Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, nations in Southeast Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, and Aerica engaged in wars of national liberation, independence movements against either foreign invaders or European colonial rulers in the hope of gaining self-rule, social reforms, and democracy.
In the years following World War II, many former European colonies struggled to become independent nations. Their efforts led to the dismantling of the colonial empires of Great Britain and France and the unshackling of Dutch and Portuguese colonies as well. Algeria, the Belgian Congo, Mozambique, Angola, and the Dominican Republic were among the former colonies that pushed for self-rule in the postwar years. Often, revolutionary leaders favored social reforms advocated by socialist and marxist doctrines. Many forged relations with the Soviet Union, which was usually more willing than the United States to support the activities of revolutionary groups with material and motivational assistance. The United States sometimes seemed more intent on maintaining stability for the benefit of American economic interests than in addressing the concerns of people struggling for political reform.
Wars for national liberation became an important part of the cold war. During the cold war era, U. S. foreign policy initiatives responded to threats posed by the Soviet Union. When John F. Kennedy took office in 1961, he hoped to establish warmer relations with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, but Khrushchev stated instead that he would sponsor “wars of national liberation” in Third World countries. The statement posed a threat to the containment policy the Kennedy administration favored. In response, the United States continued its effort to hold back the spread of Soviet-inspired communism into unstable countries by initiating economic and military policies designed to thwart the advances of the Soviets.
In Southeast Asia, one such war of national liberation unfolded in Laos. An American-backed right-wing general battled with a neutralist prince and a Soviet-supported official for control of the country previously ruled by France. Lacking any strategic significance to the United States, Laos instead represented symbolic importance to Kennedy, who feared that the loss of the small, poverty-stricken nation to communist forces would represent “visible humiliation.” Negotiations at the 1962 Geneva Conference staved off a
Soviet takeover, making Laos a neutral country. The victory was short-lived, however, as Laos became an area of contention in the Vietnam War. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) organized an army of Laotians to attack North Vietnamese supply routes along the Vietnam-ese-Laotian border. Political and social upheaval followed.
Another such liberation effort took place in South Vietnam. The American-supported leader, Ngo Dinh Diem, failed to win popular support with the Vietnamese people while the procommunist forces of the Vietminh took to killing village leaders throughout the country in an attempt to overthrow the corrupt regime of Diem. By 1960, an anti-Diem coalition made up of communists and Buddhists created the National Liberation Front with a military force known as the Vietcong. The United States, in the 1954 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) accord, had agreed to defend South Vietnam against communist infiltration, and Kennedy held firm to this commitment. American forces, economic aid, and political reforms in South Vietnam all comprised part of an effort to fend off the advances of the Vietnamese communist leader, Ho Chi Minh. In the years that followed, South Vietnam’s war of liberation was substantially aided by the United States. Kennedy and his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, believed that the loss of South Vietnam to communist forces would lead to the fall of all of Southeast Asia to communism, and as a result, both administrations expended significant time and resources on the fight against communist infiltration. Their dedication to assisting South Vietnam’s struggle proved costly for the United States both at home and abroad.
Wars of national liberation also occurred in Latin America. Kennedy’s Alliance eor Progress sought to expand the middle class in Latin American nations to create a bulwark against revolution. But runaway inflation threatened the fragile peace between rich and poor, and the Alliance for Progress failed in its objective. Revolution grew more likely, and Johnson responded with force when a rebellion broke out in Santo Domingo, in the Dominican Republic. Juan Bosch, a former president who had been overthrown by a military junta, sought to replace the military regime with one that allowed free elections and a redistribution of land benefiting a wider representation of the population. As the military regime fell apart, it asked Johnson for help. Fearful of what he felt was communist influence in the regime, he sent 22,000 American troops to the Caribbean nation under the guise of protecting American citizens. It became apparent, however, that Johnson intended to establish a pro-American government, as he claimed that the troops had prevented “the Communists . . . from taking over.” The president announced the initiation of the “Johnson Doctrine,” a policy that stipulated that the United States would use force anywhere in the hemisphere to keep communist forces from coming to power. Latin American wars of liberation came at a cost to both the United States and Latin America.
American policy in Africa was much like that in Latin America. In Africa, between 1945 and 1970, more than 40 nations gained their independence from European masters. Lack of funds and political experience, however, prevented many new governments from maintaining stable regimes. While the United States offered little help to many of these countries, the Belgian Congo was the exception. In 1960, Congolese leaders declared independence and Patrice Lumumba, a militant nationalist, assumed control of the nation. The United States became fearful that Lumumba, who had received training in Moscow, would halt the export to the West of valuable minerals such as copper and uranium. When civil unrest erupted in the region, the United States backed Joseph Kasavubu, the right-wing leader of the mineral-rich province of Katanga, as a potential replacement for Lumumba. Following Lumumba’s assassination in 1961, Kasavubu took control of the nation. With the help of the United Nations and U. S. support, order was restored and revolution was headed off for a while. By 1964, the United States was the dominant foreign power in the Congo, but nationalist revolts threatened the region. Assistance from the CIA combined with a large-scale outlay of military aid helped quell the rebellion, but when it erupted again in 1967, the U. S. Senate forced a reduction in economic and military support. The Congolese were left to fight their own war of liberation.
Further reading: Richard J. Walton, Cold War and Counterrevolution: The Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy (New York: Viking Press, 1972).
—Kim Richardson