For centuries controlling the surroundings of the Kuban River Crimean Khans made expeditions to Circassia with no aim but plundering. While for the Ottoman Empire the southern Caucasus was important strategically concerning its rivalry with Iran, it never tried to control North Caucasus, which was seen as a peripheral area, and a matter of the Crimean Khans. However, after the Treaty of Ku9uk Kaynarca with the loss of the Crimea and Kuban, Circassia turned into the front defense line of the Ottoman Empire against Russia’s further advance. At this period, the Sogucak fortress on the Northeastern coast of the Black Sea became crucial, and in the north of it was Anapa fortress constructed by French architects.
On the other hand, Russia’s first initiatives to conquer Caucasus started soon after the demise of the Golden Horde as the fall of Kazan and Astrakhan opened the way to the steppes north of the Caucasus. During their never-ending wars with Mongols and Tatars, the Kabardians sought to build closer relations with Russia from whom they perceived less threat being relatively distant. Such involvements of Russia date back to Ivan the Terrible when the delegation of Kabarda Prince requested the help of the Russian state.9 At the same time the Cossacks around the Terek River also asked for the protection of Ivan the Terrible.10 With the failure of the Astrakhan campaign of the Ottoman Empire in 1570, it then became clear that Russia would be one of the “major players in the game of Caucasian politics”.11 However, the Russian desires over the North Caucasus were checked in 1605 when a combined force of the Shamkhal of Daghestan and the Ottoman Empire dealt with a blow to the Russian ambitions, and the Russian project over Caucasus was to be delayed for almost 130 years.12
Therefore, though Russia’s activities in the Caucasus date back to sixteenth century, real involvements came in the 18lh century under the rule of Peter the Great. Before that, owing to Cossack establishments, Slavic stock in the Caucasus began to form.13 With the Cossack stanitsas (military villages) the core of the future Russian military lines across the Caucasus was started to be established. In 1721, the Terek Cossacks submitted to Peter the Great, and from then on they became the potent force in the Russian drive through the Northern Caucasus.14
In the resulting treaty of Belgrade in 1739 after 1736-1739 Russo-Ottoman war, the independence of Kabarda was formally guaranteed. After the Russo-Turkish war of 1768-1774 ending up with the Treaty of Ku9uk Kaynarca, Ottoman Empire not only lost Crimea but also ceded Kabarda.15 Afterwards Russia occupied the northern Kuban in 1781 and annexed the Crimea in 1783. Actually, Catherine II embarked on an ambitious and well-established plan to break the Caucasus from Turkish influence and annex it to her ever-expanding empire. The northern frontier of Circassia with its fortresses would be used as a catalyst for further expansion. The first military outpost, Mozdok, was established in Kabarda in 1763 on the left bank of the Terek. V. A. Potto underlines this incident as the start of the Russo-Caucasian war.16 By 1769, Russian line of fortifications was extended eastwards to Kizlar in Dagestan, followed by a string of fortresses in the opposite direction that extended northwestwards to the Sea of Azov, forming the so-called Caucasian Military Line.
As a result of completion of the Terek-Mozdok line in 1777 and Mozdok-Azak line in 1782, establishment of two corpses (Kubanskii and Kavkazskii) again in 1782, and Suvorov’s harsh defeat of the Kuban Nogays in 1783, north of the Kuban and Terek entered under the Russian control.17 18 Then in 1786 the Caucasian governorship was established, and in 1792 Black Sea Cossack Host was established
In Taman peninsula.
Russia’s activities and advance in the Caucasus urged the Ottoman Empire to establish a defense system in the Northern Caucasus. In 1781, Ferah Ali Pasha, an experienced Ottoman statesman, was appointed the governor (vdli) of Sogucak to reinforce the defense there against Russia and to attract the Circassians to the
Ottoman side by strengthening Islam there. In 1781 he would establish the Anapa fortress near the Taman peninsula, which would be the front defense against Russia. Anapa also served as the base from which the Ottomans maintained their political
And commercial contacts with the North-Western Caucasians.
In 1787, struggle resumed between the Russians and Ottomans. The former destroyed a Circassian force under Sheikh MansuR19 20 21, who took refuge in Anapa. This strategic port was taken by the Russians on 21 June 1791 by General Gudovich, and Sheikh Mansur fell into the Russian hands. However, according to the Treaty of Ya§ of 29 December 1792, Russia ceded Anapa back to the Ottoman Empire. In 1807, Russians took back Anapa and other ports, and returned them back in 1812 with the Bucharest Treaty. Actually, in every defense of the Ottoman Empire in the Caucasus Anapa fortress played a key role. Therefore, to protect the fortress from the Russian assault, Circassians actively participated in the Russo-Ottoman wars in the side of the
Ottomans.
However, it seems that there hardly was a unity among the Circassians as to which state they should turn to, that is the Ottomans or Russians. Circassians were not only disunited, but also were not stable in their choices. Their relations with the Pasha of Anapa, and the Russian policies in this respect were important to understand the behavior of the Circassians. Russia was trying to attract Circassians with a profitable trade, and it was not useless. Besides, the tribes or families having difficulties in the trans-Kuban were trying to immigrate to the Russian territories around the river Kuban.22 On the other hand, Anapa was a city for the Circassians where they could wander, trade, and rest. The Pashas of Anapa fortress were not only giving feasts and gifts to demonstrate the generosity of Turks, but they were also marrying the daughters of the Circassian Princes or members of the aristocratic families to establish strong ties with the tribes. Without any attempt to impose Ottoman institutions per se to Circassia, the Ottoman Empire tried to establish some kind of a loose suzerainty over, or an alliance with, the Circassians.23 As a result of these social bonds, prior to the Treaty of Edirne the Circassians overwhelmingly took side with the Ottoman Empire during the Russo-Ottoman wars.24 No doubt, such relations would leave positive implications for the Ottoman Empire in the memory of the Circassians even after the Treaty of Edirne.
During first decades of the nineteenth century, Russia’s position got stronger also in the Trans-Caucasus. In 1801, Pavel declared Russian suzerainty over Georgia, and by this way the Russo-Georgian alliance from the time of Yekaterina and Irakli was concluded with the full Russian domination. After this first step, Russia’s victories in 1806-12 and 1826-29 against the Ottoman Empire resulted with the Treaties of Bucharest and Edirne. In addition to the victories against the Ottoman Empire, Russia was also victorious in its wars against Iran during the first decades of the nineteenth century which were concluded by the Treaties of Gulistan (1812) and Turkmen9ay (1828). Thus, within a few decades, Russia had decisively eliminated two rivaling powers for the domination of the Caucasus, and it could feel itself the sole and legitimate ruler of this land. However, the genuine control of the Caucasus should yet to be realized by the pacification of the indigenous mountainous population. The Russian strategists thought that it would not take long. They were blatantly wrong; however, the defense of the indigenous population in the Northern Caucasus would be so stiff that the war was to continue for decades to come.
World History
