The Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman Empire in 1740 embraced a vast array of territories and peoples, from Bosnia to the Persian Gulf, although the concern of this chapter is principally with its provinces in south-eastern Europe. (See Map 2.) It illustrates each of the three themes of this study: modernisation, nationalism and the nature of multinational states. Firstly, the Empire in the eighteenth century offers a conspicuous example of failure to modernise, despite fitful attempts in that direction and despite having every incentive to reform in the threat of partition. Secondly, although nationalism was barely discernible among most of the sultan's Balkan Christian subjects, we can see some of the essential preconditions falling into place, to the point where open revolt against Ottoman rule was imminent by the turn of the century. Finally, the very nature of the Ottoman imperium meant that the Empire was by definition supranational and opposed to any accommodation with nationalism. In addition, the Empire was weakened in the Balkans not only by the fundamental division between Muslims and Christians but also by the conflict between its own Muslim subjects and the central authority in Constantinople.1

To make sense of what one historian has called 'an enormous and intricate mosaic of social subsystems', we need first to understand the nature of the Ottoman state and why it appeared to be breaking apart in the eighteenth century.2 Only in this way can the reactions of individual peoples and classes, whether Christian or Muslim, be explained, or the increasing liability of the Empire to be attacked by its rivals be understood. The inability of the Ottoman government either to reform, or to maintain order in its Balkan provinces, ultimately led to territorial losses, internal revolt and that long nineteenth-century career as the 'sick man' of Europe.