Led by the most talented general to emerge from the civil wars, Alvaro Obregon, the Sonorans set out to modernize the country along classical capitalist lines, while at the same time realizing personal ambitions that had been frustrated in the stifling atmosphere of the late Porfiriato.
Dudley Ankerson, 198428
Following Carranza’s death, Congress selected Adolfo de la Huerta, a former governor of Sonora, as provisional president to serve the remainder of Carranza’s term. Since De la Huerta had not been a military rival of Villa as Carranza had been, he was able to persuade Villa to surrender. In exchange for his surrender, Villa was given Canutillo Hacienda, a 163,000-acre spread situated at the headwaters of the Rio Conchos in Durango. Villa was to be defended by a fifty-man guard of his choosing, whose salary was paid by the government. Villa felt such an arrangement would protect him from his many enemies. In fact, he selected Canutillo because it was easily defendable.29
While at Canutillo, Villa created a semi-autonomous military colony, the model he had hoped to implement throughout northern Mexico. He showed his concern for education by establishing a school on the premises. He later commented, “When the day comes that a school teacher earns more than an army general, Mexico will be saved.”30
Other rebels laid down their arms during De la Huerta’s presidency. Felix Diaz, who had revolted once again in southern Mexico, was allowed to sail to exile in the United States. Many Zapatistas were incorporated into the regular army. De la Huerta not only left Mexico a more peaceful country after his six-month presidency but also substantially reduced the size of the bloated military.31
On September 5, 1920, Obregon, facing only nominal opposition, received 95 percent of the votes for president. Since Bonillas had withdrawn his candidacy and Obregon’s backers controlled nearly all the polling places, once again the election served not to select a president but to legitimize a military victor.32
On December 1, 1920, Obregon took the oath of office as president. He formed an administration independent of any one sector. Porfirian hacendados were played off against peasants, workers, and emerging industrialists, all of whom were overshadowed by foreign interests and the government.
Local military leaders who had supported Obregon in his showdown with Carranza were rewarded with considerable freedom of action as well as government support. Many of these generals controlled their states and regions like oriental despots.33
While accepting the reality of local warlords, Obregon did begin the long process of political centralization. Many local figures were bought off with government jobs or forced into exile. Cabinet members and military commanders were amply rewarded for their support with promotions and the possibility of using their position for personal enrichment. To further extend his power base, Obregon formally allied with the major labor federation, the Regional Federation of Mexican Workers (CROM).34
During the Obregon administration, the number and diversity of new organizations was unprecedented. Labor unions, peasant leagues, union federations, and political parties all sought to shape post-revolutionary society to their preferences. Their being organized around regional power centers rather than at the national level limited the effectiveness of these groups. Their sheer numbers and their diverse demands also diminished their impact on policy.35
Obregon did not attempt to contain the masses through repression as Huerta had. Rather, reform—or the promise of reform—was used as a means of political control. Obregon’s indulging in radical rhetoric served to whet appetites and make the impoverished look to his administration for change. The terms “class struggle,” “socialism,” and “anti-imperialism” flowed easily from officials’ tongues.36
Land reform became a political tool. By the time Obregon left office in 1924, 2.7 million acres, or 3.5 percent of agrarian land, had been distributed. In contrast, as late as 1925, some 79 million acres were foreign owned. His lack of enthusiasm for land reform is understandable, since his personal estate covered 8,645 acres and employed 1,500 workers. Obregon was aware that a sweeping land reform would alienate his most important base of support, the army, many of whose officers had recently acquired haciendas. Obregon stated that subdividing estates would reduce production. He felt that if haciendas were subdivided, “We would put to flight foreign capital, which at this moment we need more than ever.”37
Land reform did permit Obregon to consolidate power. In Morelos, where surviving Zapatistas had helped him oust Carranza, Obregon promoted extensive land reform. By 1923, 115 of the 150 towns in the state had received land. Similarly, given the degree of peasant mobilization in Chihuahua, Obregon felt he had no choice but to expropriate the estates of the Terrazas and the Creels and redistribute a large part of them to Chihuahua’s landless.38
During the 1920s, given the weakness of the central government, state governors had the leeway to experiment with radical social change. Such change often involved the position of women, land holding, and the role of the Church. These state governments dealt with the major issues incorporated in the 1917 constitution, and their projects were known as laboratories of the Revolution.39
Conservatives furthered their interests, with or without the blessing of the central government. Landowners in Yucatan assassinated progressive governor Felipe Carrillo Puerto in 1924, thus ending his “socialist” experiment. In Chiapas, the governor used all of his power to obstruct the work of the local Agrarian Commissions and to destroy the agrarian movement. In many areas, agrarian leaders who formed peasant leagues to push for their rights under land reform laws were declared “bandits” and murdered. Generals cooperated with local hacendados and state governors to drive off land reform beneficiaries. They used the army as a rural police force, and it sometimes turned its weapons on peasants to maintain the status quo.40
Obregon increased social mobility for the middle class. Its members enriched themselves quickly, taking advantage of the power the government gave them. During the 1920s, they became virtually indistinguishable from those whom they had fought during the Revolution. Often their wealth was based on public works contracts or simply on pillaging the public treasury.41
By 1922, speculation had begun on who Mexico’s next president would be and how he would be selected. Pancho Villa told an interviewer at Canutillo that he was considering getting back into politics. Villa was not at all discreet, stating, “I have told all my friends the same thing, just wait, when they least expect it, the opportunity will come. . .”42 He bragged that he could “mobilize
40,000 men in 40 minutes.”43 Villa also volunteered this statement concerning Adolfo de la Huerta, who had fallen out with Obregon, “Adolfo is a very fine person and very intelligent, he wouldn’t make a bad president.”44
It is not known if this 1922 interview contributed to Villa’s death or not. In any case, on July 20, 1923, as De la Huerta’s presidential ambitions began to pose a serious threat to the government, gunfire riddled Villa’s car as he drove into town from Canutillo, killing him instantly.
In his magisterial biography of Villa, historian Friedrich Katz concluded, “There can, on the whole, be little doubt that the Mexican government was not only implicated in but probably also organized the assassination of Villa.” Likely Obregon took seriously Villa’s boast that he could mobilize 40,000 men in forty minutes and feared that they would be mobilized in favor of De la Huerta. He also felt that Villa would rally nationalist sentiment by criticizing a pact, known as the Bucareli Accords, which he had made with the United States.45
During his term, Obregon personally chose those who would serve as congressmen, senators, and governors. His departure from the presidency began another Mexican political tradition—the out-going president selecting his successor without popular control or even popular involvement.46
Obregon chose Plutarco Elias Calles, another general from Sonora, to succeed him. When Calles’s nomination was announced in 1923, General Adolfo de la Huerta, who had served as Obregon’s secretary of finance, attempted a coup. He followed the example set in 1920 by Obregon, who had revolted when he was not selected to succeed Carranza.
De la Huerta’s revolt drew some 50,000 followers, mainly in the north, and had the backing of conservatives, hacendados, and Catholic leaders. Cuts in military spending had once again alienated the army, so half the generals and 40 percent of the troops joined him. The revolt drew support from independent labor, those fearing Calles’s radicalism, and nationalists who resented Obregon’s compromising of Mexican sovereignty by signing the Bucareli Accords.47
Obregon’s alliance with peasants, a product of his populist style, served him well. Feeling that Calles offered the best hope of land distribution, 120,000 peasants attacked De la Huerta’s lines of communication, sabotaged supplies, and formed small military units. In addition, U. S.-supplied arms, ammunition, and airplanes, as well as support from organized labor, contributed to De la Huerta’s defeat.48
The revolt lasted three months and cost about 7,000 lives. After personally leading the campaign against the rebels, Obregon had fifty-four of its leaders, his former comrades-in-arms, shot. The De la Huerta revolt permanently weakened the military as an institution, since so many generals died or fled into exile. De la Huerta took refuge in Los Angeles, where he gave voice lessons.49
When elections were finally held, Calles received almost 90 percent of the vote. Most Mexicans showed little interest and abstained. It was hard to excite potential voters, since opposition was token at best.50
Assassinating Villa and creating schools were exceptions to what was generally a non-activist presidency. Most of the large estates that existed during the Porfiriato were intact at the end of Obregon’s term, although ownership of many of them had passed to generals. It was only in 1922 that industrial production surpassed the level of the late Porfiriato. In 1924, Mexicans probably ate less, had fewer jobs, and enjoyed no greater political rights than they had before the Revolution.51
Although the Obregonistas took power under the mantle of Revolution, there was little change. Rather, they destroyed Porfirian privilege, such as monopolies and special tax concessions, and opened opportunity for themselves. These reforms were not addressed to the masses. Obregon, like Madero and Carranza before him, was basically a nineteenth-century liberal whose main goal was to update and streamline Mexican capitalism. Obregon did have the distinction of being the first Mexican president in generations to complete his term and leave office.52
World History
