Carranza had difficulty controlling the large standing army that had emerged from the Revolution and the regionally based caudillos who led it. This force, which lacked an effective internal command structure, was composed of groups of armed men who were loyal to their immediate chief, not the central government. The military received two-thirds of the federal budget, which hampered Carranza’s efforts at both social reform and economic restoration. As had been the case after previous wars, the military was reluctant to disband. Military officers, who occupied 46 percent of top government positions between 1914 and 1920, were permitted to enrich themselves through their positions, since Carranza felt that if they were getting rich, they would not be plotting coups.140
During the Obregon administration, many of the newly rich generals became petty rural tyrants upon whom Obregon relied to control their respective turfs. As Obregon noted, his military officers thought the land tenure problem was solved as soon as they owned the best haciendas.141
Academy that stressed military subordination to civilian government. The academy’s graduates owed their loyalty to the military institution, not to locally based caudillos. New graduates slowly weaned power from the generals, who numbered one per 200 soldiers in 1920. During the first three years of the Obregon administration, the size of the army declined from more than 100,000 soldiers to 40,000, and military spending declined from 61 percent to 36 percent of the federal budget. Commanders were regularly rotated so their troops would be loyal to the military institution, not to their commanding officer.142
Calles continued Obregon’s efforts to bring the army under tighter government control. In 1926, the military accounted for 33.5 percent of government spending and education for only 9.3 percent. In non-revolutionary Argentina, the military only took 17.5 percent of the budget while
20.8 percent was earmarked for education. Calles continued to rotate zone commanders so they would not develop personal ties to the troops they commanded, and he retired roughly sixty army generals, many of whom were given governorships as a reward for their leaving quietly.143
Calles’s founding of the PNR definitively defanged the military establishment. He assembled leading generals and had them each promise that for the good of the country none of them would aspire to the presidency. Calles made a similar promise. Since the party’s founding the military has not mounted a serious armed challenge to the incumbent administration.144
When Cardenas assumed office, the military still wielded substantial power. Eleven state governors were military men, and generals governed three federal territories. To continue the process of shifting troop loyalty from caudillos to the government, Cardenas raised military salaries, improved army education, and promoted junior officers who then owed their position to the president. Increasingly Cardenas used the army to construct public works, such as hospitals, ports, and irrigation canals. He lowered the military retirement age, shoving out revolutionary generals and making room for a more loyal generation. The share of top government positions held by military men declined to 27 percent during the Cardenas administration.145
In response to those who criticized Cardenas for formally including the military in the newly organized PRM, Cardenas noted: “We did not put the army in politics. It was already there. In fact it has been dominating the situation, and we did well to reduce its influence to one vote out of four.”146
World History
