In July 2009 Mexico held its mid-term congressional elections in which all 500 members of the Chamber of Deputies were elected, as well as the governors of six states. Since candidates for the Chamber of Deputies are generally not well known, even before the first ballot was cast this election was widely viewed as a referendum on the Calderon presidency.8
As in past elections, polling places were managed by citizens who had been randomly selected and trained by the IFE. Detracting from the sound organization was a voter turnout of only 44.72 percent, just slightly above the percentage that voted in the 2003 mid-term elections. The chief complaints were that President Calderon, with a $160 million media budget, unfairly promoted the PAN using government funds. Similar complaints were voiced concerning Enrique Pena Nieto, the PRI governor of the State of Mexico and a 2012 presidential hopeful.9
The PAN courted voters based on the presumed success of Calderon’s war on drugs. At the same time, the party portrayed the PRI as corrupt and unwilling to tackle drug gangs. This message failed to resonate with voters, who castigated the PAN for multiple shortcomings. These included a failure to combat corruption, an inadequate response to the global economic crisis, and the PAN’s inability to develop a model of governing that clearly distinguished it from the PRI. The PAN vote,
Source: El Financiero (August 24, 2009, p. 37) and Political Data Base of the Americas
Which reached 33 percent in 2006, sunk to 28 percent. The number of PAN deputies in the Chamber of Deputies fell from 206 to 143 for the 2009—2012 session.10
The election resulted in a significant weakening of Calderon’s presidency. Columnist Lorenzo Meyer wrote that the president ran the “risk of becoming a political zombie.” In the wake of the election, PAN president German Martinez assumed blame for the PAN’ poor showing and resigned.11
The PRI received 36.7 percent of the vote, a remarkable rebound from its 2006 showing of 22 percent. In addition to increasing its number of seats in the Chamber of Deputies to 237, it won five of the six contested governorships. The successful PRI campaign adopted the slogan, “Today’s PRI. Proven Experience. New attitude.” In addition to its catchy slogan the PRI victory combined: 1) attractive candidates, 2) television, 3) money, 4) a nationwide political machine, and 5) party
Unity.12
The PRI did well since it occupied a vaguely defined political center, while the leadership of both the PRD and the PAN had become more polarized than the electorate. Lorenzo Meyer described the PRI as “searching for power for power’s sake.” Luis Rubio, the head of a Mexico City think tank, paraphrased the position of the PRI as, “We might be corrupt, but we’re more efficient than the other guys.”13
The biggest loser in the 2009 election was the PRD, which in 2006 had received 29 percent of the vote—a record for the party. The party receiving only 12 percent in 2009 reflected the PRD’s on-going, very public internal struggles. In 2009, it failed to articulate a clear position. The PRD failed to take advantage of the elections to publicize a response to the economic crisis. Its internal splits were highlighted by the election itself. Rather than disseminating PRD policies, the media fixated on the fact that its 2006 presidential candidate ALMO had supported the candidacy of a small left party in Ixtapalapa (a borough of Mexico City) because one of his supporters did not receive the PRD nomination. His successful promotion of another party’s candidate left the party leadership with a dilemma after the election as to whether it should expel Lopez Obrador, its record vote getter, for his clear violation of party rules.14
The election set the political field for the upcoming 2012 presidential elections. The strong PRI showing favored State of Mexico Governor Enrique Pena Nieto, the front-runner for the 2012 PRI nomination. Pundits began labeling Calderon a “lame duck” and felt he would merely tread water until the end of his term. Finally, the election plunged the political left into disarray. This left the political spectrum devoid of a group that could effectively respond to the high degree of social inequality.15
World History
