the conclusion that the body was not mutilated and that during the night it was removed by some of Tecumseh’s followers and buried.19 As with the identity of Tecumseh’s slayer, the final word on this mystery likely will remain unsaid.
The death of Tecumseh did not end opposition to efforts by the United States to take over traditional Indian lands, but for all practical purposes it did end serious resistance in most of the Old Northwest Territory. The War
Of 1812 ended officially on Christmas Eve 1814. The Shawnees never again would be a bulwark against U. S. expansionism and as a people would prove increasingly peripatetic, wandering among Ohio, Missouri, Kansas, Texas, and Oklahoma. Death, however, did not diminish Tecumseh. His reputation would grow and endure, with the Shawnee leader being exalted by romantic primitivists and serious historians alike. Today few American Indian leaders occupy such a respected position as Tecumseh, who worked tirelessly, if ultimately unsuccessfully, to unite Indians throughout the United States in an attempt to preserve a way of life that he believed Shawnees and other native peoples had a right to maintain.
World History
