The first test of the newly trained and disciplined Continental army since Valley Forge (1777-78), the Battle of Monmouth was also the last major battle fought on northern soil during the Revolutionary War (1775-83).
With the change of commanders from William Howe to Henry Clinton, the British decided to abandon Philadelphia, move the army back to New York, and concentrate their efforts on conquering the South. Since the French navy in the Atlantic Ocean made it too risky to move everything by sea, only the heavy guns and baggage and approximately 3,000 Loyalist refugees and their belongings were placed aboard transports at Philadelphia. The British army was to march across New Jersey. Encumbering the movement of the roughly 15,000 troops was an enormous column of carriages, carts, and wagons loaded with baggage, provisions, and equipment that stretched at times from eight to 10 miles in length. Knowing the vulnerability of his position, Clinton’s objective was to reach New York, not to provoke a battle.
General George Washington, proceeding with caution, initially sent only a small detachment to watch Clinton’s flank and determine his intentions. Once it was clear Clinton was not going to initiate an attack, however, Wash
Ington sent more men to follow the British until almost a third of his men were within striking distance of the enemy. Washington then made a critical mistake. He had wanted the marquis de Lafayette to lead the vanguard, but he selected the more senior general, Charles Lee. Lee vocally opposed an attack on what he regarded as the vastly superior British army. In the comedy of errors, indecision, and faulty communication that followed, Lee deferred to Lafayette, changed his mind and accepted command, then stepped aside once again. In camp near Freehold, Clinton learned that a large Continental force was approaching in battle formation and decided to move on to Monmouth Courthouse, having Charles, Lord Cornwallis to the north and William von Knyphausen and his Hessians to the east. Washington, informed of Clinton’s destination, sent another 1,000 men to Lafayette with orders to attack the British rear guard at the first opportunity. When Lee realized that Lafayette had the chance to attack Clinton, he wrote him begging to be allowed to assume command. The
Frenchman generously agreed to serve under Lee as the overall commander of the advance units if Washington sent Lee with more men. Inexplicably, Washington allowed Lee to resume command, although Lee had no plans of his own, preferring, as he informed Lafayette on the eve of battle, to wait and see what circumstances warranted. Nor had he undertaken any reconnaissance of the surrounding terrain, which was dissected with brooks, ravines, roads, and woods. Clinton anticipated an attack and ordered Knyphausen to move before dawn toward the sea, with Cornwallis covering the rear of the column.
When he received word the enemy was on the march, Washington ordered Lee to attack, but it was almost midmorning before the indifferent leader got his troops underway. Orders were vague or contradictory and, consequently, the advance proceeded in a confused and halting manner. The Continental army finally came upon Cornwallis, who organized a series of attacks designed to give Clinton time to bring men back to his aid. The revolutionaries repulsed a cavalry charge and an infantry detachment, and they were holding their own when suddenly, instead of pressing the attack, Lee ordered a general retreat. The command angered the men, but they retired in an orderly manner. Upon hearing of the retreat, Washington, who had been moving forward with the main army, immediately rode to intercept the soldiers, halted their withdrawal, and assigned them to defensive positions. When Lee appeared on the scene wondering why the retreat was not proceeding as ordered, he found an enraged Washington. Lee explained his decision by claiming that contradictory reports of the enemy’s movements had caused confusion he could not control, and he reminded Washington of his opposition to the attack. Though Lee had no good answer when asked why he had assumed command if he had not intended to obey orders, Washington then put Lee in charge of the defensive positions while he personally took charge of forming the army in the rear. In the meantime, Clinton, sensing a chance to soundly beat the enemy, mounted a counterattack. Striking first at the revolutionary left, the British were met by devastating musket and artillery fire. Bringing their own guns into position, a long artillery duel ensued in the searing temperatures of the day. Men on both sides collapsed from heat exhaustion, and it was during the battle at Monmouth that the legend of the water bearer, MoLLY Pitcher, was born. When the revolutionaries held on the left, Cornwallis attacked the right, but was forced back. At the same time, Clinton launched a series of assaults against the center. Not until the fourth charge did Washington’s troops withdraw, but the defensive position in the rear was too strong for Clinton to risk another charge. Washington wanted to strike back with fresh troops, but night fell and the attack was canceled.
When morning came, Washington discovered that Clinton had quietly put his men back on the road to New York during the night, making a renewed assault impossible. Washington’s decision to allow Lee to command the advance units may have cost him the chance to inflict serious harm on the British. In the end, Monmouth was virtually a stalemate. Both armies remained on the field and counted almost equal numbers of casualties from the battle (about 300 killed and wounded each). Clinton got his troops to New York and Washington’s men, though forced onto the defensive, fought well against the European professionals. Seeking to retrieve his damaged reputation after his conduct at Monmouth, Lee demanded and was given an immediate court-martial, which found him guilty of disobeying orders and suspended from his command for a year. When he contested Congress’s approval of the sentence, he bitterly denounced their action, and was dismissed from the service altogether.
Further reading: Alfred Hoyt Bill, New Jersey and the Revolutionary War (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1992); Robert Leckie, George Washington's War: The Saga of the American Revolution (New York: HarperCollins, 1993); Page Smith, A New Age Now Begins: A People's History of the American Revolution, vol. 2 (New York: McGraw Hill, 1989).
—Rita M. Broyles
World History
