The Suez crisis involved a joint Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of the Suez Canal Zone in Egypt in 1956, followed by a major international furor that resulted in the withdrawal of the invading forces and the humiliation of the invaders.
The Suez Canal had long been an important axis upon which many important themes in the modern Middle East turned. Soon after it was built in 1869, the British obtained a controlling interest in the canal and made it the linchpin of British imperialism in the region. With the rise of Egyptian nationalism in the decades that followed, what constituted a point of pride to the British served as a mark of humiliation to the Egyptians. Despite local opposition, British control of the canal was never seriously questioned as long as British power in the region remained strong. After two debilitating world wars, however, British power waned to such an extent that the Egyptian government, led by nationalist Gamal Abdel Nasser, threatened to end British control of the canal.
Nasser at first used the canal as a bargaining chip to gain economic aid for the construction of the Aswan Dam, which, when completed, would create thousands of new acres of fertile farmland. Egypt needed British and American economic aid, however, to carry out this project. The United States, for its part, was primarily concerned with preventing communist influence in the region as a result of the cold war and maintaining access to crucial oil reserves. After Nasser negotiated an arms deal in 1955 with Czechoslovakia, a satellite of the Soviet Union, the United States abruptly canceled American funding for the Aswan Dam, and Nasser, in retaliation, unilaterally nationalized the Suez Canal that same year.
Three powers had a vested interest in returning control of the canal back to the British. In addition to Great Britain, France, which still possessed colonies in North Africa, feared that the example set by Nasser would threaten control of its possessions elsewhere. Israel was also deeply antagonistic toward Egypt as a result of Egypt’s role in the war of 1948 and also because Nasser had made anti-Israeli propaganda a key component of his brand of Arab nationalism. The additional threat of arms from the Soviet bloc also struck fear in the hearts of Israeli policymakers. Although the United States opposed Egyptian nationalization, the administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower chose to rely on economic as opposed to military force to return control of the canal to Britain. As a result, Britain, France, and Israel secretly formed a plan, named Operation Musketeer Revise, to regain British control of the canal by force.
Israel attacked Egypt and occupied the Canal Zone in late October 1956 followed by a joint Anglo-French invasion in early November. Although militarily successful, the matter was far from settled. Both the United States and the Soviet Union condemned the invasion of Egypt and demanded a complete withdrawal from the Canal Zone. American leaders informed Britain that it would withhold all economic aid, including crucial oil supplies, until it withdrew. Britain, still recovering from World War II, was forced to comply, which forced the French to withdraw as well. Israel withdrew from all but the Gaza Strip and Sharm al-Sheikh near the straits of Tiran, regions which military planners considered vital to Israel’s national security.
Despite the fact that it had lost the battle militarily, Egypt retained control of the canal. Nasser became a national hero to Egyptians, who believed that their humiliation at the hands of Israel in 1948 and from Britain over the course of the last century had finally been reversed. Israel also enjoyed some measure of success as a result of the conflict. Despite its withdrawal, it had again demonstrated its military superiority over the Arab states, as well as its willingness to fight threats to its national security. For the United States, the Suez crisis showcased tensions within its cold war alliances. Eisenhower felt personally betrayed by the British role in the affair. The Suez crisis also enhanced the public image of the Soviets in the region. Although the Soviet Union was brutally crushing a revolt in Hungary at the time, it was still able with very little effort to portray itself as anti-imperialist in the Middle East. The French gained nothing from their intervention and confirmed the worst suspicions of nationalists in their North African colonies. The biggest loser by far, however, was Great Britain. The Suez Crisis clearly demonstrated that British power in the Middle East independent of the United States was virtually nonexistent.
Further reading: Diane Kunz, The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); William Roger Louis and Roger Owens, eds., Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences (Oxford, U. K.: Clarendon Press, 1989).
—Matthew M. Davis
Taft, Robert A. See Volume VIII.
World History
