After Charles, Lord Cornwallis decided to take his army to Virginia in the spring of 1781, he left Lord Francis Rawdon the task of defending the Carolinas against General Nathanael Greene’s Continentals and the revolutionary militia. In April, Greene approached Rawdon’s position at Camden, South Carolina, but found the British general too well ensconced to attack. Greene encamped on Hobkirk’s Hill about 1.5 miles north of the town. Rawdon’s position, however, was precarious. Militia units snipped at his line of communications, and he detached 500 men under Colonel John Watson to try to check General Francis Marion’s partisans. That decision left Rawdon with about 900 men at Camden facing over 1,200 men under Greene. Moreover, Rawdon realized that if Greene were reinforced by additional militia units, the odds would only get worse. Rawdon’s best chance was to deliver a knockout blow before the situation deteriorated further. Rawdon ordered Watson to return to Camden. Greene ordered Colonel Henry Lee (“Light Horse Harry”) and Marion to delay Watson. He also wanted General Thomas Sumter and the South Carolina militia to come to Hobkirk’s Hill, but the so-called Gamecock liked his independent command and was too busy picking off easy targets and gaining plunder. Neither Rawdon nor Greene received any significant reinforcements before battle at Hobkirk’s Hill.
Rawdon decided to attack when he received intelligence from a deserter concerning Greene’s dispositions and word that Greene was low on supplies and without his artillery (the latter information proved to be false). Rawdon moved his men out of Camden on the morning of April 25 in relatively tight formation since the terrain and woods would cover his approach. Greene’s first word of the impending attack were the shots fired by his pickets. However, Greene had wisely camped his men along Hobkirk’s Hill in battle formation. The pickets and skirmishers delayed Rawdon’s men long enough to allow Greene’s troops to grab their weapons and quickly form a line. On observing the small front presented by the British, Greene then made a tactical error. Rather than holding his position and allow the high ground, his artillery, and his superior numbers to win the battle for him, he decided to attack since his line overlapped both wing’s of Rawdon’s advance—a situation that, Greene believed, would allow him to double envelop the British. He also sent Colonel William Washington’s cavalry, under 100 men, on a long circuit around the battlefield to strike at Rawdon’s rear.
Rawdon quickly recognized what Greene was trying to do and redeployed his men, moving his center to the wings with his reserves filling the gap in the middle. This maneuver meant that Rawdon’s line now was longer than Greene’s on both sides. Still, the battle may have been a near thing if a Maryland regiment of the Continental army under Colonel John Gunby on Greene’s left had not broken in the heat of battle. Gunby’s men had become disordered in their advance, with some companies getting ahead of others. Gunby called the unit to a halt, and he then pulled the Marylanders back to reorganize. In the process, the regiment became confused and retreated. Panic spread throughout the revolutionary line as other units fell back. One Virginian regiment held, which probably prevented a rout. But the situation became untenable, and Greene ordered a general retreat. In the meantime, Washington’s cavalry finally made it to the British rear, but rather than destroying the baggage train or falling on the British from behind, Washington busied himself with capturing prisoners—mainly noncombatants. However, Washington was able to help cover the retreat and save the revolutionary artillery. Both sides lost about the same number of men: The British had 38 killed, 220 wounded; the revolutionaries, 25 killed, 108 wounded, and 136 missing.
The Battle of Hobkirk’s Hill was another British tactical victory that did the king’s cause little good. Although Watson eventually joined Rawdon, the British general decided that his supply lines were too exposed and withdrew closer to Charleston. After destroying whatever supplies he could not take, and leaving most of the town in ruins, on May 9, 1781, Rawdon left Camden to the revolutionaries.
Further reading: John S. Pancake, The Destructive War: The British Campaign in the Carolinas, 1780-1782 (University: University of Alabama Press, 1985).
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