The last decade of the twentieth century had reflected a civic distaste for politics and a declining interest in government. In Ontario, in 1990, voters had elected Bob Rae’s NDP government largely because the prosperity associated with a half-century of Progressive Conservatism had vanished in the wake of the free trade agreement with the United States. In a single term, the ndp failed to undo the damage, and it annoyed its trade union allies by its struggle to balance the budget. At the next election, Michael Harris led the Conservatives back to power with the promise of his Common Sense Revolution, which proceeded to hack out a surplus by drastic cuts in public spending. After two terms, angry Ontario voters turned to the Liberals, for the first time since 1902. In Europe, too, reforming regimes lost power because optimistic promises proved slower and more costly than wealthier taxpayers would tolerate. The collapse of the Soviet Union as both a world power and a socialist experiment left its reflection in former satellites and former enemies. Whether or not history had taught that capitalism was more efficient than communism, that seemed to be the lesson learned.
Since conservative ideologues had always insisted that state management, lacking a profit motive and competition, was inherently inefficient, conservative governments could hardly be held to account if their regimes fostered public-sector failures. On the other hand, conservative enthusiasm for business and for universal free trade ignored the claims of collective social values. In a conservative paradise, people prospered or starved as a consequence of free choices about earning, learning, and spending. If corporations pursued a single-minded drive for profits, why not abandon their unionized workers for ill-paid and often brutally exploited labour in Third World dictatorships? If ordinary Canadians earned less as a result, prices would be lower in their nearby Wal-Mart or Target store.
European and North American trade unions plummeted in membership and militancy as their members lost the jobs, wages, and benefits essential for their previously affluent lifestyle. Much as the Depression of the 1930s had been a foreseeable consequence of falling labour incomes, so had the mortgage foreclosure crisis of 2008 been predictable—the result of deregulation, with the repeal of laws designed to protect citizens from market-bred temptation. Business control of the media and donor-dependent political parties had led governments to scrap any law that seemed irksome to their wealthier contributors.
As Canada’s governing party from 1993 to 2008, the Liberals had prudently avoided most of the massive financial and corporate deregulation that occurred in the United States. But there was a price to pay for frustrating the greed of an increasingly influential financial industry. Business was not without allies among lower-income voters, who resented the salaries and job security of public servants. Moreover, many felt directly threatened by environmental activists promoting costly solutions to their own prophecies of drastic climate change, poisoned air, and vanishing potable water sources. Pressure groups to save the environment could be found everywhere in Canada, and nowhere more than in the Conservative-leaning western provinces. But so could millions of voters whose livelihood seemed threatened by “green” policies.
Immigrants to Canada traditionally favoured the party in power when they arrived, a huge advantage for the Liberals, who had held power for sixty-two of the twentieth century’s years, including most of those that witnessed mass immigration. Sources of immigration and the roles and ideology of New Canadians had changed. Under Trudeau, a point system had been introduced, which conscientiously favoured education, skills, and job experience over the racial issues that had traditionally favoured white-skinned Europeans and Americans. People from such countries as India and China brought language skills and economic ambitions far different from those of earlier immigrants. Rather than seeking cheap land and a farming future, the new arrivals more often expected to prosper in a free-enterprise environment. Some were refugees from the socialist experiments of their homelands. Many were devout social conservatives, appalled by liberal policies that accepted equal rights for gays, lesbians, and transgendered members of the community. The Liberals, accustomed to winning urban ethnic ghettos, saw little need to rethink their strategies, even as the New Canadian population changed in ideology as well as in economic roles. Meanwhile, Harper’s Conservative party was determined to make business-friendly immigrants a force within its ranks.
The anti-Liberal trend of Canadians in the first decade of the new century, apparent in provincial and municipal elections, grew out of resentment for politicians who had been in power since 1993 and, in some sense, for most of the previous century. Mr. Justice John Gomery’s investigation of the Chretien-era sponsorship program may have been Paul Martin’s revenge on his predecessor, but Gomery’s charge that the Liberals had fallen into an illusion of entitlement hurt Martin and his successors just as painfully. So did joining President Bush’s war in Afghanistan. Perhaps as a gesture of apology for the “friendly fire” bombing outside Kandahar in 1992, Washington offered Canada the command of all NATO forces in Afghanistan. It even named a Canadian general, Rick Hillier. Six months later, at Hillier’s behest. Ottawa had dispatched a thousand soldiers to occupy Kandahar city and province, home to thousands of Taliban activists and their allies. As casualties mounted, Canadians suspected that their government had chosen to engage them in an endless, unwinnable, and bloody war. Re-equipping peacekeeping soldiers for real war sent Ottawa’s deficit swirling upward. On coming to power, Stephen Harper rushed to recognize veterans of all Canadian wars. Wedded ideologically to George Bush’s Republicans, he made militant patriotism part of the Conservative brand. He also improved relations with Washington by confirming a multibillion-dollar order for its controversial and troubled f-35 fighter. To fulfil future obligations to injured veterans, he proposed to substitute an investment fund for their lifetime pension payments, but criticism from the government’s own veterans’ advocate forced some second thoughts.
As a minority prime minister. Harper did his best to dispel the hard-line image established by Conservatives such as former Ontario premier Mike Harris. While the media chastised the opposition parties for daring to deny the Conservatives the chance to run a minority government. Harper proved effective in silencing members of his government who voiced their personal ideas of a Conservative Canada. For the benefit of rural supporters, he stressed that the costly and unpopular long-gun registry would be scrapped. A host of tax cuts favoured small-time contractors, volunteer firefighters, and parents lacking the means to sign up their children for local teams. When the American economy plunged into its consumer debt crisis in 2008, Canada’s economy immediately felt the effect. While tax cuts had already slowed deficit reduction. Harper wasted no time in implementing Keynesian solutions, with massive funding for public works in supportive provinces and loyal constituencies. In the circumstances, who could complain about a renewed expansion of Canada’s federal deficit? If Canada’s falling crime rate seemed to offer little justification for the government’s plan to lengthen jail sentences and fund a major expansion of federal prisons, the government simply explained that crime was seriously underreported. However else Conservatives might disappoint their hardliners, they would not be “soft on crime.” As a prime minister solidly backed by Canada’s media owners. Harper kept a tight fist on potentially embarrassing opinions and information from ministers and backbenchers. Opposition questions on the treatment of Taliban prisoners in Canadian-supervised Afghan jails would simply not be answered.
Since 1911, Canada’s census had collected data on income, religion, personal possessions, and other details banned from the U. S. census questionnaire. In the 2011 census, Canadians no longer had to answer such questions. Protests from social scientists dependent on such data went unheard. Since the results usually led to criticism of governments and demand for social reform, silence was preferable. In Ottawa, the questions and complaints of opposition mps twice led Harper to prorogue Parliament to escape embarrassment or defeat. A few weeks of political silence usually sufficed to make voters forget the political issue and accept a government view that only “partisan bickering” was at stake. Meanwhile, as the United States and Europe battled years of recession, Canadians were constantly reassured that their country was the economic envy of the world, as well as a highly profitable polluter. Though Canada’s relations with the United States remained Harper’s highest priority, he brought combat operations in Afghanistan to an end in July 2011. While Canadian soldiers might still die, their responsibilities would be limited to training an Afghan National Army and police force.
By early 2011, Liberal party polls suggested that voter support was returning. Although negative advertising was usually brutally effective, the Conservatives’ personal campaign against Michael Ignatieff seemed to have missed its target. Meanwhile, Jack Layton, the ndp leader, struggled from crippling hip surgery and cancer. How could he campaign? Yet he had little choice when the Speaker, Peter Milliken, declared the government in contempt of Parliament for refusing to answer opposition questions. On March 26, 2011, Harper sought writs for Canada’s forty-first general election, its fifth in eleven years.
While denouncing the election as a waste of public money and voter energy, the Conservatives were privately delighted. Their polls told them that vilifying Ignatieff as a self-seeking visitor to Canada had worked. So had Harper’s attempt to transform his somewhat chilly image into a loyal, piano-playing family man. Canadians largely accepted his claim to have shielded them from a worldwide economic disaster while his opponents were merely playing political games. Liberals waited for their leader to perform miracles or even to defend a creative policy program. On the whole, they waited in vain. The surprise performer of the campaign turned out to be Jack Layton. Flourishing his walking stick, broadening his appeal beyond labour and the afflicted to “Canadian families,” he was especially effective in Quebec, a province the Conservatives largely chose to ignore.
On May 2, a seemingly useless election brought a bounty of surprises. As his pollsters had promised, Harper’s game plan got him the majority that had avoided him
For three elections: 166 seats for 39.62 per cent of the vote. The night’s first big surprise was that the Liberals’ steady decline since 2000 had left them with only 18.9 per cent of the vote, with a mere 34 seats. The evening’s biggest winner was the ndp’s Layton. His 103 seats, almost half of them from Quebec, made him Leader of the Opposition. The major source of ndp strength was a mass defection from the Bloc Quebecois, which was left with only 4 seats and 6.04 per cent of the national vote. While more than half the Green Party vote had vanished, the party’s leader, Elizabeth May, had won a seat in British Columbia and a place in Canadian political history.
The election was not, of course, the end of politics. By late June, Layton’s cancer had been displaced by a more brutal condition, and he felt compelled to resign in the wake of his triumphant breakthrough, leaving his leadership with Nicole Turmel, a public-service trade union leader and—like many other beneficiaries of the so-called “Orange Crush”—a former Blocquiste. While more thoughtful Canadians could rejoice that a Quebecer had found her way back to a federalist party, separatists and others preferred to denounce any Quebecoise who dared have second thoughts about the advantages of sharing the future of Canada.
The most durable of Canada’s prime ministers, William Lyon Mackenzie King, understood that Canadians are anxious about change, accepting of compromise, and happiest with leaders who divide them least and bear no grudges. Canadians live with forces in nature and geography that are much greater than themselves. A half-century and more of affluence has allowed most Canadians to learn the virtue of tolerance. A partial erosion of prosperity is a reminder of both the source and the limits of that most essential civic virtue. United in a sovereign state or divided in regional provinces, Canadians cannot escape from each other, despite the vast distances of their half of North America. Only with tolerance can Canadians expect to live well.
What Canadians need to remember from their history is the power of community and the continuity of life in a great and generous land. A cautious people learns from the past; a sensible people can face their future with hope. On the whole, Canadians have been both.
Further readings on the general themes and topics in The Illustrated History of Canada are suggested here. The authors of each of the chapters offer more suggested readings for people who wish to study a particular era or time period in greater detail.
The historical geography of Canada is beautifully illustrated in the three volumes of the Historical Atlas of Canada. Volume I, From the Beginning to 1800(1987) is edited by R. Cole Harris. The editor of Volume II, The Land Transformed, 1800-1891 (1993) was R. Louis Gentilcore. Donald Kerr and Deryck W. Holdsworth are the editors of Volume III, Addressing the Twentieth Century (1990). R. Cole Harris and John Warkentin, Canada Before Confederation: A Study in Historical Geography (1974) is also valuable.
The Dictionary of Canadian Biography, 14 Volumes (1965-), a unique multi-volume project, organized chronologically by death dates, sketches the people who made our history, high and low, sacred and profane, rich and poor, in beautifully written accounts of their lives and times. To date the DCB covers our biographical history from aboriginal times to 1920.
The Canadian Centennial Series in 19 volumes (1963-1987) is a rich source of historical narrative and analysis. Among the volumes Hilda Neatby, Quebec, 1760-1791 (1966); Gerald M. Craig, Upper Canada: The Formative Years, 1784—1841 (1963); Fernand Ouellett, Lower Canada, 1791-1840 (1980);VJ. Stewart MacNutt, The Atlantic Provinces, 1712-1857 (1965); J. M. S. Careless, The Union of the Canadas, 1841-1857 (1967); W. L. Morton, The Critical Years, 1857-1873(1964); R B. Waite, Canada, 1874-1896: Arduous Destiny (1971); R. C. Brown and Ramsay Cook, Canada, 1892-1921: A Nation Transformed (1974); Morris Zaslow, The Opening of the North, 1870-1914 (1971); John Herd Thompson and Allan Seager, Canada, 1922-1939: Decades of Discord (1985); and J. L. Granatstein, Canada, 1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation (1986) are most useful.
The definitive survey of the history of Canada’s Native peoples is Olive Patricia Dickason, Canada’s First Nations: A History of Founding Peoples from Earliest Times (1997). Arthur J. Ray, I Have Lived Here Since the World Began: An Illustrated History of Canada’s Native People (1996) and J. R. Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: A History of Indian-White Relations in Canada (2000) are also excellent.
The standard source on Canada’s external relations through the Second World War is C. P. Stacey, Canada in the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Policies, Volume I, 1867-1921 and Volume II, 1921-1948 (1977 and 1984). Nicholas Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience, Volume I, The Durham Report to the Anglo-Irish Treaty and Volume II, From British to Multi-Racial Commonwealth (1983) is an excellent survey of Canada’s Imperial and Commonwealth relations. Desmond Morton, A Military History of Canada (1999) and Donald J. Goodspeed, The Armed Forces of Canada, 1867-1967: A Century of Achievement (1967) review Canada’s military history. Three modern perspectives on Canada’s relations with the United States are Robert Bothwell, Canada and the United States: the politics of partnership (1992); J. L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990’s (1991); and John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies (1994).
Roger Gibbins, Conflict and Unity: An Introduction to Canadian Political Life (1990) and William Christian and C. Campbell, Political Parties and Ideologies in Canada (1990) are general examinations of Canadian politics. W. T. Easterbrook and Hugh G. J. Aitken, Canadian Economic History (1988) is a standard source. More recent is K. H. Norrie and Doug Owram’s excellent A History of the Canadian Economy (1991). A lively, insightful analysis of the history of Canadian business is Michael Bliss, Northern Enterprise: Five Centuries of Canadian Business (1987). Peter Baskerville and Graham Taylor, A Concise History of Canadian Business (1994) is also useful.
Craig Heron, The Canadian Labour Movement: A Short History (1989) and Gregorys. Kealey and Peter Warrian, eds.. Essays in Canadian Working Class History (1979) are fine examples of recent analysis of the history of Canada’s working women and men.
Important studies of Canada’s social and women’s histories are Margaret Conrad and Alvin Finkel, History of the Canadian Peoples (1998); Alison Prentice, et. at, Canadian Women: A History (198S); and Susan Mann Trofimenkoff and Alison Prentice, The Neglected Majority: Essays in Canadian Women’s History (1977 and 1985). John Webster Grant, The Church in the Canadian Era: The First Century of Confederation (1972) and Mark G. McGowan and David B. Marshall, Prophets, Priests, and Prodigals: Readings in Canadian Religious History, 1680-Present (1992) are valuable accounts of aspects of our religious history. Carl Berger, The Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English-Canadian Historical Writing since 1900 (1986); A. B. McKillop, Contours of Canadian Thought (1987); and Serge Gagnon, Quebec and its Historians (1982 and 1985) are thoughtful accounts of our intellectual history and historical writing.
World History
