MERCENARIES
Mercenaries are soldiers who fight because they are paid for their services, and usually they are employed by countries to which they have no allegiance. During the Renaissance the majority of fighting soldiers were mercenaries. The total number of mercenary troops in Europe in the 16th century has been averaged at 500,000. When we mention “the troops fighting for Metz in 1490,” for example, those soldiers included Albanians, French, Italians, Flemish, Germans, and Spaniards. During France’s aggressive actions in Italy during the late 15th and early 16th centuries, Swiss pikemen were a mainstay of the French infantry. As did the Swiss companies and the German Landsknechte, most small companies of mercenaries during the Renaissance consisted of soldiers recruited as a group from one geographic area. Typically these regions, such as Gascony, Swabia, and Scotland, were plagued with a high rate of unemployment and depressed economy. Because language barriers could be a problem, it was strategically important that the most cohesive groups of fighting men be able to communicate effortlessly among themselves. By 1500 these companies might have more than 100 men. Heavily armed cavalrymen and pikemen dominated the market for mercenaries in the 15th century, and infantry soldiers experienced in use of artillery and small firearms gradually replaced most of the cavalry between 1500 and 1600. The most famous mercenaries on horseback during the 15th century were the condottieri of Italy (discussed later).
Regular pay was only one of the benefits of fighting as a mercenary. Taking prisoners for ransom was a lucrative business in Renaissance warfare. Mercenaries also looted the baggage trains of enemy forces and seized booty in conquered cities. Occasionally
Handbook to Life in Renaissance Europe
They were out of control, as in the 1527 sack of Rome and the 1576 sack of Antwerp. In these events, mercenaries stole priceless treasures from the sacristies of churches and cathedrals and destroyed property. They were also infamous for cruelty and sexual excesses. The life of a mercenary probably appealed to some men who had maverick, asocial personalities. Nevertheless, mercenaries had their own codes of honor and sometimes refused to fight, or only pretended to fight, when opposed by fellow countrymen.
CONDOTTIERI
Italian condottieri were leaders of (mainly) cavalrymen working under a condotta, a contract in which they promised to supply a certain number of soldiers for a finite period. Condottieri and their companies were the most efficient and respected fighters of 15th-century Italy. Most condottieri companies originated in city-states other than those for which they were fighting, with the result that they might find themselves fighting in their home state against home forces. Apparently this system was acceptable to those who followed the profession of soldier. Many Italian mercenaries fighting for condottieri were from Umbria, Romagna, or the Marche, remote or economically depressed regions. Although one condottieri was the son of a butcher and another the son of a baker, normally such leaders did not advance through the ranks. Most con-dottieri were of noble birth, and several of the most noteworthy were lord of their city-state, such as the Estes and Gonzagas. Although almost all condot-tieri were Italian, or at least half-Italian, a few illustrious foreigners led Italian mercenary companies. The most famous was the Englishman Sir John de Hawkwood (c. 1320-94).
STANDING ARMIES AND MILITIA
As warfare became a predictable aspect of life by the mid-15th century, commanders in chief began to think about how they could be best prepared for the next conflict. France was the first country to establish a standing permanent army: Charles VII (1403-61) ordered that permanent companies of cavalry be organized, and Louis XI (1482-1515) established a permanent infantry. Naturally as soon as one major European power had a standing army, others had to follow. Italy, especially Milan, Venice, and Naples, soon had standing armies as well. One serious problem was that permanent armies existed to fight. During peacetime these soldiers often marauded through towns and villages on their chargers, wreaking havoc and terrifying the populace. In addition, they were usually accompanied by prostitutes and other unsavory characters. Of another caliber completely were the impressive numbers of permanent guards who protected the immediate vicinity of rulers across Europe. Queen Isabella, for example, had 1,100 infantry and 130 knights, and Francis I had 720 soldiers assigned to his household. These soldiers, much more than just bodyguards, often marched to war with their leader and instructed new recruits.
Although militia were organized during the 16th century, their members had very little training or opportunity to practice with their weapons, which were handheld. The strategy of military commanders during this period depended on maneuvering fairly large groups of soldiers as single units, such as pikemen alongside gunners. Small towns in Europe usually did not have groups of men who all fought with the same weapon. The following report describes the battle readiness of a typical English village: “The said armour and ammunition... is kept in one several place of every town, appointed by the consent of the whole parish, where it is always ready to be had and worn within an hour’s warning. . . . Certes there is almost no village so poor in England (be it never so small) that hath not sufficient. . . readiness to set forth three or four soldiers, as one archer, one gunner, and a billman [man with a billhook] at the least” (Scott 1976, p. 244, from William Harrison’s 1587 Description of England). These soldiers often set out without any idea of how to follow instructions for deploying their weapons during actual warfare. The situation became even worse toward the end of the 16th century, when firearms used in battle were not always the same firearms used in hunting, so that militiamen had to fight not only in unfamiliar formations, but with unfamiliar weapons. There were, of course, exceptions to these conditions, such as militia near court centers who were occasionally drilled by the princely guards.
Warfare
COMMUNICATIONS AND SUPPLY LINES
An army could advance no faster than its supplies, and heavy artillery slowed the daily pace of baggage wagons pulled by horses. Depending on the weather and terrain, an army transporting artillery could move forward no more than three to nine miles per day. Ammunition had to be hauled for firearms because soldiers no longer could use local stones for siege attacks. Even though wheat or other grain was sometimes acquired from local suppliers, each army usually traveled with its own flour mills and portable ovens, necessitated by the great quantity of bread required for provisioning troops. Moreover, as plate armor became heavier, soldiers no longer wore it on long marches unless the enemy was nearby. Armor, too, had to be transported in the baggage trains, adding to the weight and slowing the march. The numbers of individuals who had to be supplied with food were staggering, an average of one noncombatant for each soldier, doubling the mouths to be fed. Every member of the nobility had several attendants, and some of them even took their “wife,” although that practice was discouraged if not forbidden. When the French king Henry II (1519-59) joined the Lutheran princes to oppose Charles V, he estimated that his 50,000 troops would be accompanied by almost as many noncombatants.
During battle, communication could be impeded by the international composition of the troops. One advantage of hiring mercenaries was that at least each company’s own members could communicate easily. Certain basic commands were effected by hand signals and signal flags; fighting usually ended at nightfall. When those engaged in battle needed reconnaissance information, a runner was sent. Military runners also carried communications between front-line commanders and the commander in chief. For such communications carried over an appreciable distance, a rider was used. The practical limits of communication with military headquarters by horseback riders became evident as the Turks advanced across eastern Europe. Turkish efforts in the siege of Vienna were futile because Vienna was too far from Constantinople to allow effective transmission of battle plans.
COMMAND STRUCTURE
During the Renaissance the main purpose of a military command structure was to impose discipline and cohesion on a disparate group of individuals. Developing out of feudal warfare in which a knight was the smallest fighting unit, the earliest command structure in the 15 th century employed a horseman in armor in charge of a small combat group. This fighting unit, called a lance, was first organized in France. It consisted of a knight, his squire and page, a few mounted archers, and a servant. For battle the lances were organized into “conroys” of fewer than 100 men, in groups based on geographic origin or language. The convoys fought alongside mercenary bands with comparable numbers of men and alongside groups of Swiss pikemen.
As warfare became more professionalized during the 15th century and the discipline of Swiss pikemen became the standard to be emulated, the concept of a military regiment evolved within the Landsknechte. Mustering, in which recruits were read their terms of service and swore to follow their officers, was required. Each company (of approximately 400 men) was overseen by a colonel, and each platoon of 40 men elected its own leader. Other appointed officers mediated disputes among platoon leaders and imposed disciplinary measures. This regimental system was adopted by military commanders in other areas, who recognized the value of the esprit de corps fostered within the platoon. The commander in chief was, of course, the king or duke, whose general commanded the colonels in charge of each company. When the monarch was present at a battle, he usually commanded a special reserve group who would charge into the conflict if the general faltered.
BATTLE TACTICS
Organizing a battle in the field was a matter of selecting groups of fighters appropriate for the specific conditions and type of enemy to be engaged. Mountainous terrain, for example, required more infantrymen and archers than horsemen in heavy armor. Whatever the configuration of soldiers, having more troops than the enemy was crucial because sheer numbers often won the day. Military commanders usually arranged their troops in a main battle line, with a vanguard, rearguard, and two flanks. The battle line could have several shapes, depending on the terrain and available men; favorite arrangements were a dense, solid square of pikemen or a thick crescent of infantrymen. Archers or gunners
Handbook to Life in Renaissance Europe
Often filled the ranks of the flanking troops. Battle tactics during this period involved “shock” tactics of hitting the enemy first and hitting him hard with pikemen, armored horsemen, or artillery. Surprise encounters, however, were sometimes effective, and the best surprise were massive desertions by the enemy’s own soldiers. One tactic used as a last resort, but surprisingly successful when used, was for a large group of soldiers to pretend to flee. An enemy who broke ranks to chase them became vulnerable to attack from flanking troops who could be hiding in a forest or behind a hill.
World History
