While rail service was interrupted, marine commerce was largely unaffected by the Revolution. Even during 1915 and 1916, the American-owned Ward Line provided almost uninterrupted passenger and cargo service between New York, Havana, Veracruz, Tampico, and Progreso, Yucatan. largely to maritime commerce, U. S. imports from Mexico, which totaled $57 million in 1911, increased through 1916, when they reached $105 million. Even though U. S. exports to Mexico declined at mid-decade, they quickly rebounded.21
After 1911, the oil industry boomed, the Revolution not withstanding. By 1915, Mexico had become the world’s second largest oil producer, behind only the United States. The following year, production reached 40.5 million barrels, up from 12.6 million in 1911. Between 1910 and 1921, the population of Tampico, the major oil center, increased from 23,310 to 94,667. With soaring production levels, the weak Mexican market was soon saturated, causing oilmen to turn to exports. All the revolutionary leaders refrained from damaging oil production facilities because they hoped to tax petroleum. Also, since production remained largely in the hands of American and British companies, no revolutionary leader wanted to offend the U. S. and British governments by attacking property of their citizens.22
The problem for oilmen operating in Mexico shifted from locating fields and securing leases to finding foreign markets and ships to deliver the oil. Beginning in 1912, Doheny began to order tankers to meet his transport needs. Fortunately for these oil producers, world demand soared, spurred by increases in heating, shipping, paving, industry, auto use, and the conversion of the world’s naval fleets from coal to oil. Since the oil industry had few ties to the rest of the economy, producers were largely unaffected by interruptions in the delivery of Mexican-supplied goods. Jobs were so scarce that workers would appear on their own, seeking oil-field employment, sparing companies the effort of recruiting.23
Spectacular oil strikes continued, most notably at a well known as Cerro Azul No. 4, seventy-five miles south of Tampico. When the well blew in on February 10, 1916, the 4,000-pound string of drilling tools shot straight out of the hole and landed 125 feet away. Cerro Azul spewed a 260,000 barrel-a-day jet of crude a thousand feet into the air—the largest gusher in the history of the industry. The well ran wild for nine days, saturating the ground for two miles around. When the flow was finally shut in, 150,000 barrels a day flowed from the well without pumping, making it the most productive shallow well ever. By 1932, it had produced 80 million barrels.24
The weak central governments of the revolutionary period exercised little control over the oil industry. The advantages provided by the absence of government regulation were offset by armed rebels who would enter oil camps and demand supplies, including food, livestock, and fodder. Oil companies often paid “taxes” to competing revolutionary bands so they might operate in peace.
Between 1914 and 1920, a former Huertista general, Manuel Pelaez, requested large “loans” from oil companies. These funds allowed him to assemble the best-paid, best-fed, best-outfitted armed force in Mexico. He exercised control over substantial oil properties along the Gulf Coast and operated virtually independently of other leaders. The presence of Pelaez, who was variously characterized as an extortionist, a cacique, and the champion of local hacendados, was key to the sustained growth of the oil industry during the Revolution.25
Changes in the Mexican oil business occurring at this time reflected changes in the world oil business. Increasingly, production was dominated not by larger-than-life pioneers such as Doheny and Pearson but by huge, impersonal, vertically integrated corporations. Pearson sold his oil properties to Royal Dutch-Shell. Standard Oil of New Jersey began to buy massive amounts of Mexican oil. to the oil boom, U. S. and British investment in Mexico increased substantially during the Revolution.26
As a result of oil, Mexico became more closely linked than ever to the United States. In 1911, Mexico only supplied 1 percent of U. S. petroleum needs. By 1919, Mexico supplied 14 percent of the greatly increased U. S. demand. More than two-thirds of the petroleum was exported as crude oil, with little value added.27
Given its isolation from combat zones, henequen production was not interrupted. The United States had become so dependent on henequen twine for its wheat harvest that when unrest threatened to interrupt supply, President Wilson ordered U. S. navy ships to Yucatan to assure delivery of the fiber. These vessels brought the gold used to pay for the henequen to Yucatan and then returned to U. S. soil with the fiber. As historian Gilbert Joseph commented, “While the rest of the Republic made war, Yucatan made money.”28
As soon as Villa was driven back to Chihuahua, the Constitutionalists turned their attention to economic recovery. They welcomed industrial magnates, foreign and domestic, back into Mexico. Relying on an established industrial elite facilitated economic recovery. Beginning in 1916, to increase agricultural production for both export and domestic use, Carranza began to return seized estates to their former owners, including such arch-enemies of the Revolution as the Terrazas and the Creels. He believed that the elite could best restore agricultural production. Such a return of land also allowed Carranza to build a political base among members of this group.29
Given the disruption of the war years, Mexico did not carry out a census until 1921. Based on this census data, economist Leopoldo Solis calculated that between 1910 and 1921, the economy shrank from 11,650 to 11,273 million 1950 pesos.30
World History
