These changes would in the long run work againstMichael VIII Palaiologos’
efforts to restore the Byzantine empire, but failure hardly seemed possible
as the emperor took formal possession of Constantinople on 15 August 1261.
Early successes suggested that the Byzantine empire would soon be returned
to its pre-1204 boundaries.Michael VIII quickly obtained a foothold in the
Peloponnese.William II of Villehardouin, prince of Achaia, had fallen into
Byzantine hands, along with many of his barons, at the battle of Pelagonia
in 1259.He now agreed to come to terms.He ceded toMichael the fortresses
ofMonemvasia,Mistra andMaina (see below, p. 768). The recovery of the
Greek lands beckoned. In 1264 Michael II Angelos Doukas, the ruler of
Epiros, accepted the hegemony of the new emperor of Constantinople.
Substantial gains had been made in the previous year at the expense of the
Bulgarians. Philippopolis, gateway to the Balkans, was recovered together
with the ports of the Black Sea coast.Michael VIII then secured control of
theDobrudja, the region at the mouth of theDanube, where he established
Turkish colonists. They had come over to Byzantium with the last Seljuq
sultan of Rum, Kay-Kawos II, who had fled toMichael in April 1261. Even
if it meant accepting baptism, the sultan found this preferable to remaining
under the Mongol yoke. Such a spectacular defection gave Michael
VIII reason to hope for further gains in Asia Minor. The recovery of Constantinople
also put the Venetians on the defensive. They were driven from
Constantinople and replaced by the Genoese, who were Byzantine allies.
However, the Genoese in their turn were temporarily banned from the
capital in 1264, as Michael VIII had no intention of allowing the Italians
a dominant position in Constantinople. He built up the Byzantine fleet,
which for the last time would be a major force in the waters of the Aegean.39
The tragedy ofMichael VIII Palaiologos’ reign was that he was never able
to capitalise on these early successes. He failed to drive the Venetians from
their Aegean bases in Crete and Euboea. The Franks of the Peloponnese
stubbornly refused to cede any more territory to his armies. TheGreek rulers
of Epiros and Thessaly threw off their Byzantine allegiance. Opposition to
Byzantine rule was stiffened by the appearance of a new figure on the
scene, Charles of Anjou, youngest brother of the French king Louis IX
(1226–70). Charles’ victory at Benevento over Manfred of Hohenstaufen
in 1266 established him as papally approved ruler of the kingdom of Sicily
and heir to ambitions in the east. In 1267 he entered into separate treaties
withWilliam II ofVillehardouin, prince of Achaia, and with Baldwin II, the
dispossessed Latin emperor of Constantinople. He took the former under
his protection, securing succession to the principality of Achaia for his son
Philip through a dynastic marriage. He promised the Latin emperor that
within seven years he would launch an expedition to recover Constantinople
on his behalf. The petty rulers of the Balkans and Greek lands – orthodox
and catholic alike – turned to him for support against the pretensions of
Michael VIII. The Albanians seized the Byzantine base of Dyrrachium
(Durr¨es), at the head of the EgnatianWay, and in February 1272 recognised
Charles of Anjou as their king. Charles thus secured the key positions along
the Albanian coast. It was a serious setback for Michael VIII.
The Byzantine emperor sought to counter the Angevin threat in various
ways. He strengthened the sea walls of Constantinople. The lesson of the
Fourth Crusade was its vulnerability to an attack from the sea. Michael
VIII therefore wooed Venice to prevent it from joining the Angevin camp.
He finally induced the Venetians to make a treaty with Byzantium rather
than with Charles of Anjou in 1268: the Venetians recovered control of
their old quarter in Constantinople. However, Byzantium’s major diplomatic
offensive was directed towards the papacy. Michael employed the
age-old ploy of offering a reunion of the churches. The papacy was at first
unconvinced of the sincerity or utility of the offer, but this changed in
1271 when Gregory X (1271–6) became pope. He was not interested in supporting
Charles of Anjou’s designs on Constantinople. His purpose was
instead to rescue the crusader states from theMamluk menace. An alliance
with Byzantium might have its uses, but the pope insisted that it must be
cemented by reunion on Rome’s terms. Essentially, this meant Byzantine
recognition of papal supremacy. It was a price that, in the circumstances,
Michael VIII thought worth paying. In 1274 he despatched a Byzantine
delegation to Lyons where a council of the church was gathering.Without
any serious debate of the issuesMichael accepted a reunion on papal terms.
He cited as a precedent for his actions the negotiations with the papacy
initiated by John III Vatatzes.40 These had produced little, if any, protest,
perhaps because they were never brought to a conclusion. But Michael’s
unionist policies would earn him the hatred of all sections of Byzantine
society. Why were people so unwilling to accept his reassurance that almost
nothing worthwhile had been conceded? Why did the orthodox church
refuse to approach the question of union in a spirit of oikonomia?41
The answers to these questions reveal that it was not only Charles of
Anjou’s ambitions that thwartedMichael VIII’s plans to restore the Byzantine
empire. Michael’s unionist policy confirmed the tyrannical nature of
his rule. His usurpation of the throne was not easily forgotten. On ChristmasDay
1261 he had had the legitimate heir to the imperial throne, John IV
Laskaris, blinded and exiled to a fortress on the Sea of Marmara. Patriarch
Arsenios protested. He was responsible for protecting the rights of John
Laskaris, which the usurper had solemnly sworn before God to uphold.
The patriarch therefore excommunicatedMichael. It took three years before
the emperor could rid himself of Arsenios, but his dismissal only produced
a schism within the orthodox church, weakening the authority of subsequent
patriarchs. Arsenios gave his support to an uprising around Nicaea
in favour of John Laskaris.Michael VIII may have suppressed it with some
ease, but thereafter he found the Anatolian provinces increasingly alienated
from Constantinopolitan rule. The historian George Pachymeres singled
this out as the underlying cause of their subsequent fall to renewed Turkish
pressure.42
Michael VIII’s unionist policy reinforced the growing distrust of his rule.
He refused to listen to the reasonable objections of Patriarch Joseph I. As
soon as it became clear that the emperor intended to do the pope’s bidding,
the patriarch retired to a monastery rather than be party to the reunion of
the churches. This produced another schism within the orthodox church,
when Michael VIII pressed ahead with his designs. Efforts to win support
for the union were crude and largely counterproductive. The story goes
that when the members of the Byzantine delegation to Lyons returned to
Constantinople they were greeted with cries of ‘You have become Franks!’43
It catches a sense of betrayal that spread throughout Byzantine society.
This was confirmed by the harsh way in which Michael VIII and his
new patriarch, John Bekkos (1275–82), implemented the union. In 1276
the patriarch convened a council which not only confirmed the union, but
placed all who opposed it under ban of excommunication. The next year
the emperor and his son publicly swore to recognise the supremacy of the
papacy and read out a profession of faith that included the Roman addition
of the filioque.
Michael’s opponents seized on his unionist policy to justify their actions.
The Greek rulers of Epiros and Thessaly used it as a pretext for refusing
to submit to his authority. John of Thessaly held an anti-unionist council
in 1275/6 which attracted many ofMichael’s opponents within the church.
This was blatant exploitation of the unionist issue for political ends. Less
easy to explain is the opposition to church union of some ofMichael VIII’s
closest relatives and political associates. Even his favourite sister, the nun
Eulogia, turned against him and fled to Bulgaria. Such was the hostility
to the union within the imperial family that Michael was compelled to
imprison many of his relatives. The papal emissary was taken down to see
them languishing in the dungeons of the Great Palace.Michael hoped that
their misery would convince the papacy of his sincerity over the union.
This opposition from within the imperial family was prompted in the
first place by concern for orthodoxy, which was being needlessly compromised
by the emperor; but it ran deeper than this. Michael VIII was seen
to be using the unionist issue as a way of imposing his arbitrary power
over Byzantine church and society. Like all Byzantine emperors, Michael
was faced by the conundrum of imperial authority. In theory, he wielded
absolute power; in practice, it was limited by obligations to the church and
the ruling class, and to society at large.Michael came to power as the leader
of an aristocratic faction. He ensured that the chief offices of state went to
his close relatives. He also widened his basis of support through a series of
shrewd marriages that linked his family to other great houses.45 At first, his
style of government was conciliatory. At the same time as donations to the
army and monasteries, he clamped down on the dishonesty and oppression
of provincial governors and military commanders. He improved the
quality of justice by setting up a court of appeal, the sekr¯eton, and abolished
the use of the ordeal by hot iron which had become an instrument of
arbitrary government. He showed exaggerated respect for the church and
patriarch.46 This changed once Michael became master of Constantinople.
He employed the western notion of the ‘law of conquest’ to justify a
more autocratic approach to government. He claimed that, since he had
conquered Constantinople, it belonged to him exclusively, and he used
this as a pretext to threaten opponents of the union with confiscation of
their property, if they did not comply with his wishes. He was, after all,
the ‘new Constantine’.47 He became increasingly remote from his natural
basis of support. He made use of western adventurers, such as Benedetto
Zaccaria, who received the alum concession at Phokaia near Smyrna.48
He also relied heavily on trusted bureaucrats, such as the grand logothete
George Akropolites, who was a leader of the Byzantine delegation to Lyons.
The humiliating concessions made by Michael VIII to the papacy
brought little concrete advantage. This only increased distrust of the
emperor. The papacy, for its part, continued to have doubts aboutMichael’s
sincerity, so much so that in 1281 PopeMartin IV (1281–5) had him excommunicated.
This was at Charles of Anjou’s behest, and provided him with
the justification he needed for a new assault on Byzantium. This time
Charles was able to win over Venice to his cause. Unionist diplomacy had
apparently left Byzantium stranded. The Byzantine armies were able to
stem the Angevin advance down the Egnatian Way with a victory at Berat
in 1281. But salvation came from an unexpected quarter: on 30 March 1282
the inhabitants of Palermo rose up against their hated Angevin rulers. This
was the famous revolt of the SicilianVespers.49With Sicily in revolt, Charles
had to abandon his plans for an expedition against Constantinople.
Michael VIII saw himself as the saviour of his people. In the autobiographies
that he wrote at the end of his life he took sole credit for throwing
back the Angevins in Albania and for organising the Sicilian Vespers.50 He
was unable to comprehend his unpopularity; had he not restored the seat
of church and empire to Constantinople? This could not be denied, but
few would have accepted his other claim: to have ruled according to the
best traditions of his family and the imperial office. It seemed much more
like a betrayal. It comes as no surprise that, whenMichael VIII Palaiologos
died on 11 December 1282 in a small Thracian village, the orthodox church
refused him a proper burial.51
UnderMichael VIIIByzantium was for the very last time a major force on
the world stage.His diplomatic contacts stretched from Aragon and France
in the west to the Ilkhans of Persia in the east; from the Golden Horde on
the Caspian to the Mamluks of Egypt.52 But his efforts left Byzantium
exhausted and virtually bankrupt. His legacy was one of schism, poverty
and rapid decline.He was a victim of the profound changes which occurred
during the period of exile. The defence of orthodoxy against the Latins
gave the Byzantine identity an anti-Latin twist. Any compromise with the
Latins over dogma was seen as an act of betrayal. Michael VIII was even
more vulnerable to accusations of this kind because of the way Laskarid
propaganda instilled the notion of the emperor as the servant of his church
and people. Political power had become more diffuse. The different regions
of the old Byzantine empire developed separate identities and interests. At
best, the emperor of Constantinople could expect to exercise a degree of
indirect authority. These problems existed before 1204, but Constantinople
had – albeit with increasing difficulty – the prestige and resources to hold the
empire together. The city that Michael VIII Palaiologos recovered was but
a husk. It had been wasted by the years of Latin rule. He made great efforts
to restore his new capital, but it was expensive and time-consuming.53
Constantinople no longer dominated. 1204 had destroyed the myth of
Byzantine invulnerability.
World History
