The failure of the siege of 674–8 marked the high point inMu’awiya’s efforts
to seize Constantinople and for some Muslims this episode became the
stuff of legend.49 There followed the secondMuslim fitna, which provided
a welcome breathing space for the Byzantines. The years 678–9 marked
a turning-point in the earliest Muslim–Byzantine encounters. The failure
of the blockade of Constantinople, followed by the civil war, caused
Caliph Mu‘awiya to purchase a suspension of hostilities from Constantine
IV (668–85) in 680: he had to offer an annual payment of 3,000 gold pieces,
together with fifty slaves and the same number of horses. The Byzantine
empire observed these terms throughout the caliphate of Yazid I (680–3),
and early in 685 Caliph ‘Abd al-Malik requested renewal of the truce for
several reasons. These included the ongoing fitna, the Khazars’ pressure on
Armenia and Constantine IV’s offensive which regainedMopsuestia for the
Byzantines.50 The cost of a truce was now huge, amounting to 365,000 gold
pieces, 365 slaves and an equal number of horses. Constantine did not seize
the opportunity to push deeper into Muslim Syria, or even to try and win
it back, at this very vulnerable moment for ‘Abd al-Malik.Maybe Constantine
himself was in poor health or the plague raging inMuslim territories at
the time could have acted as a disincentive. A second truce on similar terms
was negotiated at the end of 689 or at the beginning of 690 (see above,
p. 235).
Another instrument of Byzantine diplomacy took the form of the unruly
bands of Mardaites that Constantine IV unleashed to raid along the north
Syrian coast and to infest its hills. The hardyMardaites were few in number,
and proved disproportionately successful in disrupting Muslim control
over northern Syria. A troublesome and temporary Byzantine tool of the
late 680s and early 690s, they were probably of Armenian origin. Their
operations on behalf of the Byzantines were all the more effective thanks to
the protracted second fitna, which lasted from 683 until 692: the Muslim
authorities found it difficult to check the Mardaite raids while they were
seriously distracted by their own internal strife. Justinian II (685–95, 705–
11) withdrew theMardaites from the mountainous regions around Antioch
and the north Syrian coast sometime around 687, shortly before sending
Leontius to Armenia in command of a strong expeditionary force; in 690
Caliph ‘Abd al-Malik restored Antioch to Muslim rule. The city may have
slipped out of Muslim hands because of the Mardaite raiding and the
distractions of the fitna.
Caliph ‘Abd al-Malik achieved many of his objectives against Byzantium,
although he did not radically shift the borders; these remained roughly
where they had been at the beginning of the 640s, following the line
of the Taurus and Anti-Taurus mountain ranges. Although the end of
the second fitna was a significant turning-point, it would not be until
Caliph ‘Umar II’s reign (717–20) that another major effort was launched
against central Byzantine lands, reaching as far as the capital itself and
making use of both naval and land forces. ‘Abd al-Malik’s armies were
unable to accomplish the sort of deep penetration of Byzantine Anatolia
that Mu‘awiya had achieved. His military actions were fairly effective but
limited in scope; they concentrated on the border areas, in contrast to the
sweeping Muslim gains made in the western Mediterranean region in this
era.
‘Abd al-Malik’s Byzantine strategy fits well with his domestic policies.
These included the Arabising of both his bureaucracy and the coinage,
while the coin reforms involved the polemical rejection of the types of coin
struck by his adversary, Justinian II. The monumental construction of the
Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem (see fig. 26) reinforced Umayyad assertions
of their right to control the holy places and to the heritage of Abraham. But
‘Abd al-Malik and his armies and subjects also benefited from the internal
tensions and strife of the reign of Justinian II. The kaleidoscopic changes
of emperors in the two decades or so following Justinian’s initial overthrow
provided ample opportunities for bolder Muslim initiatives (see above,
p. 236).
Arab–Byzantine warfare intensified. By 691/2 the truce had been broken
and Justinian II suffered a sharp defeat at theMuslims’ hands at Sebastopolis,
north-west of Sebasteia, after his Slavic recruits defected to theMuslims
en masse.51 Serious Arab invasions of Byzantine Anatolia followed in 695
and 696, reaching as far as Mopsuestia and Melitene. By 695 the Muslims
were raiding the region of Fourth Armenia, and by 697 they were marauding
elsewhere in Anatolia and taking large numbers of prisoners. Exploiting
the instability of the Byzantine throne after the overthrow of Justinian II,
Muslim expeditions reached Theodosioupolis in 700, Samosata by 701 and
the fortress of Taranda in 702. They succeeded in gaining control of the
region of Fourth Armenia, but raiders in Cilicia met with defeat in 704 (see
also above, p. 346). From 705 onwards Maslama began to lead expeditions
into Anatolia in person.
The early eighth century saw an intensification of Arab offensives while
the Byzantines were distracted by internal upheavals.52 Under Caliph al-
Walid I (705–15), Maslama captured Tyana in 707/08; in 713 Antioch-onthe-
Maeander in Pisidia fell; and in 714Maslama managed to reachGalatia,
bringing back many captives. Maslama’s brother, the caliph Suleiman, put
him in command of the great expedition to capture Constantinople in 716–
18. This unwieldy force allegedly numbered more than 100,000 warriors
and it is said to have had a supply train of some 12,000 men, 6,000 camel
and a similar number of donkeys. The venture turned out to be a costly
and embarrassing fiasco for the Arabs and a morale-booster for the Byzantines.
Serious logistical challenges faced the attackers while Leo III’s shrewd
bargaining skills and talent for deception contributed to the Byzantines’
repulse of this assault on their capital. Immediately thereafter, the Kharijite
rebellion in Iraq distracted the attention of Maslama and the caliphal
government. Later Umayyad raiders mostly sought to obtain booty, rather
than attempting to acquire territory for good.
World History
