The powers exercised by presidents increased in the late 19th century. Until about 1870 the Whig concept of a passive chief executive (a reaction to the vigorous presidency of Andrew Jackson) prevailed. The president was expected to follow the lead of Congress and simply execute the laws it made. He could suggest but not dictate legislation, and he should resort to the veto only in extraordinary cases. Indeed, members of Congress interfered with the administrative responsibilities of the president by dictating whom he should appoint as the department heads that formed his cabinet as well as civil servants in their districts and states. The president was to be dignified and above the sordid business of politics. Neither the Civil War nor Reconstruction appreciably changed the presidency. Necessity forced Abraham Lincoln to expand presidential war powers temporarily, but he deferred to Congress in other matters, while Andrew Johnson not only lost the battle with Congress over reconstructing the Union but also damaged the prestige of his office.
Yet, whatever political experience, theoretical ideas, or personality traits presidents possess, they all make some effort, with varying success, to defy Congress and enhance their power. Ulysses S. Grant, upon taking office in 1869, selected his cabinet without consulting Republican congressional leaders, but soon, at their behest, he replaced the conspicuous political independents with pliant party men. On the other hand, Grant influenced the Senate to depose Charles Sumner, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, when he challenged Grant’s control of FOREIGN POLICY, and in 1874 Grant obeyed his hard-money conscience and vetoed the Inflationary bill (which actually had very little inflation in it).
Rutherford B. Hayes, however, consistently tried to enhance the power of the executive. His choice of a cabinet outraged party leaders, and his attack on “senatorial courtesy” succeeded to the point that members of Congress suggested but did not dictate appointments. Hayes also, in the “battle of the riders,” preserved the executive veto power by vetoing several appropriations bills with additions that were designed to force his acceptance of unwanted legislation. The veto messages, as Hayes wished, aroused public opinion. Hayes also travelled widely, spoke frequently on policies but not politics, and identified his presidency with issues as contrasted with the congressional orientation toward party organization. James A. Garfield after long service in Congress was inclined to defer to his former colleagues, but to control his appointments to office he fought and again defeated senatorial courtesy. The adoption of CIVIL SERVICE REFORM during the Chester A. Arthur administration reduced the men and money available for political parties and would in time enhance the control of issue-oriented presidents over their party.
Presidential power did not grow during GROVER Cleveland’s first term. Immersed in the minutiae of office, he specialized in scrutinizing and vetoing private pension bills. Although in 1887 he signed the Interstate Commerce Act and the Dawes Severalty Act, he shaped neither, and while he called for tariff revision he did not fight effectively for it. In contrast, his successor Benjamin Harrison did influence much of the legislation passed by the “billion dollar Congress,” including the Sherman Antitrust Act (1890) and the reciprocal feature of the McKinley Tariff (1890). And the economic depression following the panic of 1893 inspired Cleveland in his second term to convince a reluctant Congress in 1894 to repeal the Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890.
William McKinley, much like his Civil War commander Rutherford B. Hayes, was not dominated by Congress on either domestic or foreign policy issues and cultivated public opinion. Responding to his wishes, Congress raised rates and included the reciprocity feature in the Dingley Tariff (1897). He was not stampeded into a declaration of war against Spain in 1898; he personally directed the war effort; and he made the decisions that acquired overseas possessions in the Pacific and the Caribbean and paved the way for the construction of an isthmian canal. In his relations with Congress, his conduct of foreign policy, his enlarged White House staff, and his use of the press, McKinley paved the way for powerful 20th-century presidents.
Further reading: H. Wayne Morgan, From Hayes to McKinley: National Party Politics, 1877-1896 (Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1969).
World History
