World War II marked an important watershed in Ameri-can-African relations because the United States established a new relationship with Africa, which had been closely identified in the past with its European allies, such as Great Britain and France, which had colonies on that continent.
In the immediate post-World War II years, U. S. dealings with Africa were largely driven by two key determinants: decolonization of European colonies and the need to contain the spread of communism. In principle, successive postwar American administrations referred to the Atlantic Charter of 1941 to insist that the “right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live” must be extended to all European colonies in Africa and not just countries then occupied by the Axis powers. The United States also believed that the spread of communism to Europe and regions like Africa, where decolonization was becoming increasingly likely, would run contrary to its vision of a global economy under American leadership. Africa, potentially, could serve American geostrategic, political, and economic interests.
American preoccupation with containing expansionism by the Soviet Union meant that, by the early 1950s, American policymakers still considered the future of European colonies in Africa important only insofar as how U. S. attitudes toward colonial issues would affect U. S. relations with its European allies. State Department officials therefore carefully weighed the practical advantages of strengthening the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance against what would accrue from granting self-government to European colonies in Africa. Not only was the United States cautious not to alienate its European allies but it also still recognized Africa as a “special European responsibility.” Thus, in spite of its official rhetoric in support of self-determination for all peoples of the world, American support for African independence was tempered by its desire to maintain strong ties with its European allies.
From the mid-1950s onward, the Soviet Union became more actively engaged in debates in the United Nations calling for African independence and established friendly relations with newly independent African states, including Ghana (1957) and Guinea (1958). In spite of this obvious Soviet drive to extend its influence in Africa, the American response to African affairs was slow and ambivalent, reflecting the dilemma of supporting decolonization while not pushing it at a pace that would alienate European allies of the United States.
Ghana’s independence served as a catalyst for rapid decolonization in the rest of Africa, prompting Americans to rethink their position about the continent. An independent Bureau of African Affairs was created in the State Department in 1958. A number of American consulates in Africa were replaced by fully operational embassies. The United States realized that it could lure the votes of the newly independent African states in the United Nations to strengthen its global dominance.
A significant milestone in American-African relations came with the ascension of John F. Kennedy to the presidency in 1961. In Kennedy’s view, anticolonialism could serve the United States and guard against growing Soviet influence in Africa. Furthermore, his administration realized that Africa could serve American military and nonmilitary needs with products such as uranium and copper. American aid to Africa thus expanded during this period. More than any other presidency before it, the Kennedy administration became more directly involved in African affairs. In 1961, for example, the United States provided some covert financial support for rebel Holden Roberto’s
Frente Nacional de Libertagao de Angola (FNLA), a revolutionary independence movement then fighting a guerrilla war against the Portuguese-controlled Angolan government.
Apartheid in South Africa prompted responses by Kennedy and his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson. In the aftermath of the 1960 Sharpeville riot in Johannesburg, during which South African police opened fire at black protesters, killing 67, Kennedy not only criticized apartheid but also announced that the United States would discontinue its arms trade with South Africa after 1963. The Johnson administration went one step further. In June 1964, the United States endorsed a UN Security Council resolution to establish a special committee of experts to study the feasibility of sanctions against South Africa.
While most Africans welcomed such developments, American involvement in the Congo was considered less palatable. During the Congo civil war, on November 24, 1964, American planes transported Belgian paratroopers to Stanleyville in an apparent move to rescue hostages from the rebel forces of the Congolese National Liberation Council. Many Africans, however, viewed the Stanleyville airlift as a cover for a military operation to assist the central government then headed by the largely unpopular Moise Tshombe against the rebels. On a more positive note, on October 27, 1966, the United States supported the UN General Assembly resolution terminating the South African mandate in Namibia.
In spite of some significant changes in the 1960s, American policy toward Africa continued to be predicated on the need to support only moderate and constitutional demands from African nationalists and also to prevent Soviet influence from spreading throughout the continent. Rather than being regarded as important in their own right, African countries were generally perceived by United States policymakers as a means of preventing the spread of Soviet communism.
Further reading: Peter Duigan and L. H. Gann, The United States and Africa: A History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Peter J. Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
—Tamba M’Bayo
World History
