Political scientist Alvaro Arreola Ayala commented on how, just as in the times of Porfirio Diaz, the political elite placed great importance on staging elections:
One of the distinguishing characteristics of the post-revolutionary Mexican state has been an
Obsessive desire to exhibit, both domestically and abroad, a formal political structure which is
Similar to or at least comparable to those of the western capitalist democracies.69
Through 1970, the opposition parties served more as pressure groups than as real alternatives to the official party. PRI presidential candidates won by overwhelming majorities—90.5 percent in 1958, 89.0 percent in 1964, and 85.8 percent in 1970. PRI candidates for lower offices usually won by similar margins.70
Since it was clear that elections did not lead to a change in government, the opposition parties constantly faced the question of what their role was. Many felt the primary purpose of the opposition parties was legitimizing the PRI. The raison d’etre of the opposition political parties was further clouded by some of them regularly backing the presidential candidates of the PRI.71
A variety of motives prompted the recognized opposition parties to continue to present candidates. Election campaigns allowed opposition parties to enunciate their views and lobby for concessions. A few opposition victories at the mayoral and congressional level whetted the political appetites of would-be challengers to the PRI. Finally, even if the opposition parties could do little for the average Mexican, they did benefit party officials and the handful of opposition party candidates who held office. This select group received recognition, contracts, loans, services, and political training for a more auspicious political future. Sociologist Pablo Gonzalez Casanova observed that the masses “learn that the opposition parties solve the problems of opposition politicians, not those of the masses.”72
In 1963, the government enacted a political reform in order to enhance the image of democracy, decrease domestic dissidence, and undercut sympathy for the Cuban Revolution, which caused the political elite to run scared throughout Latin America. The reform legislation provided that any opposition party receiving 2.5 percent of the vote nationwide would automatically be awarded five seats in the Chamber of Deputies, regardless of whether its candidates had won a plurality in any single congressional district. (There are no run-off elections in Mexico, so all that is needed for victory is a plurality.) For each additional half percentage point of the vote nationwide, the party would receive another seat, up to a maximum of twenty. This law was clearly not designed to undermine PRI power. Even if the four recognized opposition parties received the maximum of twenty seats, the PRI would continue to control the Chamber of Deputies. The law denied proportional representation to any party winning more than twenty single-member congressional districts.73
The 1963 political reform did produce change. The number of opposition deputies in the Chamber of Deputies increased from six after the 1961 election to thirty-five after the 1964 election. A wider variety of views—left and right—were expressed in the Chamber and, to the extent that they were covered in the press, these views were made available to the public. However, the reform did not entice voters back to the polls. In the first mid-term elections after the reform, voter participation declined by five percentage points compared to the previous mid-term elections. Through the late 1960s, two recognized opposition parties even failed to receive the 2.5 percent of the vote necessary to receive deputies. The government, wishing to enhance the image of democracy, granted them some deputies anyway, claiming that was in the “spirit” of the law.74
The 1963 political reform did breathe a little life into the Chamber of Deputies, but had no impact whatsoever on the rest of the electoral process. Thus for example, between 1946 and 1970, more than 27,000 municipal elections occurred. Of these, the opposition, left and right, only won forty.75