On 1 January 1068, at the invitation of the widowed Empress Eudocia
Makrembolitissa, Romanos IV Diogenes (1068–71) was crowned emperor
(see above, p. 608). Two months later he set out for Membij in Syria,
which he captured. Romanos’ next campaign took place between spring
1069 and the winter of 1069/70. Although he drove the enemy from Larissa
in Cappadocia, he did not manage to prevent the Turks from plundering
Ikonion (Konya). The main battle, however, took place in 1071. In the spring
of 1070 the emperor sent the kouropalat¯es Manuel Komnenos, nephew of
the late emperor Isaac I Komnenos (1057–59), as strat¯egos autokrat¯or of the
Byzantine eastern army.Manuel had to defend the theme of Chaldia, which
was being threatened by a certain Arisghi, brother-in-law of Sultan Alp
Arslan. An important battle took place at Sebasteia in the autumn of 1070.
The Byzantines were defeated; but then Manuel Komnenos persuaded
Arisghi, who was at odds with the sultan, to join the emperor’s side.
Meanwhile in August–September, Alp Arslan took Arjish (Archesh) and
Manzikert, moving on to Mayyafariqin, Amida and then Edessa, which
he besieged but did not manage to take. By April 1071 Alp Arslan was
besieging Aleppo. His primary aim, however, was to campaign against
the Fatimid forces in Syria. At this juncture a Byzantine embassy arrived,
offering Membij in exchange for Arjish and Manzikert. The sultan, who
needed to secure his northern flank, agreed to a peace treaty on condition
that the emperor paid a yearly tribute. But in the meantime Afshin al-Turki
had penetrated deep into the territory of Byzantine AsiaMinor (see above,
p. 701) taking Chonai and ravaging the environs ofTzamandos. It was at this
moment when news of Afshin’s audacious raid arrived in Constantinople
that Romanos IV decided to declare open war.
In July 1071, the Byzantine army moved across the River Sangarios to
Caesarea and the emperor arrived at Theodosioupolis; at this point the
sultan was in Vostan, near Narek. By mid-August Romanos had retaken
Manzikert. Alp Arslan believed that Diogenes had broken the truce; he
abandoned plans to go to Syria and hastened back towards the Byzantine
army. However, he offered to sign a peace treaty with Romanos once again.
The emperor refused. The battle ended in humiliating defeat for the Byzantines,
with Romanos IV being captured and brought before Alp Arslan on
26 August 1071.
The causes of the Byzantine defeat were manifold and complex. The
first was Romanos’ misjudgement of Alp Arslan’s strategy. Had Romanos
known that the sultan intended to concentrate on Syria instead of attacking
the Byzantine borders, and that he faced serious financial difficulties
in paying his own soldiers, the battle could have been averted. Secondly,
the Turks employed superior tactics; they were mostly horsemen armed
with bows and arrows, capable of striking the enemy while themselves
staying out of range, thus rendering the Byzantine army’s close formations
a disadvantage. Not only did Byzantine tactics fail against the Turks;
the action of the imperial army depended far too much on the instructions
of its commander-in-chief. Romanos realised too late that the sultan
was approaching, and divided his forces by sending large contingents in
the direction of Akhlat. Finally, the emperor was betrayed by the proedros
Andronikos Doukas, whose detachment withdrew when the outcome of
the battle was still uncertain (see above, p. 608).
Given the crushing nature of the defeat, the terms of the peace treaty
were comparatively moderate. Reparations came to a total of one and a half
million dinars: an immediate payment of 300,000 dinars, with the balance
to be paid as an annual tribute of 60,000 dinars, implying that the peace
treaty was expected to last for twenty years.11 Romanos was also required
to cede four cities in northern Syria and Armenia to Alp Arslan – Edessa,
Membij, Antioch andManzikert – before the sultan would release him. Alp
Arslan’s intentions remained the same as they had been before the battle:
he wanted the empire to be his peaceful neighbour and to keep his flanks
in Syria secure for his further advance against the Fatimid caliph in Egypt.
Although in the event the Byzantines only ceded Manzikert, these four
cities were the key Byzantine strongholds in northern Syria and Armenia.
And although the peace treaty in theory gave the empire a twenty-year
respite from attacks by the sultan’s army, it could not stop the incursions of
the other Turks. The bitter experience of the three decades before the battle
of Manzikert had shown that the Byzantines’ defence of the region relied
on a strong field army, working in liaison with the large fortresses’ garrisons.
After 1071 the main field army was no longer an operational military unit,
although the empire still possessed battle-worthy detachments.12 Had there
been a strong government, the army could still have been restored to a level
comparable with the enemy’s. Instead, the empire plunged into civil war.
World History
