Tactics is concerned with deploying troops effectively at a local level, while strategy involves thinking more broadly. Military theorist Karl von Clausewitz provided a famous definition of the distinction between the two concerns: “Tactics is the art of using troops in battle; strategy is the art of using battles to win the war.” While the Union and Confederacy employed identical weapons and battlefield tactics, their respective strategies were governed by different wartime objectives: reunion and independence.
Tactics
The tactics used by both the Confederacy and the Union tended to be similar. Early in the CiviL War, most generals’ approach to battle mirrored that of the French general Napoleon Bonaparte. Napoleon did not invent this style of warfare; he was merely its most effective practitioner. Napoleonic tactics were oriented toward offense and dramatic victories. The hallmark of Napoleonic-era warfare was the massed infantry assault, where troops would advance within range of the enemy, fire a volley, and then charge forth with bayonets to finish the job. Given the relatively low lethality of infantry weapons of the day, both cavalry and artillery also bore prominent roles, with dramatic and decisive results in the hands of a master coordinator such as Napoleon.
Napoleonic tactics were effective in the time of Napoleon, as some Civil War generals had undoubtedly learned from reading the influential works of ANTOINE-HENRI, baron DE JOMINI. The tactics had also worked during the Mexican-American War, where many of the army commanders of the Civil War saw their first military service. However, in the 1850s, most of the world’s armies, including the army of the United States, began to use rifles. Rifles could fire bullets accurately at a range of 500 yards, compared with the 75-yard range of the smoothbore muskets used in Napoleon’s time. For the military leaders of the United States, it was not immediately clear what the implications of longer-range weapons would be. In 1855 the army issued a new tactical manual, Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics, by William J. Hardee. Hardee’s answer to the adoption of the rifle, in essence, was to keep using Napoleonic tactics but to go faster when doing so. The tactical consequences of such new technology were not completely appreciated at first, but caused tremendous carnage to soldiers employing it in battle from 1861 to 1865.
When the Civil War got under way, it was soon clear that the impact of rifles was going to be more substantial than anyone had anticipated. Over the first few years of the war, it became evident to commanders on both sides that the massed infantry assault was obsolete. When firing cannot begin until a range of 75 yards, only one volley can be gotten off before hand-to-hand combat begins. Charging infantry can reach their target with their ranks relatively intact. When firing begins at a range of500 yards, on the other hand, three or four volleys can be fired before the infantry reaches its target. Under such circumstances, soldiers attempting a frontal assault are almost certain to be slaughtered. Nonetheless, the use of massed frontal assault against lines and strong points persisted throughout the war, with commensurately heavy loss of life.
The advent of the rifle had other implications as well. Cavalrymen and their horses presented easy targets for men armed with rifles. As such, cavalry was relegated to a largely supporting role during the Civil War—protecting the flanks of their armies, scouting out troop locations, pursuing defeated enemies, and sometimes dismounting to fight as infantry. Rifles also reduced the role of artillery. In Napoleon’s era, cannons would have been located along the front lines of battles. During the Civil War the ability to pick off artillerymen with rifles necessitated their removal to the rear of the battle. This relegated artillery to a largely defensive role in most engagements. But even in this capacity artillery firing canister shot or grapeshot (spherical metal balls that had the effect of a giant shotgun) and cavalry armed with rapid-fire, repeating carbines could exact a terrible toll at close range. Cavalry enjoyed a particular renaissance as mobile infantry capable of covering vast distances, striking quickly, then moving off to safety before an enemy could react. This made cavalry units ideal raiders, and they posed a particular menace to railroads.
Despite the shortcomings of the massed infantry assault, Napoleonic tactics were not entirely discarded during the Civil War. Indeed, the most famous tactical maneuver of the war, George Edward Pickett’s charge at the Battle Of Gettysburg, was a massed infantry assault. However, commanders preferred to use infantry charges as a last resort. Their favored alternative was the turning maneuver. This tactic was taught at the United States Military Academy at West Point and had been used to great effect during the Mexican-American War by Gen. Winfield Scott. In a turning maneuver, a commander tried to attack the enemy from the side or behind, so as to avoid the bloodshed inherent in a frontal assault. Turning movements could be difficult to achieve, however, and very dangerous if they failed. The trick, from a grand tactical viewpoint, was to maneuver for advantage before coming into contact with the enemy and strike select portions of his line with overwhelming force before the enemy had time to react properly. This required experienced leaders and well-trained troops, qualities in exceedingly short supply for many months into the war.
Increased use of turning maneuvers was not the only development to come out of the Civil War. Most field commanders showed a willingness to embrace new technologies to gain a tactical advantage. The telegraph and railroads became critical tools for generals during the Civil War. Commanders also experimented with hot-air balloons, land mines, and machine guns. An even more important change during the war was the increased use of defensive warfare. Commanders soon discovered that if their troops dug trenches and built fortifications, the number of enemy troops needed to take the position generally tripled.
Whether a commander was pursuing an offensive or defensive strategy, there were only a handful of ways in which troops were commonly deployed. A line was a group of soldiers standing next to one another, generally with three or four feet between each individual. Lines could fire thick volleys of bullets, but they were highly exposed to enemy fire. a column was a formation with many ranks standing one behind the other. A 100-man column, for example, might consist of 10 ranks, each made up of 10 men. Columns could not fire nearly as many bullets, but they were less likely to be destroyed by enemy fire. Mixed formations incorporated both columns and lines. For example, 100 men might be organized into an 80-man column, with its flanks guarded by two lines of 10 men.
During battles a fairly common pattern of deployment emerged. Small groups of soldiers, called skirmishers, would move out in front of their armies to determine if enemy troops were present and in what numbers. During or after skirmishing, the armies themselves would march into battle in columns, often as much as four miles wide. Once soldiers reached the ground they were ordered to occupy, they would form into lines, usually in pairs. A company of 100 men, for example, would have a line of 50 kneeling men, and behind them 50 standing men. The two lines would alternate their volleys to provide a constant hail of bullets. If a charge was ordered, soldiers generally tried to maintain a two-line formation as much as was possible.
After the Civil War American military commanders stopped using line and column formations, along with Napoleonic tactics. The Indian Wars of the 1870s and 1880s were largely based on defensive warfare, guerrilla tactics, and strategic raids. This trend continued into the 20th century.
Confederate Strategy
Strategically, the Confederacy had a much easier task than the Union. All the South wanted was to be allowed to secede, and so all the Confederates had to do was avoid being conquered. Jeeeerson Davis hoped to mirror the strategy of George Washington during the Revolutionary War, holding his ground when possible, retreating when necessary. At the same time, Davis had to make some concession to political realities. A war following Washington’s example may have been strategically advisable but not necessarily popular among the voters.
Early in the war, the Confederacy used what came to be called the “cordon strategy.” No Southerners wanted their states to be invaded, and so Confederate leaders spread their troops throughout the Confederacy, particularly along the nation’s borders. This was despite the fact that the South enjoyed movement along interior lines of communication and could quickly shuttle troops to threatened points by rail as at the First Battle oe Bull Run in 1861 and the Battle oe Chickamauga in 1863. But the South was continually hobbled by a lack of manpower and, try as it might, it could not effectively cover every point along its extensive periphery. The disadvantage of this strategy soon became obvious—Union troops could concentrate on one position and break through with relative ease. After losses at Fort Donelson, Fort Henry, and Roanoke Island, it was clear that a new strategy was needed.
This new strategy evolved over the first few months of 1862, particularly after Robert E. Lee took command of the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee and Davis both favored an “offensive-defensive” strategy that had several components: First, Confederate generals would try to occupy strategically advantageous positions that the enemy would be compelled to attack, generally along the Union’s lines of supply or communication. Second, key defensive points would be defended by concentrations of troops. These troops would be shifted around as needed, taking advantage of the Confederacy’s shorter interior lines. Third, Confederate armies would go on the offensive whenever an opportunity presented itself. Sometimes these offensives took the form of small raids, sometimes large-scale attacks. Jefferson Davis particularly sought to make a move when he knew that it would hurt the political fortunes of the Lincoln administration and the Republican Party.
The offensive-defensive strategy effectively blended the Davis administration’s strategic concerns. It allowed the Confederacy to spend most of the time on the defensive and to keep important strategic points guarded. At the same time, it had enough of an offensive component that the Southern populace’s thirst for dramatic victories could be satisfied. The offensive-defensive strategy governed Confederate thinking from 1862 through the end of the war. In practice, however, this strategy entailed great risks and even greater loss. Gen. Lee’s invasion of Maryland in 1862 and Pennsylvania in 1863 began spectacularly and caused infinite alarm in political and military circles in Washington, D. C., but both ended in Confederate retreats marked by staggering casualties. Simply put, the South lacked resources of every kind to carry on such offensives indefinitely.
Union Strategy
At the start of the Civil War the Union faced a much more difficult task than the Confederacy. If the North could not convince the South to return to the Union voluntarily, then the Northern armies would have to conquer an incredibly large area while destroying the populace’s will to fight—in other words, to subdue and occupy a hostile landscape larger than that of western Europe. In addition, like his Confederate counterpart, President Abraham Lincoln always had to keep political concerns in mind.
The Union pursued a number of strategies early in the war, all of them intended to compel the Confederacy to return to the Union rather than to conquer the South. The first strategic plan to be proposed to Lincoln came from Union general in chief Winfield Scott. Scott’s proposal was almost entirely dependent on the Union navy and the use of gunboats to gain control of Confederate ports and the Mississippi River. This strategy would make it difficult for the Confederacy to get the materials needed to survive and wage war, ultimately forcing the South to give up on secession. Scott favored this plan because it had the potential to bring the war to an end with minimal bloodshed.
The Northern public roundly ridiculed Scott’s proposal. Newspapers derisively labeled it the “Anaconda Plan,” after the snake that slowly squeezes its prey to death. Although Lincoln ordered the blockade that Scott suggested, he otherwise rejected the Anaconda Plan. Lincoln knew that the public wanted a dramatic victory and a quick end to the war, and the Anaconda Plan could provide neither. When Gen. Irvin McDowell suggested an offensive against Confederate forces at Manassas Junction, Lincoln was receptive, and he approved the plan. The result was a humiliating defeat in the First Battle of Bull Run.
In November 1861, Winfield Scott was replaced as general in chief by George Brinton McClellan, who quickly went to work devising his own strategic plan. McClellan proposed to focus most of his attention on Virginia and on a campaign against the Confederate capital at Richmond. He felt that if the city could be captured, the South’s will to fight would be broken. At the same time, McClellan sent a small group of troops under Henry W. Halleck to try and take the Mississippi River.
McClellan spent several months building the Army of the Potomac into a formidable fighting force, but he hesitated to actually move against Virginia. After many months of inaction, Lincoln grew exasperated with his general in chief and removed him from the post. McClellan was still allowed to lead the Peninsular campaign, however, when it finally got underway in spring of 1862. Ultimately, it failed. Shortly thereafter, Halleck took over as general in chief.
By the time that Halleck took responsibility for formulating Union strategy in the latter part of 1862, it was clear that the Civil War was not going to end quickly. At the same time, Lincoln had determined that emancipation would be added to the Union’s war aims. From this point forward, Union strategy focused on conquering the Confederacy rather than convincing the South to return to the Union with minimal damage. Halleck, working with Lincoln, devised a plan that reversed the strategic priorities of McClellan. The Mississippi River and the liberation of eastern Tennessee became the Union’s primary strategic objectives. This change in emphasis, originally planned by Gen. Scott, became one of the lynchpins of Union victory, and it culminated in the July 4, 1863, surrender of Vicksburg, Mississippi, to Gen. Ulysses S. Grant.
Halleck remained as general in chief for nearly two years. During his tenure the Union’s goals in the west were achieved, while a number of important victories were won in the east against the Army of Northern Virginia. By the end of 1863, however, the war had become stalemated and the Northern public was growing impatient. In March 1864 Halleck was replaced by Grant.
Grant introduced wholesale changes in the Union army’s approach to the war. Grant wanted to eliminate the Confederacy’s ability to use interior lines to move troops to where they were needed. To accomplish this, he planned simultaneous advances on two fronts. Gen. William T. Sherman would lead the western armies through Georgia and the Carolinas, while Grant himself would lead the eastern armies through Virginia. At the same time, Grant realized that the Confederacy could not be conquered unless the populace’s will to fight was drained. As such, he sought to make war on the citizens of the Confederacy, destroying crops, buildings, factories, railroads, and anything else important to the Confederate war effort. Grant’s other western general, Philip H. Sheridan, was ordered to destroy the rich resources of the Shenandoah Valley. Grant’s notion of “total war” was one of the innovations to come out of the Civil War, and it would come to be a hallmark of warfare in the 20th century. In this manner the North finally brought its great strategic advantages in population, transportation, and military numbers to bear effectively against a tottering Confederacy. The Union steamroller had taken years to gain momentum and occasioned a lengthy period of stalemate but by fall 1864 was moving toward decisive victory.
Grant’s vision first came to fruition during Sherman’s March through Georgia. Sherman vowed to “make Georgia howl,” and he delivered on the promise. Sherman’s armies cut a swath of destruction through the heart of Georgia. The campaign featured the capture of Atlanta, an event that secured Lincoln’s reelection to the presidency. After completing his activities in Georgia, Sherman went on to conduct a similarly devastating campaign in the Carolinas. Sheridan’s Shenandoah campaign proved even more destructive to the Confederacy’s survival because it robbed the South of its most productive breadbasket. Destruction of the Southern agrarian infrastructure was so extensive that crop production fell below Civil War levels until World War I, five decades hence.
The war that Grant waged in the east was not as destructive as Sherman’s campaigns, but it was effective nonetheless. There the vaunted Army of the Potomac confronted the equally redoubtable Army of Northern Virginia in a series of bloody, inconclusive clashes. In little over a month’s campaigning Grant had lost 50,000 men, nearly one-third of his force; Lee’s casualties, while fewer, constituted a greater proportion of his smaller force. Grant remained unfazed by the carnage and invariably tried slipping around Lee’s flank and inching closer to Richmond, Virginia, the Confederate capital. Lee, having no recourse but to follow and protect the capital, inevitably surrendered the strategic initiative to the North. Hereafter, Grant chose the place and time of attacks along the extensive Peters-burg-Richmond defensive line. Dwindling Confederate manpower was stretched to the breaking point. In April 1865, Lee was forced to abandon Richmond in hope of joining Confederate forces in North Carolina. Grant anticipated the maneuver and cut it off. With no other options, Lee was forced to surrender his army, effectively ending the Civil War.
Grant’s strategy must be judged a success, not only for bringing an end to the war but also for bringing an end to the war when it did. The Confederacy still had troops in the field when Lee surrendered, and it could have continued to wage a conventional war or shifted to guerrilla warfare. This did not happen, however, because Grant had done more than checkmate the Confederate military. He had broken the Southern populace’s will to fight, and that was the critical factor in bringing the Civil War to a close. But the price of victory was steep—360,000 Union dead and another slain 258,000 Confederates—a larger toll than U. S. losses in World War II.
See also Appomattox Court House, Virginia; Atlanta campaign; Balloon Corps; Mississippi River war; science and technology.
Further reading: Bevin Alexander, How the South Could Have Won the Civil War (New York: Crown Publishers, 2007); Peter S. Carmichael, ed., Audacity Personified: The Generalship of Robert E. Lee (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2004); David Eicher, Dixie Betrayed: How the South Really Lost the Civil War (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007); Buckley T. Foster, Sherman's Mississippi Campaign (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2006); Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2007); Henry W. Halleck, Elements of Military Art and Science (1846; reprint, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1971); Joseph L. Harsh, Confederate Tide Rising: Robert E. Lee and the Making of Southern Strategy, 1861-1862 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1998); Arches Jones, Civil War Command and Strategy: The Process of Victory and Defeat (New York: Free Press, 1992); Brent Nosworthy, The Bloody Crucible of Courage: Fighting Methods and Combat Experience of the Civil War (New York: Carrol & Graf, 2003); Geoffrey Perret, Lincoln’s War: The Untold Story of America’s Greatest President as Commander in Chief (New York: Random House, 2004); Ethan S. Rafuse, McClellan’s War: The Failure of Moderation in the Struggle for the Union (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005).
—Christopher Bates and Michael O’Connor
World History
