Throughout most of the colonial period, the vast majority of New Spain’s residents remained loyal to the king, just as, being good Catholics, they were loyal to the pope. Gradually, however, colonists became disenchanted with royal administration. Eventually, after grievances accumulated, most politically aware Mexicans welcomed a clean break with both royal administration and the monarchy.
The Crown’s 1767 expulsion of the Jesuits irreparably damaged elite loyalty to the mother country. Of the 680 Jesuits expelled from Mexico, about 450 were Mexican. Their life-long exile caused resentment not only among themselves but among the families and sympathizers they left behind. For the first time, the viceroy required a formally organized army to suppress the violent protests that the expulsion provoked.2
In most instances, inefficiency, incapacity, and corruption permitted early eighteenth-century Creoles considerable flexibility, autonomy, and even a modicum of self-government. The 1786 creation of intendancies directly targeted local officials and their illegal, but widely tolerated, commercial monopolies. The Bourbon state regarded the ending of Creole participation and its corollary, government by compromise, as necessary steps toward control and revival. Residents of New Spain perceived these same measures as the issuance of non-negotiable demands from an imperial state. As historian John Lynch commented, “To creoles this was not reform.”3
In the short term, royal agents successfully fulfilled their goal of increasing colonial revenue. The Bourbons increased the alcabala from 4 percent to 6 percent and tapped new revenue sources, such as the tobacco monopoly. New taxes were placed on various commodities such as grains, cattle, and distilled beverages (aguardiente). Tax collection increased from an average of 6.5 million pesos annually during the 1760s to 17.7 million pesos in the 1790s, as growth in mining, commerce, and the internal market enlarged the tax base. Between 1779 and 1820, the cost of trade restrictions and taxes equaled 7.2 percent of Mexico’s income. In 1775, British colonialism only cost its North American colonies 0.3 percent of their income.4
Even contemporary observers felt that taxes had exceeded the prudent level. Humboldt reported that New Spain contributed ten times as much revenue to Spain, on a per capita basis, as India did to Britain. These taxes fell upon all social groups.5
For Spain, trade policy provided revenue, protected Spanish industry and influential merchants, and ensured that the colonies remained a part of the empire. In 1794, Viceroy Revillagigedo commented on this last function:
It should not be forgotten that this is a colony which must depend on its mother country, Spain, and must yield her some benefit because of the protection it receives from her; and thus great skill is needed to cement this dependence and to make the interest mutual and reciprocal; for dependence would cease once European manufactures and products were not needed here.6
Creoles resented economic restrictions, such as the prohibition on producing paper, which protected Spanish producers. Except in colonies such as Cuba and Venezuela, which could produce export crops, landowners received little benefit from Bourbon trade reforms. Lowered trade barriers hurt Mexico’s relatively unsophisticated manufacturers. By 1810, European imports were competing with textiles produced in Queretaro and Puebla. Finally, Spanish trade policy failed to recognize that Mexican mining, agriculture, and commerce had few economically rational links to Spain. The mother country could not supply the American market nor could it absorb goods produced in the New World. As historian Colin MacLachlan noted, “American economies could not be sustained by an obsolete trading system regardless of how it was reformed.”7
Military forces in Mexico were largely recruited locally and sustained by local taxes. Not surprisingly, this drain on resources created resentment. The defense strategy deemed most cost-effective—a cadre of Spanish officers who trained Mexican soldiers—inevitably produced resentment, as Spaniards filled top posts. Between 1798 and 1800, of the thirteen colonels and lieutenant colonels in New Spain’s regular army, only one had been born in Mexico. Spaniards stationed in Mexico acted as an arrogant occupation force. to thefuero, all military personal had the right to be tried in courts martial, even in civil matters.8
Compulsory military service created still more resentment. Few felt any interest in Spain’s conflicts with European powers. Poorly paid soldiers often could not afford to bring their families with them when they were transferred. Militiamen lived in mortal fear of being sent to garrison duty in Veracruz and having to face the threat of yellow fever. Soldiers feared death from this disease, known as vomito negro, more than death in combat. Volunteers for military service were never sufficient.9
Economic growth under the Bourbons did not translate into improved living standards for the majority of Mexicans. Higher taxes and the concentration of income left little for the majority. Cash crops increasingly relegated corn farming to marginal lands, while the population increased from 4.48 million in 1790 to 6.12 million in 1810. Not surprisingly, agricultural prices rose 50 per cent between 1780 and 1811. Food, housing, and clothing all increased in price more rapidly than wages after the 1780s.10
As large estates devoured increasing amounts of land and the population increased, the rural poor were caught in a Malthusian vice. Population increase led to an oversupply of rural labor, which resulted in a 25 percent decrease in the buying power of wages between 1775 and independence. This produced a steady migration of unskilled workers to cities, especially to Mexico City. In 1786, Viceroy Bernardo de Galvez declared that the many beggars, vagabonds, and unemployed in Mexico City threatened religion, the state, and public tranquillity.11
World History
