An experienced diplomat, as French foreign minister (1774-87), Charles Gravier, comte de Vergennes was the architect behind France’s support of the United States in the Revolutionary War (1775-87). Concerned with both the humiliation suffered by France in the French and Indian War (1754-63) and the balance of power in Europe, Vergennes saw the North American rebellion as an opportunity to weaken Great Britain. His position was pragmatic, not ideological; if the British North American colonies became independent he believed Britain’s commercial power would be crushed. In early 1776 he persuaded King Louis XVI to begin secret preparations for war and encouraged Spain to do the same. On May 2, 1776, the French government began clandestine financial aid to the United States, providing 1 million livres to buy arms and supplies. After the revolutionary victory at Saratoga (October 17, 1777), Vergennes sought a greater a commitment to the United States to prevent an accommodation between the colonists and the British. He had also waited until France had built up its navy so that it might challenge the British command of the sea. On February 8, 1778, he concluded two treaties with the United States: one for commerce and the other a military alliance. War broke out openly between France and Great Britain on June 17, 1778.
The support of Vergennes was crucial to the winning of independence by the United States. France provided money, supplies, armies, and a navy—all of which played a major role in the victory at Yorktown (October 19, 1781). France also helped to bring Spain into the war, although not as a direct ally of the United States. Despite the popularity of the war in France, it did not have the long-term effects Vergennes had hoped. The negotiators for the United States violated the terms of alliance with France and instructions from the Second Continental Congress by holding separate peace talks with Great Britain and gaining a highly favorable agreement in the Treaty of Paris (1783). Vergennes knew about these negotiations and even encouraged them. By 1782 France was on the brink of bankruptcy, and Vergennes wanted the war to end. But the French were committed to fight until Spain conquered Gibraltar. Vergennes believed that once Great Britain and the United States came to terms, Spain would have to follow suit and abandon its hopes for Gibraltar. Although the peace negotiations concluded as Vergennes expected after the Anglo-American agreement, France was still left with dire financial problems, which helped to precipitate the French Revolution (1789-99). Great Britain, on the other hand, may have lost the jewel in its imperial crown, but it quickly recovered its commercial prowess and expanded its empire territorially elsewhere.
See also eoreign aeeairs; French alliance.
Further reading: Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert, eds., Diplomacy and the Revolution: The Franco-Ameri-can Alliance of 1778 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1981); Richard B. Morris, The Peacemakers: The Great Powers and American Independence (Syracuse, N. Y.:
Syracuse University Press, 1985); William C. Stinchcombe, The American Revolution and the French Alliance (New York: Harper & Row, 1969).
World History
