Aleman is arguably the most important president in 20th-century Mexican history. He profoundly changed the nation's course by allying the state with moneyed interests, wooing foreign capital, accelerating industrialization, and undoing or mitigating many of the reforms promulgated by Cardenas.
John W. Sherman, 200015
Many welcomed Aleman as a charismatic young leader with something of a playboy image. The average age of his cabinet members, who were largely civilian university graduates like the president himself, was forty-four—the first cabinet formed by the generation that had grown up under the Revolution. Military men headed only the secretaries of national defense and navy. Aleman’s rise to the presidency made it clear that the military no longer provided entry into the political establishment. Graduation from the National University and a career in government had become the route to the presidency.16
The month after he was inaugurated, Aleman declared in a widely publicized speech: “Each Mexican should be a soldier in the great battle for the industrial growth of Mexico. That is the only way we can combat the high cost of living and strengthen our economic independence.”17 By 1950, the PRI had become a smoothly functioning political machine. That year the party adopted new statutes, a declaration of principles, and a plan of action. The 1,066 delegates at the PRI convention unanimously approved drafts of these documents in two days of sessions. The degree to which the PRI had become subordinated to the president was indicated by this overblown resolution passed by the 1951 General Assembly of the PRI:
We consider the political ideas expressed by President Aleman to be doctrine of such congruence, profundity, and precision that it can serve as an official source to stimulate our thinking and our will. . . This Assembly resolves to increase its reliance on the political thinking of MIGUEL ALEMAN and the Party’s Declaration of Principles so that they may constantly guide the Party’s actions.18
Aleman forced all elements of the government to accept his ideological position. Aleman-like political clones replaced the center-left to center-right coalition that had existed under Cardenas. During his first eight months in office, Aleman removed ten governors who were unwilling to follow his policies or who were closely associated with other strong political figures. Aleman further marginalized the military, which for the first time since the Revolution was allocated less than 10 percent of the federal budget.19
Even though Aleman began his administration with a pledge to fight corruption, graft became more firmly entrenched than ever in the Mexican political system. By one estimate, during his term Aleman and his associates “plundered” $800,000,000. Lesser officials followed Aleman’s example, noting: “Aleman led and we followed.”20 Corruption took several forms:
¦ In some cases, money was illegally transferred from municipal, state, or federal coffers to private accounts.21
¦ Politicians funneled government contracts to themselves or their associates.
¦ A bribe, known as a mordida, would expedite legal activity or prevent prosecution for illegal activity. During the Second World War, when he was serving as interior secretary, Aleman, for a fee, arranged to protect citizens of Axis nations and prevent foreclosure of their property. A 1951 CIA report commented on the social impact of the mordida, “The mordida, because it gives the moneyed class an advantage over the poor, is a serious obstacle to the democratic functioning of government in Mexico. . .”22
¦ Public office was used to engage in lucrative but illegal activity. The CIA commented on Carlos I. Serrano, the head of the Federal Security Directorate: “Serrano, an unscrupulous man, is actively engaged in various illegal enterprises, such as narcotics traffic. He is considered astute, intelligent, and personable, although his methods violate every principle of established government administration.”23
¦ Insider trading took place. Just before a devaluation, those in the know would change their pesos to dollars. They bought land at low prices when they knew government-financed irrigation projects would make it valuable. Aleman purchased extensive tracts in Acapulco at low prices and then saw his property soar in value as the government built a new airport, an oceanfront boulevard, and a highway connecting Acapulco with Mexico City.24
Historian Daniel Cosio Villegas observed, “It has been the dishonesty of the revolutionary governments, more than anything else, which has cut off the life of the Mexican Revolution. . .”25 Aleman furthered rapid industrialization and increased agricultural production by promoting an alliance between the state and foreign and domestic capital. If he felt the left or independent trade unions stood in the way of achieving these goals, they would be violently suppressed. As writer Octavio Paz noted, this emphasis on development was not irrational since one of the contradictions of revolutions in underdeveloped countries is that they have no base to finance reform. For this reason, Paz believed development was tied to, not antithetical to, social reform. Industrialists and most of the rising middle class felt authoritarianism and increasing social inequality were an acceptable price to pay for achieving these goals.26
In October 1951, it was announced that the PRI presidential candidate would be Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, Aleman’s colorless interior secretary. As governor of Veracruz, Ruiz Cortines had administered his state efficiently and eliminated widespread graft and waste. Since he exuded honesty and austerity, he was an ideal candidate to offset Aleman’s corruption and profligate spending.27
Ruiz Cortines faced an electoral challenge by General Miguel Henriquez Guzman, a wealthy contractor with impeccable establishment credentials. Henriquez Guzman had been a close associate of Cardenas while serving as an army officer. After unsuccessfully seeking the 1952 PRI presidential nomination, he left the party to challenge the official candidate. Henriquez Guzman drew a substantial following including Cardenistas excluded from the Aleman coalition, military men who resented being replaced by younger civilians, members of the middle class wanting multi-party democracy, and peasants resenting government aid going to landowners with political ties rather than to poor farmers. Most of Henriquez Guzman’s support was concentrated in urban areas—a harbinger of the long-term decline in the PRI’s urban strength.28
Henriquez Guzman directly criticized the lack of social justice. He noted that rising living costs had hurt the majority, that government agricultural policy had left peasants in misery, and that there was no democracy. He also criticized government control over organized labor and Mexico’s increasing dependence on the United States.29
Henriquez Guzman supporters called for a victory rally in the Alameda, a park in downtown Mexico City. The day after the election, thousands gathered there to celebrate the “victory,” even though official election returns had not yet been released. Police and army troops attacked the crowd of Henriquez Guzman supporters, leaving dozens dead and wounded and as many as 500 arrested. The message was clear—the government was unwilling to tolerate independent political activity.30
Official election returns attributed 74 percent of the vote to Ruiz Cortines and 16 percent to Henriquez Guzman. The challenger’s poor showing was not surprising, since his party, the Federation of Parties of the People, had been created specifically to back his candidacy. He lacked a political machine comparable to the PRI’s, the means to prevent the rampant vote fraud that occurred, and an endorsement by the one Mexican who might have propelled him into the presidency—Lazaro Cardenas. In 1978, historian Olga Pellicer de Brody commented on the legacy of Henriquez Guzman’s candidacy: “Since then, members of the political bureaucracy have accepted that the only way to reach the peak of power is to submit to decisions of the incumbent president.”31
World History
