When Britain and France declared war in late March 1854, they hardly had any plan other than giving a lesson to Russia. At first, neither the war arena, nor the war aims were clear. The first attempts concentrated in the Balkans against the Russian presence in the Principalities. However, after the withdrawal of the Russian forces from the Balkans, the Crimea and the Caucasus came under discussion as to where the Allied offensive would be conducted.151 When the plans of the allied powers clarified, and the Crimea was assigned as the war ground, then the importance of the Caucasus decreased. This did not mean, however, that the Caucasian front was overall abandoned. Throughout the war, plans for an effective utilization of the mountaineers were still under discussion; however, there was hardly any coordination among the allies regarding how to use the mountaineers.
The allied navy powers entered the Black Sea to protect the Turkish coasts against the possible Russian onslaught on 5 January 1854. Afterwards, Russia took a defensive stance, and not only brought back its navy to Sevastopol, but also abandoned forts and garrisons on the eastern Black Sea coast with the exception of Anapa, Novorossiysk, Gelincik and Sohumkale.152 153 Actually, the Caucasian command of Russia was very pessimistic for the future Russian presence in the Caucasus. Prince Mikhail Vorontsov, the viceroy of the Caucasus, left the scene, thinking there was no possibility for Russia’s success. General Read, who was appointed in his stead, was more pessimistic. He advocated the evacuation of all the Muslim territories in the eastern Caucasus, and even the temporary sacrifice of Georgia, Imeretia, Mingrelia and Guria. He proposed a Russian defense along the rivers Kuban, Sunja, and Sulak. While these fears were to some extent exaggerated, the opportunity of the Ottoman army in the Caucasian front was obvious as also Allen and Muratoff put down:
The possibility of widespread attacks by the Cherkesses - with Allied support from the sea - and the likelihood of an invasion of Kakheti by Shamyl were real dangers, and there was no absolute certainty that the ‘peaceful’ Muslim population of eastern Transcaucasia would remain loyal if they were disturbed by the news of Allied and Turkish successes or
Persian intervention.
In the presence of the Allied navy in the Black Sea, Ottoman navy could be used to help the mountaineers of the Caucasus to strengthen the front in the Caucasus. For this aim, Adulphus Slade, a British who served in the Ottoman navy with the name “Mu§avir Pasha”, gave a note to the Kaptan Pasha, in which he argued that if Sohumkale had been captured, then the Ottoman navy could have moved along the Abkhazian coasts to Anapa to conquer all the military positions of Russia along the Black Sea coast, and moreover to handle military aid, including even cannons, to the Circassians.154 155 156 According to Slade, the composition of the Caucasian mountaineers, Turkish navy and the Anatolian army could succeed against Russia in
The Caucasus front.
This note was accepted by the Porte, and Kaptan Pasha appointed Mu§avir Pasha to discuss such a Turkish initiative to Circassia with the admirals of the allied forces. However, Britain and France were not so much enthusiastic for such an Ottoman mission. Even though this proposal was not totally rejected, Allied generals expressed that it would be better for the Ottoman fleet to wait till a British-French fleet completed an operation in the Caucasus. France and British admiralty was only in favor of an initiative in which two Ottoman ferries would move to Circassia with a mission to propagate the war against Russia, instead of an actual operation. It seems, however, that the Ottoman side believed that the British and French admirals could be persuaded. Kaptan Pasha ordered to prepare a fleet, which would transport armaments and ammunitions, as well as a few hundred Circassians including Sefer Pasha, Beh9et Pasha, Sadettin Pasha (Vdli of Aydin), Sirri Pasha (Vdli of Yemen),
Ferhad Pasha, and Ramiz Bey.
This mission aimed to invite the local population to join the war by using firmans and ni§ans. Sefer Pasha had a firman, which empowered him as a civilian and military governor of all the Circassian lands. According to the decision taken in the Meclis-i Muvakkat-i Harbiye (Provisional Assembly of War) first the communication with Muhammed Emin should be established and his help to Sefer and Beh9et Pashas should be guaranteed. The Ottoman Empire would try to use the popularity of Sefer Pasha to rally the Circassians. He was also assigned to encourage Prince Mikhail Shirvashidze, the most influential man in Abkhazia, to take a part on the side of the allied powers.159
This operation would not only be useful for Circassia, but also for the Anatolian army, since an important amount of munitions and weapons would be handled to Sohumkale.160 Most importantly, such a fleet would raise the Ottoman prestige in Circassia, and would provide their active participation in the war, which could not be accomplished so far. It was hoped that with the support of the Allied forces, logistic help to the Caucasus would be easier, and by this way cooperation between Sheikh Shamil and Circassians would be attained and a blow to Russia in the Caucasus would be possible.
Obviously, the Porte gave a special importance to this mission. Having these aims in mind, the Ottoman-Egyptian fleet left Istanbul on 6 May 1854 - after a day that the allied fleet under the command of Lyons started its campaign on the Circassian shores - to the Bal9ik Bay to consult the Ottoman operation to the Caucasus. However, according to the Ottoman plans, Ahmed Pasha, the admiral of the Ottoman fleet, would meet with the generals of Britain and France, and only after their approval the Ottoman mission to the Circassian shores would be initiated. However, Dundas, the Commander-in-Chief of the allied forces, opposed to the
Kerashev, p. 107. ’ Budak, p. 74.
Ottoman plans stating that such an operation should be activated only after the return of the allied fleet.
After the arrival of a battleship at Bal9ik, which brought news about the campaign of Captain Lyons and that the Circassians shores were evacuated by the Russians, then only three battleships were assigned for the Ottoman mission. All the Circassians, who were waiting for weeks in Kavarna Bay (near Bal9ik), in a disorganized way and in a hurry, were transported from the twelve battleships to only three, and were sent to Circassia in miserable conditions on 24 May. During this process an outraged Pasha cried in grief, “I will never forget what was done to us”.161 Of course, having landed in Sohumkale in such conditions, the mission most probably could not have a positive impact on the mountaineers for the image of the Ottoman Empire, which was actually one of the main aims of the mission. Slade complained:
For half-civilized peoples, there is a great difference between landing of officials, envoys, helping battalions, armaments and ammunitions by a big and pompous navy, and a swift leaving of them to the sea sands by a few stuffed transporting ships. Transportation to such a place [Circassia] an expeditionary team and force is not the same with carrying passengers and trade materials. Rather than to act in this way, according to the orders of the Admirals, it would be better to send everything back to Istanbul.162
As a matter of fact, this mission was a complete disappointment. It not only failed to achieve anything, but also negatively affected any possible joint attempt of the Allied powers in the course of the war. Sefer Pasha would not collaborate with the Allied powers in the following year. This operation was also one of the instances
¦ Ibid, pp. 148-149.
That France and Britain did not see the Ottomans a real ally. Ottoman soldiers (and officers for that matter) were perceived by them as inferiors throughout the war.
The Porte continued its activities in Circassia in summer 1854. On 3 July 1854, Mustafa Pasha was appointed to Sohumkale. On 8 July an Ottoman fleet under the command of Ahmed Pasha, composed of 5 ships, arrived at Sohumkale with 160 boxes of cartridge, 30 barrels of gunpowder, and some amount of lead. Replies to the letters of Muhammed Emin were also sent with this fleet. Then, Muhammed Emin would arrive to Varna with one of the ships of this fleet (Feyz-i Bari) to search a
Common ground with the Allied commanders.
In July 1854, when the war theater was not yet clear, Muhammed Emin as the leader of a Circassian delegation composed of 70 Circassian chieftains and elders came to Varna to discuss a joint activity. Allied powers gave special importance to the Circassian delegation.157 158 ACtually, before his arrival Muhammed Emin succeeded in giving a hard blow to the Russian forces in Daryal Pass on 26 May 1854.159 160 However, the mountaineers of the Caucasus were not perceived as a real ally, moreover the situation of the Turkish army in the Russo-Ottoman border was not
Promising.
Nonetheless, Russia’s army of 270.000 soldiers, with 70.000 in the Russo-Ottoman border, was probably the most important reason for the abandonment of the Caucasus option. Russia did not withdraw its forces from the Caucasus, which was indeed constituted a considerable figure, and a successful attack against those forces did not seem to be an easy deal. If the Russian forces in the Caucasus would move to the Crimean peninsula, then a victory in the Crimea would be more difficult. The possible future of the Caucasus in case of an allied victory was still in abeyance. After the conquest of the Caucasus, there might be needed a military protection of the Allied powers, which they could not afford.161
Muhammed Emin with the Circassian delegation passed to Istanbul to discuss the future steps with the Porte and the Padishah on 27 July 1854. In his residence in Istanbul, he was very well received, and materially assisted. However, again any clear plan for a joint action was not visible. After two months in Istanbul, Muhammed Emin left Istanbul for Batum with Ferik Mustafa Pasha, now the commander of the Batum army, the Circassian chieftains, and the Tunisian soldiers on 1 October 1854. According to Budak, after the appointment of Mustafa Pasha, the loyalty of the people of Sohumkale to the Ottoman Empire increased. Mustafa Pasha was given the power to distribute ranks and salaries.162 This was actually a manifestation of the classical Ottoman policy in the Caucasus, which was based on the distribution of ranks and salaries rather than any concrete plan and action.
In short, all these efforts proved fruitless. There was not any concrete attempt of the Circassians and the Allied Powers against Russia in 1854 in the northern Caucasus. For the Ottoman Empire, 1854 was also an unsuccessful year in the southern Caucasus. Ottoman armies were ineffective nearly in all their engagements with Russia throughout the summer.163 164 Shamil’s campaign of July 1854 to invade Kakheti also remained ill-fated. Furthermore, this was Sheikh Shamil’s last serious effort, after which he took a cautious attitude and waited for the successes of the
Turkish army in the Russo-Ottoman border.
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