At the beginning of the 20th century, the War Department and army still retained the same organizational structure established after the War of 1812. There were two elements to it—a departmental staff and the army in the field, which was separated into tactical units based on geography and under military commanders. A legacy of bureau autonomy and congressional control in managing the affairs of the War Department was considered the principal problem of army organization.
Elihu Root, lawyer statesman, and future Nobel Peace Prize winner, became secretary of war in 1899 under President William McKinley (see Volume VI). He immediately set to work at reforming the armed forces. During the Spanish-American War, the absence of planning and preparation, lack of cooperation among the bureaus, and delays due to bureaucratic red tape scandalized the public. Secretary Root believed that drastic changes needed to be made in the War Department if it were to operate effectively during wartime. He wanted to modernize the army and streamline it, based on a corporate model influenced by scientific management. According to Root, the government could profit from the lessons and experiences of modern industry. Root created the general staff, abolished the position of commanding general, and required that the chief of staff act under the authority and direction of the secretary of war and the president. Many of these changes were instituted in the Army Act of 1901.
In November 1903 War Secretary Root established the Army War College. Its main function was to train officers for general staff duties in military intelligence, congressional liaison, and war planning. During his tenure in office, Root also enlarged West Point, opened schools for special branches of the service, strengthened control over the National Guard, and restored discipline within the department. He resigned in January of 1904.
When Henry L. Stimson became secretary of war in 1911, he instituted more reforms. Along with General Leonard Wood, the army’s first executive chief of staff, Stimson reorganized the general staff into the Mobile Army, Coast Artillery, War College, and later Militia Affairs divisions. The Mobile Army was further broken down into infantry, cavalry, field artillery, and miscellaneous sections. The effort to rationalize and integrate a fragmented and large-scale organization followed principles set out by modern industrial managers. The army and navy conducted further rationalization and efficiency studies.
In 1914 the Army War College issued a report entitled A Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the United States, which warned of the dangers of isolationism as foreign policy. It argued that newer military technology, such as the submarine, the airplane, and the wireless telegraph, placed the United States within the sphere of hostile actions of overseas nations. No longer could the nation depend on distance and geography to protect it. War College estimates demanded a standing army of at least 500,000, with a reserve of equal force. They also called for arms and training programs.
The National Defense Act of 1916 defined the roles and missions of the regular army, the National Guard, and the reserves, placing the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) and the Plattsburg idea (training for reserve officers) on firm footing. The law reduced significantly the number on the general staff, and the Mobile Army Division was abolished. After declaring war on Germany, however, Congress passed emergency legislation increasing the size of the general staff again. The National Defense Act allowed the president to commandeer factories and establish a government nitrate plant. It also doubled the size of the army by adding 11,450 officers and 223,580 enlisted men in annual increments over a five-year period. The National Guard was allowed to expand to 17,000 officers and 440,000 men. A corresponding naval appropriations bill widened the effect of the measure as naval expenditures rose. After diplomatic relations with Germany broke down, in 1917 President WooDROW Wilson ordered the arming of American merchant ships to defend themselves against U-boat attacks.
In spite of the National Defense Act, the nation would be unable to recruit up to the authorized number. In consequence, ground forces of the army numbered only 128,000 when America entered World War I. The Selective Service Act of 1917, which required that all men between the ages of 18 and 45 to register for the military draft, was used to bolster the military. Twenty-four million men registered, and the army was increased to 4 million soldiers. Congress increased appropriations for training and equipping the new American Expeditionary Force for use in the European theater of the war.
The U. S. Navy was the second largest in the world when the United States entered the war in 1917. The navy focused on building the submarine chasers and destroyers needed to protect American ships. There were 35 U. S. destroyers stationed at Cob in Ireland by July 1917. By the end of the war, more than 380 U. S craft were stationed overseas. In addition, Congress provided for the growth of the Merchant Marine under the United States Shipping Board.
Immediately following World War I, Congress rejected the principle of tight executive control or unity of command in the army. The National Defense amendments of June 4, 1920, returned to the prewar pattern of fragmented authority and congressional supervision. In a 1920 act, Congress reaffirmed the traditional military. The nation continued to rely in peacetime on a small standing army supported by a citizen’s militia, the National Guard, and military activities. The 1920 amendments also provided for a War Council made up of the secretary, assistant secretary, John Pershing, the general of the armies, and the chief of staff for the purpose of discussing and formulating military policy. It was, however, of little practical use, as the War Council did not meet on a regular basis.
During the interwar period, the navy continued to develop, despite the disarmament agreements signed at the Washington Coneerence on Naval Disarmament. In contrast, the army between the wars saw drastic reductions in number. Until the late 1930s, the army had little more than a peacetime force of less than 150,000 men in nine divisions, none of them ready for combat. The army’s reputation and morale suffered from budget cuts and disillusionment over America’s role in World War I. A major change in the organization of the War Department happened between the wars as army airmen strove to establish an air service separate from the ground forces. General William “Billy” Mitchell and others led the effort. In 1926 the War Department finally organized the Army Air Corps with its own chief. Like the Senior Service, the Army Air Corps remained small and undeveloped. The isolation of the interwar years kept the military small and expenditures low, despite growing world tensions.
See also aviation; conscription; Preparedness.
Further reading: Allan R. Millet, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America (New York: Free Press, 1984).
—Annamarie Edelen
World History
