The British Admiralty Court decision in the case of the U. S. merchant ship Essex in 1805 altered official British policy toward neutral shipping, aggravated diplomatic relations between Great Britain and the United States, and set the two nations on a collision course that ultimately led to the outbreak of the War of 1812 (1812-15). With France and Great Britain at war for most of the time from 1793 to 1815, there was a tremendous opportunity for the United States merchants to reap profits as long as both belligerents respected neutral rights. Initially, the British wanted to follow the Rule of 1756, which stated that any trade prohibited before wartime would remain prohibited after a declaration of war. In other words, if France had prohibited neutral ships from carrying goods from French colonies to France before the outbreak of war, then France could not allow such trade to occur after war broke out. Merchants sidestepped this rule by shipping goods to the United States, unloading them, paying a small duty, and then reshipping the goods to France. Although such actions flouted British control of the seas—and allowed France to obtain goods from its colonies that would have been intercepted by the British had they been in French vessels—the British courts had allowed this trade to continue as indicated in the Polly decision of 1800. With such favorable circumstances, the reexport trade in the United States rose from $40 million in 1800 to $60 million in 1805.
The Essex decision made it more difficult for merchants in the United States to evade British regulations. The court case involved the reshipment of wine between Spain (at the time an ally of France) and Cuba (a Spanish colony). The British court said that the reshipment of the wine in the United States was meant to deceive the British, and it did not represent a legitimate mercantile exchange. Since Spain had prohibited other nations from carrying goods to its colonies before it went to war with Great Britain, the trade was illegal and the ship was liable to seizure. Within the next few months, scores of merchantmen from the United States were seized by the British navy. However, clever merchants soon managed to make the reshipment of goods appear more legitimate and the total amount of the reexport trade did not decline greatly.
Perhaps more important than the exact nature of the ruling was its symbolic significance. The courts put the burden of proof of neutral trade on the merchant owner, instead of the captain of the British warship that seized a vessel. Merchants, in other words, were considered guilty of violating British regulations until they proved themselves innocent, rather than considered innocent until proven guilty. Such an approach showed little or no respect for the flag of the United States. The British government had acted in what many in the United States thought was an arbitrary way, without warning or diplomatic discussion. When James
Monroe, the U. S. ambassador to Great Britain, attempted to discuss this ruling with the British government, he was told that it was nothing extraordinary and therefore not an appropriate topic for a special diplomatic meeting. The affront to national pride could hardly have been more direct. From the Essex decision until the outbreak of the War of 1812, the United States had an increasingly difficult time gaining the respect of both France and Great Britain and in continuing its profits as a neutral trader amid a world at war.
See also foreign affairs.
Further reading: Bradford Perkins, Prologue to War, 1805-1812: England and the United States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).
Estaing, Charles-Henri-Victor-Theodat, comte d' (Jean-Baptiste-Charles-Henri-Victor-Theodat) (17291794) French admiral in the American Revolution When France joined the Revolutionary War (177583) in 1778, revolutionaries had high hopes that the conflict would soon be over. Much of the fulfilment of those hopes was placed on the shoulders of Charles-Henri-Victor-Theodat, comte d’Estaing. This French aristocrat had fought in the French and Indian War (1754-63) with some distinction, and he was given command of the French forces to be sent to North America. Unfortunately, d’Estaing, while avoiding a total disaster, never succeeded in fulfilling revolutionary expectations.
The problems began soon after the French went to war with Great Britain. The French fleet sailed from Toulon on April 13, 1778, but reached North American waters too late to trap the British fleet in the Chesapeake. Little came of a plan to attack the British in New York. Instead, d’Estaing decided to join up with Continental forces and capture the British army at Newport, Rhode Island (see also Battle of Rhode Island). This campaign never gained much momentum. The revolutionary army under General John Sullivan took too long to concentrate on Newport, delaying its attack. D’Estaing managed to bombard Newport and fought an indecisive action with a smaller British fleet from New York. Then nature interceded. A hurricane swept into both fleets, scattering the ships and severely damaging them. D’Estaing decided that he needed to take his fleet to Boston for a refitting. Without French support, Sullivan withdrew from the siege. In Boston d’Estaing repaired his fleet and patched up some hard feelings, building a sense of camaraderie between the French and revolutionary forces. Then he headed for the West Indies, where he conquered several British possessions, including St. Vincent and Grenada.
Late in 1779 d’Estaing determined to aid the Continental army in the South. He launched an attack on
French naval officer the comte d'Estaing (Bridgeman Art Library)
Savannah (see also siege of Savannah). Again, things did not work out for the French admiral. The British managed to reenforce the garrison, despite the French blockade. Then in an all-out assault on October 9, 1779, the combined Franco-American armies failed to take the British fortification. D’Estaing was wounded twice in the battle, and subsequently returned to France. This failure allowed General Henry Clinton to capture Charleston (May 12, 1780) and extend the war for two more years (see also siege of Charleston). It was left to another French admiral, FRANgois-JosEPH-PauL, comte de Grasse, to defeat the British at the Battle of the Capes (September 5, 1781) and for a French general, Jean-Baptiste-DoNATIEN de ViMEUR, comte de RoCHAMBEAU, to join George Washington in the victory at Yorktown (October 19, 1781). D’Estaing, was honored on his return to France. When the FRENCH Revolution (1789-99) broke out, he tried to play to both sides and ended his life on the guillotine in 1794.
Further reading: David K. Wilson, The Southern Strategy: Britain's Conquest of South Carolina and Georgia, 1775-1780 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2005).
World History
