Union army

The Union army comprised the U. S. Army of full-time, “professional” soldiers and, quite literally, an army of volunteers. Through the course of the Civil War, those volunteers were largely citizen-soldiers who fought not only the most costly but the bloodiest war in U. S. history. The Civil War’s victorious army, after a bumpy start, became the largest and best supplied military force the world had ever witnessed. By May 1865 the soldiers in the Union army numbered more than 1 million and the total count of men who served three-year enlistments was more than 2.3 million. Most important, the Union army was responsible for reuniting the nation and liberating 4 million slaves. The American polity deeply distrusted standing professional forces, so in peacetime the army tended to be extremely small compared with those of European nations. Even during periods of hostility, such as the War of 1812 and the Mexican-American War (1846-48), the bulk of American land forces were drawn from state militias and volunteers, as opposed to regulars. The Civil War was no exception to this long-accepted practice. In sum, while the Union army may have rivaled contemporary European forces in size and combat performance, it managed national security within the confines of uniquely American political precepts.

Creating and sustaining a formidable army to oppose Southern rebellion was initially very difficult. The North, like the South, was totally unprepared to train and supply the large number of men needed to fight what quickly became a total war. In early 1861, the regular army (the U. S. Army) consisted of only 15,259 enlisted men and 1,000 officers. After Fort Sumter, President Abraham Lincoln called for 75,000 militia volunteers to serve for three months. Northern governors offered 300,000 more troops and were responsible for providing equipment and UNieorms. A bigger challenge yet was the retention of experienced leaders. Nearly one-third of all officers trained at the United States Military Academy at West Point resigned their commissions to serve the Confederacy. Many of the senior Union officers with lengthy military experience, such as Gen. Irvin McDowell and George Brinton McClellan, were professional and talented, as were many former graduates such as Ulysses S. Grant and William T. Sherman. It nonetheless took a long period of trial and error to weed out incompetent officers at every level of command. By 1863 the bulk of Union leadership were seasoned veterans and highly capable in their appointed duties.

It must also be acknowledged that the North had the advantage in terms of industry and population. At the time of the outbreak of civil war, close to 90 percent of the nation’s overall industrial capacity was located in the North, with additional factories, mills, and foundries added as the conflict unfolded. This disparity put far greater materiel resources at the Union’s disposal: cannon, rifles, and related battlefield impedimenta, and also transportation. The Union could quickly manufacture steam engines and railroad tracks in whatever quantity deemed necessary. The disparity in population was equally telling. The North had a 2.5:1 advantage in numbers overall, while the ratio of those eligible for military service was 4.28:1. But in 1861 the nation lacked the administrative expertise and strategic direction to harness these advantages.

In May 1861, without explicit authority from Congress (which was not in session until July), Lincoln increased the size of the regular army to just over 22,000 soldiers. At the same time Lincoln called for 42,000 three-year volunteers. Lincoln believed his position as commander in chief allowed for his actions without congressional approval. In July 1861, Congress affirmed Lincoln’s extralegal decisions and authorized a volunteer army of 500,000 men. Congress also called for 300,000 more men for three-year terms. As the war progressed, volunteering declined dramatically. Though the North had a large population advantage over the South (18,936,579 to 5,447,646, with 4,559,782 versus 1,064,193 of draft age), the terrible costs of the war made young men reluctant to join the army. Losses through battlefield casualties, desertion, illness, and expiration of enlistment made it imperative to continuously add more soldiers. Congress issued another call for 300,000 volunteers in July 1862. The low response led to the bounty system, which offered cash inducements to enlist.

By spring 1863 the Union army was in need of still more men. On March 3, Congress passed the Enrollment Act calling for the first forced conscription in U. S. history. By its terms states were required to fill a certain quota of troops based on population and previous enlistment numbers. Any state failing to fill its quota would be subject to a draft. The Enrollment Act also contained a provision that allowed a person to hire a substitute or pay $300 to avoid service. More than 125,000 men took advantage of this. These exclusions reinforced the deep-rooted but erroneous notion among the immigrant working class that the Civil War was a “rich man’s war and a poor man’s fight.” Resentment exploded into the New York City draft RiOTS in 1863. After several days of rioting, Union combat troops were brought in from Gettysburg to put an end to the chaos.

Ultimately, draftees were not an especially important part of the Union army. Fewer than one man in 10 was a draftee, and beyond that, draftees tended to be poor soldiers. This is not to say that the draft was not important to the Union army, however. At the same time that Congress created the draft, it also established a series of incentives, mostly cash bonuses, in exchange for voluntary enlistment. Any soldier who was drafted forfeited these bonuses, while also carrying the stigma of being a draftee. It is impossible to say how many soldiers entered the ranks voluntarily in order to collect their enlistment bounty and avoid being drafted, but certainly their number was substantial.

The Union army, like its Southern counterpart, was divided into three parts: infantry, cavalry, and artillery, with by far the largest numbers in the infantry. In 1861 the cavalry and artillery forces were attached to infantry. By the end of the Civil War, in raw numbers, the North had raised 2,040 regiments, of which 1,696 were infantry, 272 cavalry, and 72 artillery. The Union army totaled more than 1 million men under arms, while the Confederate army mustered out about 180,000 men in uniform. This overwhelming advantage of manpower played a role in helping the Union to win the war. However, the three-pronged structure with both the artillery and cavalry forces attached to infantry units did not allow for the most efficient use of the large number of federal recruits early in the war effort. Especially troublesome was the fact that this structure often did not allow concentration of cavalry and artillery where it was most needed. In 1862 the army converted a number of cavalry regiments into three formal mounted brigades. By 1863, a cavalry corps was finally formed, consisting of about 12,000 mounted men. The new arrangement helped the Union cavalry compete better in battle against their Confederate counterparts. In that same year, artillery batteries were placed under direct control of corps commanders. This change gave army commanders more flexibility and less administrative work in carrying out tactical plans.

At first, the federal government had difficulty finding competent officers. Seven of the nation’s eight military colleges were located in the South, providing many trained officers for the Confederate army. Also, political considerations were important in the appointment of officers. At the beginning of the war, Union soldiers, like their Confederate brethren, elected their officers. This disastrous practice was ended after 1862; nevertheless, politics continued to play an important role in appointment of generals, many with little military experience. By making these political appointments, Lincoln gained support for the war among key constituencies, particularly Democrats and certain ethnic groups.

Some political appointees did quite well. For instance, Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain of Maine and John Logan of Illinois built distinguished service records. The majority were not nearly as well regarded. Two generals from Massachusetts, Benjamin Franklin Butler and Nathaniel P. Banks, and California’s John C. Fremont performed poorly in combat, costing many men their lives. Indeed, “political” generals performed so badly at the First Battle of Bull Run in July 1861 that Congress was compelled to set up a watchdog group, the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, which, among other things, established minimum qualifications for Union officers. Also, as the war went on, many of the Union’s more incompetent officers were weeded out or resigned.

In the end the formal structure of the Union command proved superior to that of the Confederacy and evolved into a modern, stafflike organization of hundreds of men, including a section of military intelligence operatives. Union officers took great risks during the Civil War. These men were 15 percent more likely to be killed in battle than an enlisted man. Generals had the highest risk for combat death; with a 50 percent greater chance of being killed than privates. Overall, Union soldiers were actually almost two and a half times more likely to die from disease than from combat during the war. Over the course of the war, the 2.5 million men who served in the Union army suffered 110,070 combat deaths and nearly 250,000 deaths due to disease and epidemics.

As Union leaders dealt with manpower issues, they also addressed the difficulties of supplying a force as large as the U. S. Army. At that time, an army of 100,000 men required 2,500 supply wagons, 35,000 animals, and an average of 120,000 pounds of supplies a day. The lack of army provisions early in the war forced states to make concerted efforts to provide troop provisions until the federal government could organize its Quartermaster Department and reimburse the states. This approach to provisioning the army led to a variety of problems in the first year. For example, Northern soldiers wore uniforms of many different colors, which often made distinguishing friend from foe difficult. The resulting confusion ultimately led to the standardization of Union uniforms after the First Battle of Bull Run to light blue trousers and dark blue blouses. An important exception to this was the two regiments of army sharpshooters, considered one of few consciously elite formations in the Union army, who were clad in distinctive green uniforms.

There were many logistical issues to be resolved in order to keep Union troops provisioned. Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton did an excellent job of directing and planning the various elements of the conflict for the North. The Union Quartermaster Department, ably led by General Montgomery C. Meigs, worked with Stanton to supply the Federals in an effective and efficient fashion. Despite notable glitches, after 1863 the soldiers of the Union army enjoyed better food, transportation, clothing, arms, equipment, supplies, and health care than any other army up to that time. The ability of the United States to acquire, train, equip, and deploy 1 million men over an area larger than western Europe reflected both the Industrial Revolution in warfare and modern military management. This feat presaged the achievements realized on an even larger scale during World War I.

Since volunteers formed the vast majority of the Union forces and came from local and state levels, regiments were named chronologically by state (for example, the First Pennsylvania Infantry Regiment was the first infantry

Regiment formed by the state of Pennsylvania). Some units were formed based on ethnicity; besides African-American troops, Scottish, Irish, and German units were also created. Training of these raw recruits first took place in designated camps in each state. The men were “mustered” into service with the U. S. volunteer army and began their lives as soldiers. Inexperienced officers, who often learned the elements of drilling by reading a military manual, emphasized regimental drill and moving from formation to fighting. Most volunteers, especially early in the war, hated the confines of camp life and were eager to get into the battle before the fighting was over. This anxiousness to get out of training camp and get into action before the “fun” was over was probably fostered by the training regime. Neither mock combat nor a meaningful amount of target practice took place. After the initial training period, the men would board trains or go on ships by regiments for transport to their assigned destinations. The Union army’s basic organizational unit was the company (numbering 100 men), with 10 companies making up a regiment (1,000 men

Union troops about to fire a field gun during the Civil War (Hulton/Archive)

Per regiment for infantry and 1,200 for cavalry), five regiments for a brigade, three brigades for a division, and three divisions for a corps. Several corps formed an army. The Union infantry (foot soldiers) forces consisted of 16 armies whose names were based on major rivers, such as the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the James in the eastern theater and the Army of the Tennessee, the Army of the Ohio, and the Army of the Cumberland in the western theater. Each army generally consisted of 35,000 to 40,000 men, although the Army of the Potomac was much larger.

An army’s numbers and organizational units fluctuated during the war. When a company became depleted due to illness, casualties, and desertions, new recruits were generally not brought in to fill spots beside veteran members, which ultimately diminished combat performance and increased casualties. Among the problems with adding new enlistees to battle-experienced units was the fact that existing regiments had built up through their service together an esprit de corps. Battle-hardened units frequently resented raw recruits, feeling that the “new guy” would threaten the efficiency of the unit. George Templeton Strong, in a LETTER home, went so far as to call new recruits “an undisciplined mob.” There was always a question whether a new recruit could really be trusted in the heat of the fight to give his all—to die for his comrades. This was especially important late in the war, when the quality of enlistees was questionable, since bounties were on the rise and “bounty jumping” (signing up, collecting the bounties, and then deserting only to sign up in another area to collect more bounties) became fairly common. On the political level, states preferred to build new companies and new regiments rather than fill gaps in existing units because there was more prestige in bringing more regiments to the Union effort, and each new regiment allowed the appointment of new officers, which was a convenient way to reward political colleagues. Generally then, new companies were formed with higher-ranking officers appointed by politicians. Thus, throughout the conflict, companies were usually at reduced strength. More companies were combined to make up regiments than army regulations specified. Therefore, some brigades consisted of up to 10 regiments, greatly complicating the logistics of army administration.

Because the government relied so heavily on civilian support (both in terms of political support and enlistments) for the war, public opinion and politics played a substantial role in determining Northern strategy. The key Union military strategy developed by Winfield Scott and refined and added to by McClellan, Grant, and others, can be summed up briefly in three slogans: the “Anaconda Plan,” “On to Richmond,” and “Total War.” The first advocated encircling the Confederate coastline and rivers, thereby choking off its economic lifelines; the second called for moving quickly and decisively to defeat the Southern armies in the field and capture the Confederate capital in Richmond, Virginia; and the third employed the first two with the added goal of destroying the Confederate civilian will to fight.

McClellan’s 1862 Peninsular campaign, in part, was conceived of as a way to satisfy the Northern populace’s demand for a strike against the heart of the Confederacy. When the Confederate army invaded Pennsylvania in 1863, Northern military leaders knew that fast action was necessary because Northern citizens would not abide by an invasion of their soil. The failure of the spring Overland campaign in Virginia drove Northern morale to new lows and placed Lincoln’s reelection bid in jeopardy. In fall 1864 Sherman made haste to capture ATLANTA in time for the presidential ELECTIONS. Sherman’s success undoubtedly clinched Lincoln’s reelection.

Waging war in a democratic republic required the consent and support of the people through elections. Lincoln, as both president and commander in chief, had to lead the Union’s war effort and explain and defend his policies to citizens. The political and military were thus closely connected in the Civil War. When the Union suffered severe battlefield losses, as it did during 1861 and 1862, drastic measures had to be taken to sustain the morale of the Northern people and achieve military aims.

One measure that heavily influenced the fate of the Union armies and the future of the United States was Lincoln’s issuance of the EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION on January 1, 1863. Although an earlier congressional act had allowed African Americans to join the Union army, the proclamation was Lincoln’s first official endorsement of the idea and resulted in the formation of the United States Colored Troops (USCT). USCT forces totaled 178,975 by the end of the war and made up 12 percent of the U. S. Army. More than half of these soldiers were recruited in the South, so their addition to the Union army had the added benefit of draining the South of needed manpower. Indeed, in August 1863 Grant wrote Lincoln that the “freedom of Negroes is the largest blow to the Confederacy yet.”

By war’s end no fewer than 120 black infantry regiments, seven cavalry regiments, and 12 heavy artillery regiments were in service. In December 1864, these Aerican-American regiments were segregated into their own XXV Corps under Gen. Godfrey Weitzel. Black troops performed valiantly in the battles during the siege of Petersburg in summer 1864, and in 1865 they were among the very first troops to occupy the former Confederate capital. On balance, African Americans performed exceedingly well when well led and given a chance to fight, and their presence helped tip the military manpower advantage in the North’s favor. It was not until spring 1865 that Southern leaders even considered the arming of slaves to fight on the Confederacy’s behalf. When such a law was passed, it exerted no impact on the outcome of events.

With the surrender of Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia in April 1865 at Appomattox Court House, Virginia, the Civil War came to a close, but the Union still had a formidable army in the field. The peaceful demobilization of the Union army was accomplished in record time after Appomattox. Once again, the uniquely American notion of massed “citizen soldiery” backed by a small core of professional veterans had risen to the occasion and prevailed in wartime. Before the soldiers went home to their respective states, a huge celebration was held in Washington, D. C. For two days, May 23-24, 1865, the men of the Army of the Potomac and Sherman’s western armies marched in the “Grand Review” down Pennsylvania Avenue to cheering crowds. Proud of their role in winning the war, freeing the slaves, and ensuring the continuance of the United States of America, Union army veterans after the war formed the Grand Army of the Republic, a powerful group that exerted considerable influence on the political and economic life of the reunited nation.

See also common soldier; homeeront; science and technology; tactics and strategy.

Further reading: James W. Geary, We Need Men: The Union Draft in the Civil War (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1991); Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983); Fred A. Shannon, The Organization and Administration of the Union Army, 1861-1865 (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1928); Bell Irvin Wiley, The Life of Billy Yank: The Common Soldier of the Union (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978); Mark R. Wilson, This Business of Civil War: Military Mobilization and the State, 1861-1865 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).

—Scott L. Stabler