When the Batum and the Anatolian armies were under preparation, in August 1853, Sheikh Shamil raided into Kakheti with 10.000 murids, most probably in order to show his desire to collaborate.143 On the other hand, the Porte also wanted to make use of Sheikh Shamil and his naib Muhammed Emin. On 9 October 1853, a firman, calling for the ‘Holy War’, was sent to Sheikh Shamil. The firman, asked Sheikh Shamil to assault on the Russian positions. Sheikh Shamil replied with his letter to Abdulkerim Nadir Pasha (known as Abdi Pasha), the Commander-in Chief of the Anatolian army, in December 1853. In his letter, Sheikh Shamil claimed that with a joint action Russians could be forced out of the Caucasus. However, this letter was directed to Istanbul only in May 1854.144 In December 1853, Sheikh Shamil held a gathering of all his naibs in New Dargiyya, after which all the Chechens were
Instructed to be ready for a campaign.145 146 In the fall 1853, Muhammed Emin was also
Engaged in successful operations against the Russian fortifications in Circassia.
In order to be affective in the Caucasus, the Porte also planned to use the influence of the Ottoman subjects of the Caucasian origin. In October 1853, Zanoko Sefer Bey had been recalled from his exile in Edirne to Istanbul,147 And in November together with Beh9et Bey, another Circassian, got the title of Mir-i miran.148 149 On 15 October 1853, Haci Mehmed Efendi, Sefer Pasha’s man, was sent to Circassia. Besides, the Dagestani Beys in Istanbul, being charged to organize the Dagestanis,
Were sent to Dagestan via Erzurum and Batum.
However, the prerequisite of any possible Ottoman engagement on the Northern Caucasus was the accomplishment of the military supremacy of the Ottoman armies in the Russo-Ottoman border and the Southern Caucasus. The Ottoman victory at St. Nicholas on 26 October 1853 was actually a good start for the Ottoman army, however, a series of defeats followed. Russia guaranteed the security of the Southern Caucasus against the Ottoman offensive in 1853, as a result of its successes in Gumru (15 November), Ahiska (26 November), and most importantly in Ba§gedikler (1 December). Moreover, the destruction of the Ottoman fleet in Sinop on 30 November 1853 would prevent further Ottoman involvements in the Caucasus till the active participation of Britain and France in the war.150
In this first phase of the war it became clear that the Ottoman Empire would pursue a Caucasian policy on the base of the utilization of the mountaineers for the Ottoman success in the Russo-Ottoman border, instead of a real involvement in the Northern Caucasus.