19th Century

The rapid economic growth that Great Britain had achieved by the early 19th century far surpassed that of its continental neighbors. By mid-century Great Britain was the world’s industrial giant and produced two thirds of the world’s coal, one half of the world’s iron and cotton textiles, and possessed a per capita income larger than countries on the continent. Britain’s dominance of the global marketplace was unquestioned, and no nation could compete with its economic strength. Although some industrial developments had begun in Europe by the turn of the 19th century, in comparison to the British model, these activities were tepid at best. In 1851, as illustrated by the remarkable displays at the Crystal Palace Exhibition, Great Britain had achieved an advantage in almost every category of industrial achievement. Indeed, German representatives who saw the modern industrial wonders at the Crystal Palace Exhibition made a gloomy assessment that Great Britain would never lose its supremacy.1 At that moment, the European nations held no illusion about challenging the British position in the near term. In reality, however, the situation had begun to change slowly in the years following the Napoleonic Wars, and industrialization gained additional momentum on the continent after 1850 as three centers—Belgium, France, and some German states— began to narrow the industrial gap.

Prior to the early 19th century a number of historical, political, geographical, economic, and social factors impeded potential industrial developments on the continent. The nations of Europe had a history of frequent warfare in the 17th and 18th centuries, and those conflicts did not run their course until the conclusion of the Seven Years War in 1763. Within one generation following that war, the French Revolution erupted in 1789 ushering in a long period of political and social disturbances that affected all the major nations of western and central Europe until 1848. Furthermore, in the midst of this era Napoleon’s armies marched back and forth across Europe for nearly two decades disrupting opportunities for sustained economic and industrial development. Because many of the nations on the continent were larger than Great Britain in size and population, it was not easy to knit together their various regions. In addition, transportation costs remained high as it was difficult to move goods over long distances either by land or water networks. The vast majority of roads were poorly maintained and at times rivers became too shallow as a result of seasonal dryness, limiting the flow of traffic to link distant markets. In addition, few ports existed to join effectively the interior of these areas to the rest of the state. Further exacerbating this problem was the nagging retention of ancient high customs duties, tolls, and excise taxes that forced agents shipping goods to avoid these fees whenever possible. Also, local guild restrictions that had all but disappeared in Great Britain remained in effect in many places on the continent, and the strict rules and dictates of these old organizations long standing traditions impeded ingenuity and innovation.

Before 1789 most European states had not made any significant advances in agricultural practices that would increase food production while at the same time reducing agrarian labor requirements. Peasants who did work in the early mills or factories usually toiled in these enterprises only part of the year and returned to the farms during planting and harvest. This reluctance to break with old ways stifled the early development of a pool of full-time factory workers. The continent also had problems with the production of native supplies. Many resources needed for expansion such as wool for textile production or iron ore had to be imported from abroad. It was not until the discovery of rich coal deposits on the continent that western European nations changed from using their abundant timber for fuel. Even at that point, coal deposits were not located near ports or key population centers, and the high cost of its transportation to manufacturing centers added a burden to emerging industrial efforts. Thus, it would take the coming of the railroad in the mid-19th century before coal and other resources could be moved over long distances efficiently and cost-effectively for industrial purposes.

Other restrictions also hampered economic development. The patchwork political boundaries of the 300 German and numerous

Italian states, for example, resulted in a plethora of laws, court systems, currencies, weights, and measures that created additional barriers to trade. The formation of the Zollverein in the 1830s allowed the German states to take the first step on the path to overcoming these barriers but only the final unification of Germany and Italy by the 1870s finally dissolved them. In France the bureaucratic rigidness of the Ancien Regime restricted commerce and navigation and maintained a heavy tax burden that stifled change. France also maintained regional and local trade zones that intended to preserve these local economies and in essence discouraged the development of a cohesive national economy. France also continued to emphasize its luxury silk industry at the expense of diversifying production of other goods. The Low Countries also felt the lingering economic effects of earlier warfare. The Dutch had closed the Scheldt estuary in the 17th century thus blocking a key waterway to the North Sea for trade affecting the future Belgium, a situation not resolved until the French Revolution.

The distribution of wealth and income on the continent also was more unequal than in Great Britain. In some cases two separate economies operated. One produced fine articles for the more affluent members of society such as the aristocracy, church, and upper middle class; the other more poor, non-standard articles for the peasant and working classes. The lingering importance of regional dress and fashion styles lends further credence to the theory of two economies on the continent. Documents and diaries of travelers to Europe also speak to this economic cleavage. Arthur Young, the noted Englishman who journeyed to France in the late 18th century, refers to women, children, and farmers with bare feet, little meat consumption, dwellings without glass in the windows, and primitive wooden wagons that could haul only a single person or small load of goods.2

The upper classes on the continent also took longer to take advantage of the investment opportunities inherent in the new industries. The cost of commerce, banking, credit, and insurance exceeded that in Great Britain. Despite the fact that some aristocrats did recognize the potential of mining and manufacturing to accumulate more wealth, early continental industrial enterprises remained a class activity. Whereas British aristocrats formed investment alliances with entrepreneurs and inventors in the 18th century, it took Britain’s continental counterparts much longer to engage in such partnerships. The bias against the middle class lingered—a group derided by the aristocrats and feared by the lower classes. Unlike Great Britain, in most cases continental men of extraordinary talent or technical skill in the 18th century had few places to seek capital to finance their enterprises or inventions. Until much later, those firms engaged in business on the continent remained mainly family affairs as an end in themselves in contrast to their British counterparts, who viewed industrial ventures as a means to make money. Thus, in France, the German states, and the Low Countries, such family-oriented firms looked for security, applied a conservative approach, and did not often take chances such as obtaining long-term loans or seeking alliances with other potential investors.

On the other hand, despite those obvious disadvantages and the gap between Great Britain and the continent, the situation was not as grim as it may first appear. Many countries on the continent had real potential for growth and shared some of the basic characteristics that had propelled Great Britain into the forefront. For example, great supplies of coal awaited discovery by the mid-19th century. A few technical developments were also at work alongside those in Great Britain. The French Jacquard Loom, which appeared in the early 19th century, is a prime example (see Biographies). In addition, 18th-century banks in a few areas such as the Low Countries and Switzerland offered loans to private enterprises similar to the experience in Great Britain. Even in pre-revolutionary France, the Bourbon regime supported a handful of national and private manufacturing enterprises and in 1786 completed a treaty with the British to allow certain British goods to penetrate the French market.3 In addition, the short distance between Great Britain and its European neighbors meant that it was not entirely possible to shut off the flow of ideas and techniques from Great Britain to the continent. Indeed, before 1789, a small number of continental observers had traveled to the British Isles to learn about the latest industrial developments. The chaos and warfare of the French Revolution and Napoleonic eras did disrupt some of the early industrial developments on the continent but also helped to accelerate other political and economic changes. Napoleon abolished the Holy Roman Empire and France, Belgium, and the German states eliminated guilds and other commercial restrictions. It is also true that although Napoleon’s Continental System closed off Europe from British competition and the acquisition of current technology, his anti-British program resulted in some independent developments and prepared the continent for more rapid advance and assimilation of technical innovation after 1815.

Despite these changes, the early industrial experience on the continent was different and more uneven than the British example. In the 18th century, governments on the continent had a more direct influence on the lives of their people. The evolution of industrial development followed this pattern. Whereas in Great Britain much of the early investment in industrialization came from the private sector, in Europe most governments provided grants for education and inventors, waived any import tax on purchased foreign equipment, and even financed infrastructure improvements such as roads, canals, and harbors and even early mill construction, particularly in the arms and luxury industries. In addition, governments established protective tariffs to protect their domestic goods from the cheaper British versions. These efforts proved costly and achieved only modest success. France had only a few cotton mills in operation by 1780 and a decade later could count relatively few working spinning jennies and water frames. The Arkwright water frame and Crompton mule did not appear in Saxony until the late 1790s and in the Low Countries at the turn of the century. Coke-blast furnaces were built during the same time in several German states but not in the Low Countries until the 1820s. The one major exception is that the continent did dabble in steam power at an early date. The first Newcomen engine arrived on the continent by 1721, and by 1750 it had been replicated and spread all over Europe. By 1790 thirty-nine improved atmospheric engines were located in the Mons area alone.4 The dislocation and upheavals of the French Revolution and Napoleon occurred at this vital moment and severed the continent’s link with Great Britain for nearly a generation. However, the embryonic stage of European industrial development left enough of an impression to prepare the continent for the real surge after 1815.

One important step was the acquisition of British techniques, a process that took several routes. The British government, most assuredly, feared the loss of its advantage and put strict laws in place against the exportation of the new industrial technology. At times the British levied stiff fines or prison sentences on persons violating the legal prohibitions. But penalties notwithstanding, it was virtually impossible to stem the exchange of ideas. British technical publications, engineering journals, and professional bulletins flowed to the continent, and their reprints provided details of inventions, machines, and factory enterprises to energetic individuals who thirsted for such information. Industrial spies also journeyed to Great Britain to seek information and return home with knowledge of machines and techniques. In addition, some legitimate agents who had approved commissions to purchase equipment for customers in Europe also received in-depth exposure to British technology. Furthermore, some Europeans gained employment in British factories and learned technical secrets. These workers drew sketches of equipment or built small models to take home and sell for a profit. Occasionally those persons smuggling secrets were apprehended, but it is certain that many individuals went undetected. Belgian agents, for example, stole equipment and whisked it home by rowboat or even resorted to kidnapping British workers.

Finally, the acquisition of detailed British scientific and industrial knowledge and its appearance in publications on the continent spurred the development of technical schools, particularly in France and the German states.5

The British could be their own worst enemy when it came to industrial information. Some industrialists were more open than others regarding the sharing of information, even to the point of providing foreigners with blueprints, models, and machine parts. British workers also received enticements to go abroad, although the British government considered this activity illegal until 1825. Records of continental enterprises in the early 19th century depict a number of British workers on the rolls, a fact that affirms that the British government failed to stop the loss of technical talent and information. These workers often found it profitable to go to the continent as employers offered high wages and bonuses to attract their skills. It is estimated that some

15,000 British workers were employed in French textile and metallurgy enterprises in 1830. A few industrialists on the continent groused at this windfall, complaining, for example, that their British workers were subpar and often drank excessively.6

After 1815 the British government debated the merits of maintaining such tough prohibitions against the exportation of technical information, machines, and labor. Beginning in the 1820s, several parliamentary commissions studied the issue. The grudging assessment was that it was exceedingly difficult to stop the losses. Even though some industrialists argued to maintain the strict laws in place, others believed that they hurt potential trade and exports to the continent and conceded that those nations would certainly turn elsewhere for technology and assistance if British sources were closed. Thus, the face of the entrepreneurs, factory managers, and workers on the continent increasingly took a decidedly British appearance after 1825.

The inability of Great Britain to stop the tide of industrial information to the continent and elsewhere and its ultimate capitulation had an impact that cannot be underestimated. Samuel Slater took the plan of the Arkwright textile factory to the United States in the late 18th century. Two British industrialists started the first Swiss textile mill. The William Cockerill family took textile machinery to France in the 1790s, and Napoleon granted its members French citizenship in 1810. The Cockerill plants employed 2,000 at Liege in 1812 and by the 1830s could boast the largest metallurgical and machine factory in the world. Belgium hired George Stephenson to establish its railroad. In 1838 Alfred Krupp studied the British railroad and mining industries. In many respects this seeding of continental industry by British entrepreneurs and workers did not reach its full potential as the cost of importing these persons was high. Many wanted to stay only short periods of time and then return home. Thus, they were paid by their time and not production results, and their real impact was what they taught European managers and workers rather than what they produced.7 Nonetheless, despite the initial efforts to maintain its industrial seclusion and supremacy, by 1850 Great Britain had, perhaps reluctantly, accepted its role as the major contributor to the industrial development of the continent and the United States.

In 1815, however, the gap that existed between Great Britain and the continent was significant. Great Britain had expanded its overseas markets during the period from 1789 to 1815 and made substantial connections with Africa, South America, and East Asia. The size and sophistication of industrial machinery had leaped to new levels. The typical mule now had 1,000 spindles and was often powered by steam. Mills, blast furnaces, puddling furnaces, etc. had all increased in size. The steam engine’s horsepower had increased from six to eight hp in the late 18th century and to fifty hp by the 1820s. In order to initiate industrial activity quickly, entrepreneurs in France, Belgium, and Germany did not attempt to purchase the latest equipment but rather sought smaller, used versions. The use of these obsolescent machines also meant that Great Britain would retain its competitive advantage for a few decades longer. After 1815 various European states took other direct actions to improve their industrial capabilities. Between the 1830s and 1850s, first Belgium and then France and the German states organized joint-stock investment banks that pooled the capital of thousands of investors and poured these assets into mining and heavy industry development. The Belgian joint-stock ventures were the most successful ones initially, whereas the French devoted a larger share of its capital into public works. By the time the continent entered fully into the industrial era, the larger pool of capital provided by governments and particularly the joint stock investment banks provided the financial basis for a rapid development of industry.8

The first continental industrial spurt occurred in Belgium. As was the case in Great Britain, a growing population contributed to this development. The Belgian population grew dramatically in the period from 1801 to 1850 from 3 million to 4.3 million inhabitants. By the mid-19th century, half of Belgians lived in urban areas, a situation that was decades ahead of the French and German experience. One major advantage that Belgium possessed was that the nation sat atop a large coal deposit and thus shifted at an early date to the use of mineral fuel. Indeed, during the 1830s and 1840s Belgium was the largest coal producer on the continent. By 1850 Belgium produced 3 million metric tons of coal per year, and that capacity jumped three-fold by 1873.

This seemingly endless supply of coal supported the iron industry. Belgium adopted coke blasting in the 1820s, and its major blast furnaces increased from 10 in 1826, to 23 in 1836, and 46 in 1847. The result was that the German states imported one sixth of their overall iron from Belgium in 1842, and that percentage had increased to two thirds by 1850.9 During the same period the export of pig iron to the Zollver-ein rose from 9,500 tons to 76,000 tons. Belgian focus on heavy industry received financial banking from the joint-stock ventures and the establishment of the Bank of Belgium. The final key piece of development was Belgium’s early decision to construct a rail network. By 1850 the nation had completed all of its major railway arteries to include key lines crossing north-south and east-west. Railroad mileage grew from 531 miles in 1850 to more than 2,300 miles in 1873.10

The trends did not occur in a similar fashion in all areas of the continent. The French experience speaks to this lack of uniformity in the industrialization process. France was the most populous country in Europe at the beginning of the 19th century. It continued to expand its population, but at a slower pace than the rest of Europe. While the overall population of Europe more than doubled in the 19th century, the French increase was merely 45%. This phenomenon was a result of lower birth rates rather than higher death rates. The most substantial urban growth was in the northern part of the country in cities such as Lille and Reims. While cities did increase in size, the average 19th century French worker still resided in an old city rather than a new factory town. Of the twenty-five largest cities in France in 1851, all but one had been chartered for more than 200 years. The slower population increase, however, meant that there were fewer workers to migrate to factories. By 1850 only 20% of all workers doing manufacturing work were employed in factories or mines. The nature of French industrialization resulted in a less revolutionary pattern of economic growth in comparison with Great Britain and its neighbors. Thus, many local and regional markets continued to exist and flourish. French industry joined with handicrafts and agriculture to ensure a slow but steady pace toward industrialization. Indeed, while the raw number of factory workers in the unskilled force increased in the 19th century, it has been estimated that the size of small scale artisans remained double that of factory workers until 1870. Yet, the more leisurely pace of the growth of factories ensured that skilled artisans survived as a group. Until the advent of interchangeable parts on a grand scale, French factory owners employed numerous machinists who were a separate class of artisans and were noted for their intelligence, skill, dexterity, and good judgment and stood out from the unskilled laborers in enterprises which they worked. While many artisans did labor for the

French national and international markets, the vast majority continued to make products and goods for local consumption—food, clothing, shoes, tools, utensils, etc.—until a substantially improved road network could be constructed later in the century (see Document 1). Many ancient French products such as silk, fine furniture, and porcelain also retained their local attraction and marketability. This combination of new industrial factories and the older craft industry with standard design techniques meant that France made a gradual and successful transition to the Industrial Revolution. Whereas the shift in Great Britain was the growing of unskilled labor in factories and mills, the French experience did not spell immediate doom for the artisan class.11

Therefore, French industrial growth initially lagged behind that of its contemporaries in Europe. However, there were success stories. By 1850 France had become the most important cotton textile manufacturer on the continent, although it remained no match for Great Britain. Unlike Great Britain, which concentrated its textile manufacturing in the two major centers of Lancashire and Glasgow, the majority of French textile firms were scattered north of the Loire River with the key centers in Normandy, Roubaix-Tourcoing, and in the Alsatian region and the remainder throughout the country. The pace of industrial development in the textile industry varied from region to region in the number of spindles in operation, the adaptation of steam power, and transition to more sophisticated power-driven machinery. For example, in 1847 Normandy had 83 mills that continued to operate with animal or hand power, and 22% of these mills had more than

10,000 spindles each. In 1832 Great Britain consumed 125,600 metric tons of raw cotton, while France’s total was just 33,600 metric tons. By 1850 France’s rate of consumption had doubled and kept pace with Great Britain’s rate of increase, although its total consumption in actual tons still significantly trailed the British. French textile production in the period remained less than the British because its smaller factories, reliance on older machinery, and a less productive labor force resulted in a higher cost industry.12

In other industries progress was notable. Coal production increased thirteen times from 1820 to 1870, and iron production grew six times during the same period. In the area of technical development, the key invention of the Jacquard Loom used for fine cloth gave a real impetus to the textile industry and laid the foundation for future technological improvements. Finally, in the early 1840s the French government moved to establish a substantial railroad system. In contrast to the British private railroad enterprises, the French government initially financed construction and then leased the railway lines to private

Companies for niney-nine years. French railroad construction proceeded at a steady pace from roughly 300 miles in 1842 to more than

23,000 miles in 1900.13

The German states entered the Industrial Revolution later than France. The drawbacks were the lack of a strong national market because of the large number of individual states, a factor that changed rapidly with the creation of the Zollverein in 1834, the lack of tariff protection for native industries, a dearth of skilled workers, and the late appearance of an inventive spirit. The German industries also relied heavily on foreign, primarily British, technology until the 1870s. Even the German industrialists believed their situation was initially weak. In the 1830s a German manufacturer claimed that he could not locate one German laborer who had the knowledge and skill to make a machine screw.14

A review of several aspects of German industrial trends in the 19th century present a picture of a long but steady successful effort to compete with the British. Germany’s population increase, although it trailed Great Britain’s rate of growth, dramatically outpaced the French and rose from 23.5 million in 1810 to 33.5 million in 1850. Although it would not be until the turn of the 20th century that more Germans lived in urban areas than on farms, the rapid population increase did eventually provide more potential workers for factories. In the 1830s German coal mining leaped two-fold. With the introduction of new technology to dig deeper mine shafts, German coal production increased another seven times from the 1840s to 1870, particularly after the opening of the coal rich Ruhr valley brought new possibilities to German manufacturing. The German states experienced the slowest continental development in the iron industry. In the years from the 1830s to the 1850s, German pig iron and wrought iron production lagged far behind Great Britain and was only half that of France. In 1845, for example, the Dowlais ironworks in Wales produced 80,000 tons of pig iron whereas the largest Silesian ironworks managed to produce only 16,000 tons. Even the coke-smelting enterprises could not compete by mid-century. British smelting industries averaged 89 tons a week in the late 1840s, whereas the German states produced only about 14 tons. The introduction of the coke-smelting technique in the iron industry, however, resulted in a steady, annual 14% iron production increase in the 1850s.15

In the textile industry, the German states’ total consumption of cotton rose seven times from 2,400 metric tons in 1832 to 17,000 metric tons in 1850. Although it surpassed Belgian production in 1834 and sliced the difference with France by mid-century, it still remained less than 10% of the British consumption at that time. The German textile industry mirrored that of the French in that it was scattered with specific concentrations in the Rhineland, Saxony, Silesia, and Bavaria. In addition, the enterprises were generally family run enterprises and remained small with few spindles in operation. These endeavors came and went as more profitable economic times waxed and waned. In most of the textile areas, entrepreneurs remained wedded to older practices and used equipment considered obsolete in Great Britain (some machinery dated back to the late 18th century). The first modern spinning mills did not appear in the Rhineland until the 1840s, and even then only a few of the textile processes used machine power rather than animal, water, and hand power. Only in the 1850s did conditions change. Additional capital from joint-stock ventures, including funds from Switzerland, began to appear in some of the German states. The number of steam engines and spindles in the ZoUverein increased significantly, while the number of hand looms decreased. The weaving industry lagged behind that of spinning and did not get a boost until the introduction of the power loom in the mid-1820s and a surge in factory production in the 1830s.16

The continent remained a generation behind Great Britain in most categories of industrial development at the middle of the 19th century. Most industry in the key western European areas (France, Belgium, and the German states) remained scattered in a number of areas. Until the advance of the railroad that dispersion remained an impediment to more rapid economic advancement. This nature of continental enterprises meant that local domestic industry would remain important for a longer period than it had in Great Britain. There was nothing to compare to the British enclosure movement on the continent. Old patterns of land tenure persisted. Rural labor remained cheap and more agrarian workers tended to stay tied to the land. Other than in Belgium, there was a slower growth of cities and consequently the growth of the number of workers in mines and factories proceeded at a more moderate pace than in the British Isles. The cities on the continent, therefore, did not witness the ugly blight of slums, overcrowding, filth, and disease to the extent found in Britain. Great Britain reveled in the world of technology and most entrepreneurs, at least until the reform era of the 1840s, did not fret about the loss of employment of their workers if technology, efficiency, and production maintained profits. On the continent, an entirely different perception was at work. New factory owners, emerging in societies only recently removed from the older traditions that were tied to feudal and manorial rights, viewed themselves in a paternalistic manner. Workers were not mere factors of production that could be added or shed like the early British approach but rather agents of work that needed a strict guiding hand.

In many respects, the fear of proletarian unrest that reared its head in 1789 lingered in the minds of the new class of industrialists on the continent. Whereas in British political circles there grew to be a grudging realization in the 19th century that the workers’ voice or the threat of a strike needed to be taken seriously, continental employers maintained the opinion that their workers should not disrupt the public order and that any efforts to organize were illegal and immoral.