Workers

Organized labor's entry into national politics was among the most significant consequences of Mexico's 1910-1920 social revolution.

Kevin Middlebrook, 1995174

Mexico adheres to the Hispanic tradition in relying on statutory laws to implement constitutional provisions. Until such legislation is enacted, constitutional guarantees are unenforceable. Given the absence of prompt federal action following the promulgation of the 1917 Constitution, individual states passed labor legislation concerning safety, union contracts, and workplace conditions. Legislation in states with a strong labor tradition, such as Veracruz and Puebla, was decidedly prolabor, while other states lacked any labor legislation.175

Even when it was protected by state legislation, labor organizing was fraught with difficulties. In 1921, Mexico remained a largely rural society, with 71.4 percent of its work force in agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing. Organizing was also complicated by the dispersal of the labor force into many small work sites. Few large concentrations of workers existed outside mining, railroads, oil, textiles, and the public sector.176

With Carranza’s backing, the governor of Coahuila sponsored the organization of a national labor federation in an effort to preempt an anticipated independent labor federation. The group’s founding convention, which convened on May 1, 1918, drew a wide variety of labor leaders representing 113 organizations.177

The anarchist faction at the convention advocated “direct action,” their term for confronting business without involving government. Another faction, led by Luis Morones, advocated “multiple action,” which combined strikes and working with government to formulate policies favorable to labor. Morones’s faction predominated, and he was selected as secretary general of the new organization, the CROM. The CROM’s initial goals included conciliation with the state and ensuring the labor provisions of the 1917 constitution were enforced. Morones urged that workers take a moderate stance since labor was too weak to win radical demands and such demands could provide the United States with a pretext to intervene in Mexico.178

Carranza viewed strikes as a direct challenge to his effort to reinvigorate the economy, so he often repressed them. Court decisions rarely favored workers. To make matters worse, the labor market was glutted, and the First World War-induced inflation eroded the buying power of wages. Before 1920, labor saw little benefit from the Revolution. Wages remained low, hours were long, working conditions were deplorable, and workers were subject to arbitrary treatment by management.179

Given Carranza’s lack of support for labor, CROM leaders sought other leadership, which they found in Obregon, who was viewed as a friend of labor for his having championed the inclusion of pro-labor provisions in the 1917 Constitution. In August 1919, the CROM signed a secret pact with Obregon, in which it agreed to mobilize support for Obregon in the 1920 presidential election. In exchange it was to receive privileged political access, the creation of a separate labor ministry with CROM influence over it, and presidential support for statutory law implementing the provisions of Article 123.180

The CROM was amply rewarded for its support of Obregon. Under his administration, the CROM could organize freely. In 1921, there were more than 300 strikes involving 100,000 workers. The government began to impose settlements favorable to labor, thus permitting the CROM to win the majority of its industrial disputes between 1920 and 1924. In many cases, as a result of government pressure management made concessions even before strikes occurred. This provided tangible benefits for the small industrial working class. Celestino Gasca, an ex-cobbler and prominent member of the CROM, was named governor of the Federal District, a relatively unimportant position but one that would have been unthinkable for a worker a few years before. As it became obvious that joining the CROM provided material rewards, its membership soared from 300,000 in 1920 to 1.2 million by 1924.181

With the benefit of hindsight, many have criticized CROM leaders for having allowed themselves to fall under state control. At the time, however, there were numerous reasons for welcoming an alliance with the state. Labor justified cooperation with the government by declaring that the main enemy of the Mexican working class was international capital, which both the government and labor should confront. It was also obvious that labor was weak numerically and organizationally and that it needed to build alliances to meet its goals. Collaboration with the government yielded government subsidies for labor organizations. Labor also cooperated with industrialists since both constituencies supported high tariffs, the former to protect their jobs and the latter to protect their

Profits.182

In 1924, the CROM backed Calles’s presidential candidacy, a move for which it once again received ample reward. Between 1924 and 1928, Morones served as minister of industry, commerce, and labor and became one of the most powerful politicians in Mexico. Other CROM members received congressional seats. The CROM repeatedly won enforcement of legally mandated seniority rights, minimum wages, and severance pay and gained control over labor conciliation and arbitration boards through which it could force settlements favorable to labor. Workers affiliated with the CROM enjoyed higher wages and had more rights than did members of independent unions. By virtue of its obvious government support, the CROM could claim 2 million members in 1928, indicating organizing well beyond the roughly 30,000 textile workers.183

The CROM-government alliance served Calles well since this workers group became his major non-military power base. His alliance with the CROM allowed him to influence its demands. Urban workers were told they should moderate their demands to attract foreign capital and to ensure economic stability and capital accumulation—arguments similar to those used under Diaz.184

Obregon’s assassination shattered the cozy relationship between Morones and the government. Obregon supporters widely believed Morones had masterminded the assassination since he had his own presidential ambitions. For self-preservation, Calles distanced himself from Morones, forced him from his cabinet, and withdrew government support from the CROM. By distancing the government from the Morones-led labor federation, Calles calmed the political waters.185

Once it became apparent that the CROM no longer enjoyed government support, trade unions began to desert en masse. The number of affiliated organizations declined from 1,172 in 1928 to 349 in 1932. Portes Gil’s becoming president only compounded the CROM’s difficulties, since he had become a bitter enemy of the CROM during his days as governor of Tamaulipas, when the CROM vied with him for control of the state. Calles’s successor removed CROM members from the government and used army troops against CROM unions.186

In 1931, in response to Calles seeking to draw labor into the PNR and due to worsening labor conditions resulting from the Depression, a Federal Labor Law was passed. The law implemented the pro-labor provisions contained in Article 123 of the 1917 constitution and reaffirmed workers’ right to organize unions and strike. It required the government to certify whether unions were legally constituted, thus allowing the government to deny the registration of radical unions and giving the state detailed knowledge of labor organizations. In addition, the law provided for a closed shop, which allowed unions to force the dismissal of any worker engaging in anti-union activity.187

The void produced by the withdrawal of state support for the CROM was filled in 1933 with the founding of the General Federation of Mexican Workers and Peasants (CGOCM), which declared that its ultimate goal was the elimination of capitalism. However its short-term goals focused on improving the living conditions of workers. By the end of 1934, the combative, politically independent CGOCM claimed 890,000 members, making it the largest labor federation in

Mexico.188

During the Depression, the number of strikes declined, since workers were afraid of losing their jobs and the government discouraged strike activity. In June 1932, Secretary of Industry, Commerce,

And Labor Abelardo Rodriguez declared: “At this time, strikes are inopportune and unpatriotic. The cooperation of everyone is needed and especially that of workers, since there is a revolutionary government, dedicated to rebuilding the country.”189

Labor became polarized, with the CROM and Morones siding with Calles. However the CGOCM, after deciding that Cardenas did in fact support labor, organized the National Committee of Proletarian Defense (CNDP) to back Cardenas in his confrontation with Calles. The CNDP, which organized both peasants and workers, announced that if necessary it would call a general strike to defend the freedom to strike, associate, and assemble.190

In 1936, the CNDP called for a convention to found a new labor organization. More than

3.000  labor representatives met and created the CTM, which included the CGOCM, the Mexican Labor Federation (CSUM), and many other groups. The CTM soon claimed 3,594 affiliates and

946.000  members, dwarfing the remaining labor groups. Reflecting the radical thinking of the period, the CTM statutes declared, “The working class of Mexico must never forget that the final aim of its struggles is the abolition of the capitalist regime.”191

Membership in the CTM continued to increase, since the federation was successful at gaining increased wages, collective contracts, and compliance with federal labor law. The CTM enjoyed obvious government support in the form of a cash subsidy, protection for CTM activities, and the persecution of the CTM’s enemies. The CTM’s close relationship with the government was formalized in 1938, as the CTM voted to become part of the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR). At the time, CTM leaders felt they could maintain their autonomy.192

As historian Joe Ashby noted, “Under the Cardenas regime, the Mexican labor movement attained its highest form of organization, prestige, and influence in national economic policy.” The number of officially recognized strikes rose from thirteen in 1933 to 833 in 1937. Since such labor actions had government support, during Cardenas’s term, there was a 43 percent increase in real wages and an improvement in working conditions. Nearly 15 percent of the non-agricultural labor force was organized, a marked increase over previous administrations. Pressure from labor unions, constant strikes, workers demands, and the presence of pro-labor authorities undermined the patriarchal style in which businessmen had traditionally treated their employees.193