The Battle of Rhode Island was the culmination of the first major effort of Franco-American cooperation after the French alliance (February 6, 1778) had been agreed upon. Despite a promising beginning, a combination of bad luck and misunderstandings almost led to disaster. As it was, the American revolutionary army that was left to attack the British at Newport by itself managed a tactical victory but was ultimately forced to lift the siege and withdraw.
The British had occupied Aquidneck Island (the large island in Narragansett Bay sometimes called Rhode Island) almost unopposed on December 7, 1776. Newport, which was on the island, was used as a base of operations against New England and afforded one of the best harbors on the continent for the British navy. Until they withdrew from Newport on October 25, 1779, the British maintained a garrison of about 5,000 on the island. For most of this period, the occupation was marked by raid and counterraid between the revolutionary forces on the mainland and the British on the island. But in the summer of 1778, when campaigns on the Delaware and in New York Harbor appeared unviable, a major Franco-American effort to dislodge the British was launched.
The plan was for the Charles-Henri-Victor-Theodat, comte d’Estaing to land the French troops he brought with him and, with his naval superiority, act in concert with a large contingent of the Continental army and New England militia to capture Newport. When the French arrived off Newport on July 29, the revolutionaries were not quite ready. After some discussion, General John Sullivan of the Continental army and d’Estaing agreed to a coordinated attack on August 10. But when General John Pigot, the British commander, withdrew from his advanced positions on the northern end of the island, Sullivan decided to move without the French. From a tactical standpoint he had little choice. From a diplomatic point of view, this action injured Gallic pride since the French believed that they were the senior allies and ought to have precedence in any attack. The question became moot, however, when a British fleet arrived from New York on August 9. D’Estaing immediately put out to sea. The two fleets maneuvered for position, but before the battle could be closed a hurricane came up, scattering the ships of both nations. By August 14 the storm had ended. Both fleets were in need of repair. The British returned to New York. D’Estaing, following the advice of his captains, decided to sail to Boston to refit. The French headed for Boston on August 22, leaving Sullivan to face the British alone. To make matters worse, thousands of militia had had enough of the campaign and went home.
Sullivan, enraged by the French withdrawal, had to lift the siege of Newport. He dug in with the remaining 7,000 troops on the northern end of Aquidneck Island. Pigot, sensing an advantage, decided to attack. An intense battle ensued in which Sullivan’s men repeatedly smashed the British advances. By the end of the day, the revolutionaries had held their ground, with losses of 30 killed, 137 wounded, and 44 missing to the British losses of 38 killed, 210 wounded, and 44 missing. Both sides were too exhausted to continue the fight. Sullivan, recognizing that he was in danger of being cut off from the mainland by the British navy, successfully removed his troops from the island on the night of August 30. Two days later, 5,000 British reinforcements arrived. Had Pigot waited to attack, this addition may well have crushed Sullivan.
See also Revolutionary War.