JOCKEYING FOR POSITION

By the beginning of 1822, the U. S. position on recognizing the Spanish American republics was ripe for change. Diplomatic recognition, which earlier might have been interpreted as a partisan act, would simply reflect a fait accompli. The House of Representatives responded to this new situation on January 30, 1822, when it asked President James Monroe to provide information so Congress could make a decision on diplomatic recognition. The House requested correspondence from U. S. agents in Spanish America, correspondence from Spanish American agents in the United States, and information on independence wars in Spanish America.1

On March 8, 1822, Monroe forwarded to Congress the correspondence requested and observed that five Spanish American countries—Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Peru, and Colombia—were “in full enjoyment of their independence” and deserved recognition.2

On March 19, 1822, the House resolved “that the American provinces of Spain, which have declared their independence, and are in the enjoyment of it, ought to be recognized by the United States, as independent nations.” Soon after this resolution, Congress appropriated funds to establish diplomatic missions in the five nations referred to in Monroe’s message.3

On April 23, 1822, U. S. Secretary of State John Quincy Adams wrote Jose M. Herrera, Mexico’s secretary of foreign affairs, stating Monroe’s willingness to receive an envoy from Mexico. In response, Emperor Iturbide dispatched Jose Manuel Zozaya to Washington. On December 12, 1822, Adams presented Zozaya to Monroe as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary from the Mexican empire. With that ceremony, the United States formally acknowledged the independence of Mexico. The United States was the first nation to recognize Mexico, a reflection of the U. S. fear that if it did not move quickly, a strong Great Britain would replace a weak Spain, leaving little benefit for Americans.4

Despite having recognized Mexico in 1822, the United States did not send an ambassador until 1825. The initial nominees were either caught up in political turmoil or declined the post. As a result, the distinction of being the first U. S. ambassador to Mexico fell upon Joel Poinsett. His name was later given to the poinsettia, which he introduced to the United States from Mexico, where it is known as the nochebuena.5

In 1825, Poinsett arrived as ambassador carrying a triple mandate: 1) to negotiate a treaty of commerce; 2) to obtain territorial concessions from Mexico; and 3) to foster democratic institutions. He faced a difficult situation. Mexican officials were already suspicious of U. S. territorial aspirations. The fact that Poinsett arrived after Henry Ward, Britain’s highly effective charge d’affaires in Mexico, also left him at a disadvantage. Ward had already negotiated a commercial treaty with Mexico and did his best to prevent the Mexican government from granting the United States any privileges not accorded Britain. Ward was in an advantageous position since: 1) Britain was not attempting to acquire Mexican territory, 2) the British had a strong navy to which Mexico might look for protection, and 3) the Mexican elite had already established strong cultural and commercial ties with the British.6

The British were generally more successful at advancing their trade interests since the finished goods and low-cost capital they exported were in greater demand than the raw materials and foodstuffs exported by the United States. In addition, the British were simply better diplomats. As Mexican historian Josefina Vazquez noted, “They were good observers, and they learned to utilize friendships and pressure to achieve their demands, without violent confrontations, and thus functioned efficiently in Mexican political circles.”7

British diplomatic success also reflected the priority they gave to foreign affairs. In the 1824 and 1828 U. S. elections, foreign affairs was a marginal issue. In contrast, as the major world trading power, Britain was vitally concerned with Spanish America in general and Mexico in particular. British Foreign Secretary George Canning commented on Mexico’s unique position in an 1824 memorandum:

I believe we now have the opportunity (but it may not last long) of opposing a powerful barrier to the influence of the U. S. by an amicable connection with Mexico, which from its position must be either subservient to or jealous of the U. S.8

While the British were advancing their trade interests, Poinsett was repeatedly offending Mexicans by offering to buy their territory rather than accepting the existing boundary between the United States and Mexico. This insistence was hardly Poinsett’s fault since Washington repeatedly instructed him to buy land. Poinsett’s attempts to acquire Mexican territory were undermined by British charge d’affaires Ward. In 1827, Ward wrote Canning:

I have no hesitation. . . in expressing my conviction, both publicly and privately, that the great end of Mr. Poinsett’s mission. . . is to embroil Mexico in a Civil War, and to facilitate. . . the Acquisition of the Provinces to the North of the Rio Bravo [Rio Grande].9

Poinsett eventually concluded that badgering Mexico to sell land to the United States was damaging relations between the two nations and refrained from pressing the issue further. Upon his return from Mexico, he reported to President Andrew Jackson that there was not the remotest possibility of buying Texas, since the Mexicans were a proud people who would never sell a single foot of their territory.10

Poinsett did successfully negotiate a commercial treaty. During negotiations, the question arose as to whether Mexico should return runaway slaves to their U. S. owners. Poinsett argued that if Mexico did not return them, respectable people, that is, slave owners, would not settle near the border. The Mexicans responded that a free republic should never assume the role of sending slaves to their merciless and barbarous masters in North America. The treaty was finally ratified under Poinsett’s successor, with the United States dropping its demand that runaway slaves be returned. Mexico agreed not to give any other nation more favorable trade privileges than it gave the United States.11

Poinsett also negotiated a border treaty. American officials sought to move the border south and west. However, the Mexicans stood firm. Finally the U. S. government recognized the boundary established in the 1819 treaty between the United States and Spain as the boundary between the United States and Mexico. The Mexicans argued that if the 1819 treaty did not determine the boundary, then the previously agreed upon 1795 borderline between the United States and New Spain must determine the dividing line between the United States and Mexico, leaving Florida in Mexican hands. As with the commercial treaty, this treaty was negotiated by Poinsett, but not ratified until after his successor had arrived.12

Poinsett’s involvement in Mexican politics often overshadowed his diplomatic activity. He openly sided with those advocating democracy at a time when many members of the elite did not want power in the hands of the masses.13 Just before the 1827 Mexican presidential election, he wrote Guerrero, “You know how much I want you to be placed in a position which you deserve, due to your service in favor of liberty.”14

Eventually, Poinsett’s meddling in domestic politics inflamed passions in Mexico. The Veracruz legislature passed a resolution declaring Poinsett to be “more dangerous than 20 battalions of the Spanish tyrant.” President Guerrero responded to popular sentiment and requested Poinsett’s recall on July 1, 1829, declaring:

The public clamor against Mr. Poinsett has become general, not only among the authorities, and men of education, but also among the vulgar classes; not only among individuals who suspected him, but also among many of those who have been his friends.15

Poinsett was replaced by Anthony Butler, who served from 1830 to 1835. As a result of his investments in Texas land, Butler had a personal financial interest in the transfer of this territory to the United States. He was chosen not because of his diplomatic tact but because he was an old friend and comrade-in-arms of President Jackson. Butler received explicit instructions from Jackson:

Let a listening ear, a silent tongue, and a stedfast [iic] heart, the three jewels of wisdom, guard every advance which you make on the subject of Texas. The acquisition of that territory is becoming every day an object of more importance to us. . .16

While Butler served in Mexico, U. S.—Mexican relations deteriorated. The Mexican ambassador in Washington, Jose Maria Tornel, reported that the United States was openly advocating the acquisition of Texas without considering Mexican rights. Since it was public knowledge that Butler was attempting to buy Texas, he was not popular in Mexico. In turn, he made no secret of his negative view of Mexicans. In 1832, he wrote, “These people will not be prepared for self government in 50 years to come. . .”17

Finally Butler exceeded the limits of Mexican tolerance. While returning to Mexico City after a visit to the United States, he visited a group of Texans whose loyalty to Mexico was highly questionable. As a result, in 1835, the Mexican government requested Butler’s recall, noting he was involved in “intrigues unbecoming a diplomatic agent.”18

Americans made no secret of their desire for Texas. Former U. S. vice president and then-Senator John C. Calhoun declared in the Senate in May 1836 that there were “powerful reasons why Texas should be part of this Union.” Calhoun noted that the acquisition of Texas would prevent events there from undermining the slave system in the U. S. south. He also noted that “the navigating and manufacturing interests of the North and East were equally interested” in acquiring Texas.19

None of the other U. S. ambassadors to Mexico before the Mexican—American War left much of a mark. Butler’s successor, Powhatan Ellis, devoted himself to collecting damage claims filed against the Mexican government by U. S. citizens. The claims issue was closely tied to the territorial issue. Many Mexicans felt that claims against Mexico had been deliberately inflated to force Mexico into ceding territory to settle them.20

Finally, Mexico and the United States agreed to arbitrate the claims. In 1842, the arbitrators awarded the United States just over $2 million, which Mexico agreed to pay in twenty equal quarterly installments. Payments continued until mid-1844. Mexico then suspended payments since relations with the United States continued to deteriorate, and, as usual, the government had no money.21