Be able to cut back conventional military forces, reduce overall defense spending, shift more funds into the civilian economy, and raise the Soviet standard of living. Although Castro had asked for more traditional military aid, he agreed to Khrushchev’s proposal. He wanted to stave off a future American invasion, enhance Cuba’s geopolitical position, and contribute to strengthening the socialist camp.
The first Soviet missiles arrived in Cuba in the late summer and early autumn of 1962. By early October, the Soviet deployment included medium-range ballistic missiles with 1-megaton warheads and a range of 1,100 nautical miles, nuclear-capable light bombers, and cruise missiles. The increased Soviet activity on the island did not escape the notice of American intelligence and the press, but Kennedy was confident that the weapons were defensive, such as surface-to-air missiles. He warned the Soviets that they should not deploy offensive weapons to a nation only 90 miles from the southern coast of the United States.
On the morning of October 16, Kennedy was informed that American reconnaissance had detected offensive missile sites in Cuba. The president immediately called his closest high-level advisers to the White House. This group of policymakers constituted the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, or ExComm, and together with Kennedy they made most of the policy decisions during the crisis.
For the next week, ExComm met secretly to discuss various diplomatic, political, and military options. They weighed the merits of an air strike, an outright invasion, a naval quarantine to prevent the deployment of additional weapons, and negotiation through the United Nations. Realizing that an air strike would not be able to eliminate all of the weapons, Kennedy opted for the quarantine. A quarantine would keep Soviet ships from reaching Cuba, but it was not called a blockade, for a blockade was an act of war.
On the evening of October 22, Kennedy addressed the nation on TELEVISION. He described the nuclear missile sites in Cuba and announced the quarantine. Several hours before, he had informed the Soviets that their missiles had been detected. The next week marked the most dangerous phase of the crisis. By October 27 all of the medium-range missiles in Cuba were assembled and could be tipped with nuclear warheads in four hours. In the meantime, a Soviet commander shot down an American U-2 reconnaissance plane, heightening the tension. Fortunately, cooler heads prevailed. After the quarantine went into effect, Khrushchev ordered many of his ships to turn back.
On October 26, Khrushchev offered to remove the weapons if the United States promised not to invade Cuba. The next day, another letter arrived with the additional stipulation of a public trade of the Soviet missiles in Cuba for the American Jupiter missiles in Turkey. Kennedy found this additional condition unacceptable, but several advisers suggested ignoring the second message and responding positively only to the first letter. This tactic proved successful.
On October 28, Khrushchev announced that work on the missile sites would cease and the weapons would be dismantled and returned to the Soviet Union. In return, Kennedy pledged not to invade Cuba, although Operation Mongoose continued unabated until the president’s death in 1963. Kennedy also secretly agreed to remove the Jupiter missiles from Turkey.
Despite haggling among all three parties over the details of removal of the weapons, the crisis ended peacefully and all offensive missiles were shipped back to the Soviet Union. Kennedy terminated the quarantine on November 21. The danger of the crisis and the threat of nuclear war led both Khrushchev and Kennedy to try to improve U. S.-Soviet relations, including establishing a hotline to provide for constant communication. Although they achieved only limited success, the post-crisis thaw in relations did contribute to the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963.
Further reading: Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naf-tali, “One Hell of a Gamble”: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997); Mark J. White, The Cuban Missile Crisis (London: Macmillan Press, 1996).
—Jennifer Walton
World History
