No doubt, the rivalry over the Ottoman Empire, namely the Eastern Question, was the main reason for the war.130 The diplomatic crisis, which ultimately led to the war, erupted in 1850. The war broke in the form of a Russo-Ottoman war in 1853, and only in late March 1854 it developed into a European war. The relative tranquility in the European state of affairs after the Straits Convention of 1841 was followed by a series of crises in the late 1840s and early 1850s: the revolutions of 1848-1849 the Russian attempt to find a common ground with Britain for the partition of the Ottoman Empire, and the Russo-French conflict over the Holy Places in Palestine. The diplomacy before and throughout the war demonstrates that the great powers did not want a war, but the crisis could not be managed: actually the Great Power’s determination not to lose the pride and prestige, as well as the influence over the Porte led to a European war instead of peace.
Explaining the causes of the war only with the policies of the great powers would be redundant. In fact, this war did not start as a European war, but as a Russo-Turkish one. The Menshikov Mission and the ‘Vienna Note’131 aRoused the religious and national feelings in Turkey and became one of the motives of the declaration of war by the Porte on Russia.132 Most importantly; however, the confidence in the western support led the Porte to adopt such a bold policy against Russia.133
After the suppression of the 1848-1849 revolutions in Europe with the Russian moral and military support, Russia had all reasons to feel itself more powerful. Yet, Nicholas I was in the opinion that only with a concerted action with Britain, Russia could attain its objectives in the Near East. During the first months of 1853, the Tsar repeatedly explained his opinions and plans about the partition of the Ottoman Empire to Hamilton Seymour, the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg.134 Seymour reported to John Russell, the British Foreign Minister: “The mind of the Tsar is now clearer. What he wants is the partition of Turkey by excluding France.”135 HOwever, the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was one of the established aims of the British foreign policy to protect Britian’s interests in the Near East, as well as to provide the security of the route to India. Therefore, the Russian initiative could not find a positive response from Britain; on the contrary it made a Britain-France alliance possible against the Russian desires.
The apparent reason of the war was not the partition of the Ottoman territories, but another phase of the Eastern Question, seemingly a more trivial matter between France and Russia: The dispute over the holy places of the Palestine. While it was a minor issue at first, the overstress of Russia and France transformed it into an international crisis. The acceptance of the French wishes over the Holy Places by the Porte seemed to injure the Russian pride. It was actually a defeat of the “Gendarme of Europe”136 Against Napoleon III, who came to throne in opposition to the very basis of the Vienna system.
Ostensibly connected with the problem of the trusteeship of the Holy Places, in May 1853, Prince Alexander Menshikov, the special envoy of Nicholas to Istanbul, declared an ultimatum about the recognition of the Russian protectorate over all the Orthodox subjects of the Porte. However, the actual demand of Russia was the conclusion of a secret treaty along the lines with the Treaty of Hunkar iskelesi, which would guarantee the Russian influence over the Porte. Menshikov and his activities in Istanbul kept the European diplomacy busy for a few months. While Britain and France pursued a conciliatory policy during the crisis, completely undiplomatic behaviors of Menshikov harmed the Turkish pride and strengthened the pro-war circles. Starting from Menshikov’s ultimatom to the last efforts for the Ottoman recognition of the Vienna Note, the diplomacy never ceased to function. However, after the rejection of this note the war became unavoidable.
Actually, when diplomacy was ongoing, the initial preparations for a war were also under way. During the summer of 1853 when the Vienna Note was under discussion, in June the fleets of Britain and France sailed towards the Dardanelles, and on 2 July the Russian troops crossed the river Pruth and invaded the Principalities. On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire tried to strengthen its armies in both the Caucasian and Balkan fronts throughout the summer.
As a result of the failure of the diplomatic efforts, and not having the evacuation of the Principalities, the Ottoman Empire declared war on Russia on 4 October 1853, and in the same month the hostilities started near the river Danube. The so-called “Sinop massacre”137 On 30 November 1853 accelerated the decisions of Britain and France to join the war and in the late of March 1854 the war became a European one.
The Crimean War was actually designed as a limited war aiming only to enforce Russia not to engage in any activity at the expense of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the war played in a peripheral theatre, in the Crimea, and throughout the war diplomatic activities of the belligerents to find a common ground did not cease. There were also some grandiose plans under discussion, as an independent Poland and a Caucasus, however such great ideas or plans could not turn
Into a war aim of the alliance.138 In addition, as the cost of the war increased and the war tragedies reflected to the British and the French masses thanks to the new technological innovations in photography, the Crimean war would lose its public support, and any grandiose project, which would prolong the war, could not be employed.
In addition, the war aims of the allied powers could hardly be regarded as identical. While Britain was the most enthusiastic to give a hard blow to Russia, Napoleon III was just in search of an easy victory, which would strengthen his position and prestige in France, as well as in Europe.139 On the other hand, the Porte aimed to guarantee its security as much as possible as a result of this war since it enjoyed the support of the Great Powers.
Having provided the security of the Balkans and Istanbul thanks to the policies of Britain, France and Austria,140 The Ottoman Empire aimed to engage in a successful war in the Caucasus front. The Porte not only strengthened the Batum and the Anatolian armies, but also developed policies to encourage the mountaineers to participate in the war. Russian troops in the Caucasus were dispersed over a vast territory and their duties and problems were numerous. Therefore, fighting “took the form of a Turkish offensive and of a relatively passive defence of the frontier by the Russians”.141 However, as Allen and Muratoff claimed, “the Turkish army remained incapable of efficient manoeuvre and therefore unsuitable to carry out any offensive operation”.142 Actually, the unsuccessful offensive against Ahiska and the defeat in Ba§gedikler, and the destruction of an Ottoman fleet in Sinop in the fall of 1853 were the first signs of the ineffective and unsuccessful Ottoman role in the Caucasus throughout the war.
World History
