In 1855, as a result of the prolonged Sevastopol campaign, Britain seemed to be more enthusiastic to take measures in order to encourage the Circassians to join the war. In late 1854, Longworth was sent to Circassia by the Foreign Office in order to assess the capabilities of the Caucasians. He arrived at Circassia in 1855 in a steamer loaded with arms and gifts for the Circassians.165 FRance also sent its agent Manduit (or Champoisser) to Circassia. According to the official explanations, they would only try to encourage Circassians to participate in the war against Russia, and would not have any politic mission.166 LOngworth was especially warned not to give any promise to the Circassians on behalf of the British government.167
According to Longworth, the power of the nobles in Circassia diminished significantly mainly as a result of the activities of Muhammed Emin. He stated in one of his letter that the landed forces of the Ottoman Empire in the Caucasus raised the prestige of Turks. On the other hand, he complained that all his efforts were averted by Turks and Sefer Pasha.168 169 According to Longworth, Turks became uneasy about his activities, and tried to ruin all his plans. In his report, he claimed that Sefer Pasha prevented his advance to the inner spheres of Circassia. He also pronounced a complain of Muhammed Emin in which Sheikh Shamil’s naib argued that the Porte did not want him to get in contact with the British officials. When Muhammed Emin visited the British Embassy in Istanbul, and when he got in contact with Brock and Hughs, two British agents in Circassia, his salary was terminated by the Ottoman
Government.
Such a less than friendly attitude of the Ottoman Empire in the Caucasian matters towards its allies during the Crimean War was quite controversial. At least a firman was written according to the instructions of Stratford Canning de Redcliffe, and was sent to Mustafa Pasha, commander of Batum army, via Longworth. According to this firman, Mustafa Pasha would completely collaborate (muavenet-i kdmile ile) with the British and French agents.170 However, Longworth’s explanations, at least, showed that there was hardly any identical and coherent Caucasian policy of the Allied Powers, and what’s more, there seemed to be some kind of an implicit rivalry among them in the Caucasus. On the other hand, the Porte also sent its agent Enis Efendi, a Daghestani, to Circassia. According to the Porte, it was necessary to send such an agent to Circassia as the other two allies sent theirs (belki muttefikeynin memurlari yaninda Devlet-i Aliyye ’nin dahi boyle bir memuru Bulunmasi kavdid-i mustelzem olacagmdan). Actually, the Porte was searching the possibility to take Circassia under its influence after the war. Mission of Enis Bey was, most probably, to investigate the possibility of this, and to try once more to encourage the mountaineers to collaborate with the Ottoman officials.171 172
On the other hand, Mustafa Pasha wanted Sefer Pasha to establish a home guard composed of the Circassians, which was to be included to the Batum corps. He also sent Haci ismail to persuade the Circassians to support the Ottoman forces. However, Haci ismail’s effort, as well as appeal of Sefer Pasha to form a home guard
From the Circassians was not welcome on the part of the Circassians.
Mustafa Pasha arrived at Gelincik on 18 May, 1855, accompanied by also Sefer Pasha. He intended to arrange a combined operation with Circassians against the Russian forts in the Circassian coasts.173 At the same time, in order to relieve their forces siege the Sevastopol, the Allied navy also started an operation in the Azov Sea and the connected territories. The allied forces occupied Kerch on 25 May.174 After the Allied control in Azov Sea, Russia evacuated Sogucak Bay and concentrated its forces in Anapa fortress.175 On June 1855, the Allied forces this time investigated that Anapa fortress was also evacuated after the powder-magazines were exploded and barracks were burnt.176 Thereafter, on 10 June 1855, Sefer Pasha settled in Anapa fortress with considerable numbers of Circassian fighters.177 During the summer of 1855, Mustafa Pasha and Sefer Pasha continued their activities in Anapa.178
From then on, Sefer Pasha’s influence among compatriots increased. However, it was the very last phase of the war, and Sevastopol and Kars campaigns would say the last words for both sides. While on the one hand, Allies won the war with the successful Sevastopol campaign, Russia’s success in capturing Kars, would resulted in its avoiding any heavy losses in the Treaty of Paris. It was actually the sign of the final failure of the Ottoman army in the Caucasus front.
In fact, the discord among the Allies prepared a way for the success of Russia’s Kars campaign. Omer Pasha, who understood the urgency of the situation in Kars best, insisted on the departure of the Ottoman troops from the Crimea. However, the refusal of France for any departure of troops during the Sevastopol campaign prevented any timely support to Kars. Only when Sevastopol fell in September 1855, then Omer Pasha could depart for the Caucasian front. It was so late that Kars surrendered on November 23, which resulted in a more powerful Russia on the table in Paris.
If Omer Pasha’s plan had been put into practice on time, then probably an allied offensive in Georgia with the participation of Sheikh Shamil’s forces would also have been possible. During his campaign in Georgia, Omer Pasha tried to establish a cavalry force composed of the Circassians. Therefore, he chose his base in Sohumkale rather than Redutkale.179 Being convinced that Sefer Pasha could not attract the Circassians to the side of the Allied Powers, Omer Pasha would try to establish contacts with Muhammed Emin in September 1855.180 However, Muhammed Emin also could not be successful in establishing a cavalry force from the Circassians to be used in the Ottoman army. According to Slade the selection of Sohumkale was the one of the important reasons for the failure of the campaign as it was very distant to Tiflis, in comparison to Redutkale.181
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