In the case of Miranda v. Arizona, the principles of the Fifth Amendment were challenged in the Supreme Court, and rules were established before a suspect needed to talk to the police.
The Fifth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution provides individuals the right to be free from self-incrimination. More accurately, this amendment allows those accused of a crime the “right to remain silent.” Law enforcement authorities, however, did not always honor that right.
On March 10, 1963, in Phoenix, Arizona, Ernesto Miranda, a mentally retarded 23-year-old, was arrested on
Charges of rape and kidnapping. The allegations arose after a movie theater employee had been abducted from her job one week earlier and raped. She described her attacker as a man of Mexican descent. Miranda’s car, matching the description of the assailant’s, was stopped one week after the incident occurred and Miranda was taken to police headquarters. He was placed in a lineup with three other men of Mexican descent and tentatively identified by the victim as her attacker. Miranda was interviewed by police and told that he had been positively identified as the suspect. After two hours of interrogation, he signed a written confession that included a section stating that he had been advised of and understood his constitutional rights as provided by the Fifth Amendment.
On June 7, 1963, Miranda appeared in court with Alvin Moore, his appointed attorney. In his cross-examination, Moore highlighted the essence of the Miranda case. He asked one of the arresting officers if he had advised Miranda of his right to remain silent and refrain from selfincrimination. The officer responded in the affirmative. Moore then asked the officer if he had advised Miranda of his right to legal counsel prior to making a statement. To this question the officer answered, “No.” Arguing this point, Moore stated that the policeman’s actions violated Miranda’s Fifth Amendment rights. Although the officers had advised Miranda of his right to refrain from self-incrimination, they had not advised him of his right to have an attorney present while making a statement. Yale McFate, the judge in Miranda’s first trial, disagreed with Moore’s argument and stated, “The constitutional right to silence did not extend to the jailhouse.” The judge’s determination to stand by his decision led to Miranda’s conviction and he was subsequently sentenced to two consecutive terms of 20 to 30 years in prison. The debate over Miranda’s and other suspects’ privilege to be advised of their rights against selfincrimination led all the way to the U. S. Supreme Court.
Chief Justice Earl Warren issued the Supreme Court’s decision on June 3, 1966. Speaking on behalf of the 5-4 majority, Warren stated, “Prior to any questioning the person must be warned that he has the right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” This decision led to Miranda’s conviction being overturned by the court.
The ideas at issue in Miranda have served as a source of controversy from the time it was decided. Opponents of the decision claim that the ruling gave “a green light to criminals,” allowing them more rights than the victims of crime. Subsequent cases have broadened the Miranda ruling by holding that an attorney, if requested by the suspect, must be present during any police interrogation. Originally intended to protect the indigent and ignorant, the practice of reading “Miranda Rights” to a suspect has become a part of standard operating procedure for police departments across the United States.
Further reading: John Hogrogain, Miranda v. Arizona: The Rights of the Accused (New York: Lucent Books, 1999).
—Erin Craig
World History
