Immediately after the quriltai of 1206 the great khan, Chinggis, began to consolidate power and reorganize his army in anticipation of dipping into the rich pickings of the Sung, the power center of China to the south. He continued the process of decimalization, and where possible he broke up tribal structures and rewarded with command postings those who had been loyal to him during the lean years. The breakup of the tribal makeup of his fighting force was to have profound effects on the loyalty, discipline, and effectiveness of his army. The ordu (base camp) was a tightly regulated unit, and its layout and organization were often uniform so that newcomers and visitors would immediately know where to find the armory, the physician’s tent, or the chief. The fighting men, who included all males from 14 to 60 years, were organized into standard units: arbans (10 men), jaguns (100 men), minghans (1000 men), and tumens (10,000 men) and were overseen by the tumen quartermaster, the jurtchi. Such an organization meant that no order would ever have to be given to more than 10 men at any one time. Transfer between units was forbidden. Soldiers fought as part of a unit, not as individuals. Individual soldiers, however, were responsible for their equipment, weapons, and up to five mounts. Their families and even their herds would accompany them on foreign expeditions.
Soldiers wore protective silk undershirts, a practice learned from the Chinese. Even if an arrow pierced their mail or leather outer garment, the arrowhead was unlikely to pierce the silk. In this way, though a wound might be opened up in the flesh, the actual metal would be tightly bound in the silk and so would be prevented from causing more extensive harm and would also be easier to withdraw later. The silk undershirt would be worn beneath a tunic of thick leather, lamellar armor-plate, or mail and sometimes a cuirass of leather-covered iron scales. Whether the helmet was leather or metal depended on rank. Contemporary illustrations depict helmets with a central metal spike bending backward, and others ending in a ball with a plume and wide neck-guard shielding the shoulders and the jaws and neck. Shields were leather-covered wicker.
The Mongols were famous for their mastery of firing their arrows in any direction while mounted and galloping at full speed. Strapped to their backs, their quivers contained 60 arrows for use with two composite bows made of bamboo and yak horn. The light cavalry were armed with a small sword and two or three javelins, while the heavy horsemen carried a long lance (four meters) fitted with a hook, a heavy mace or axe, and a scimitar.
On campaign, all fighting men were expected to carry their equipment and provisions as well as their weaponry. A horsehair lasso, a coil of stout rope, an awl, needle and thread, cooking pots, leather water bottles, and a file for sharpening arrows would be among the utilities possibly carried in an inflatable saddlebag fashioned from a cow’s stomach. When the horseman was fording a river, this saddlebag, if inflated, could double as a float.
Much is known about the Mongol fighting forces simply because they succeeded in causing such a wide impact, and artists of the pen, the brush, and the song as well as various artisans of all skills, media, and provenance have all vividly recorded in their different ways the details of the Mongol war machine, its composition, organization, and methods.43
Two other aspects of the army deserve mention before returning to the account of the Mongols’ rise to greatness, because both were crucial to the success that Chinggis Khan achieved after the quriltai of 1206. One was the nerge (hunt or chase), which was not only a source of entertainment and food but vital in the training of the Mongol fighting force and in the installation of discipline and coordination into the tribe as a military unit. The other institution was the yam and barid or “postal” system, the communications network, the efficacy of which ensured the unity and cohesiveness of the empire and its armies.
The nerge formed an essential element in Mongol life. Juwayni (d. 1282) was brought up in the Mongol court and later became governor of Baghdad under the Il-Khan Hulegu, and he must have witnessed, if not taken part in, the nerge many times. The nerge not only provided sustenance for the tribe, but served as an exercise in military training and discipline that was taken with the utmost seriousness. It was an event that was remarked upon by many, and accounts are many, from the earliest days of the nascent empire until the Golden Age of the Yuan and the Ilkhanate.
[Chinggis Khan] paid great attention to the chase and used to say that the hunting of wild beasts was a proper occupation for the commanders of armies; and that instruction and training therein was incumbent on warriors and men-at-arms, [who should learn] how the huntsmen come up with the quarry, how they hunt it, in what manner they array themselves and after what fashion they surround it according as the party is great or small. For when the Mongols wish to go a-hunting, they first send out scouts to ascertain what kinds of game are available and whether it is scarce or abundant. And when they are not engaged in warfare, they are ever eager for the chase and encourage their armies thus to occupy themselves; not for the sake of the game alone, but also in order that they may become accustomed and inured to hunting and familiarized with the handling of the bow and the endurance of hardships, Whenever the Khan sets out on the great hunt (which takes place at the beginning of the winter season), he issues orders that the troops stationed around his headquarters and in the neighbourhood of the ordus shall make preparations for the chase, mounting several men from each company of ten in accordance with instructions and distributing such equipment in the way of arms and other matters as are suitable for the locality where it is desired to hunt. The right wing, left wing and centre of the army are drawn up and entrusted to the great emirs; and they set out together with the Royal Ladies (khavatJn) and the concubines, as well as provisions of food and drink. For a month, or two, or three they form a hunting ring and drive the game slowly and gradually before them, taking care lest any escape from the ring. And if, unexpectedly, any game should break through, a minute inquiry is made into the cause and reason, and the commanders of thousands, hundreds and tens are clubbed therefor, and often even put to death. And if (for example) a man does not keep to the line (which they call nerge) but takes a step forwards or backwards, severe punishment is dealt out to him and is never remitted. For two or three months, by day and by night, they drive the game in this manner, like a flock of sheep, and dispatch messages to the Khan to inform him of the condition of the quarry, its scarcity or plenty, whither it has come and from whence it has been started. Finally, when the ring has been contracted to a diameter of two or three para-sangs, they bind ropes together and cast felts over them; while the troops come to a halt all around the ring, standing shoulder to shoulder. The ring is now filled with the cries and commotion of every manner of game and the roaring and tumult of every kind of ferocious beast; all thinking that the appointed hour of “And when the wild beasts shall be gathered together” is come; lions becoming familiar with wild asses, hyenas friendly with foxes, wolves intimate with hares. When the ring has been so much contracted that the wild beasts are unable to stir, first the Khan rides in together with some of his retinue; then, after he has wearied of the sport, they dismount upon high ground in the centre of the nerge to watch the princes likewise entering the ring, and after them, in due order, the noyans, the commanders and the troops. Several days pass in this manner; then, when nothing is left of the game but a few wounded and emaciated stragglers, old men and greybeards humbly approach the Khan, offer up prayers for his well-being and intercede for the lives of the remaining animals asking that they be suffered to depart to some place nearer to grass and water. Thereupon they collect together all the game that they have bagged; and if the enumeration of every species of animal proves impracticable they count only the beasts of prey and the wild asses.44
The yam, the successor institution to the barid, was in essence a postal system and a means of communication for the reigning and the reigned. Though first mentioned by name during Ogodei Khan’s reign, it must be assumed that the yam network was developed during Chinggis Khan’s rule. In 1234 Ogodei set up a properly organized network that in future years was to so impress visitors and merchants to the Mongol Empire. Yam is a Mongol term and the term most commonly employed in the Persian sources of the time, whereas barid is an Arabic term used to describe the horse relay stations of the Ab-basids (749-1258) and the later communications network of the Mamluks of Egypt, which in fact was a development of the Mongols’ yam system. Much of what is known of the functioning of the yam is from later sources that detail various reforms of the system and often lambaste the failings of the operation under former rulers. However, praise comes from many sources, including Marco Polo, who claims that distances of between 200 and 250 miles a day could be covered by the great khan’s couriers, adding that “these strong, enduring messengers are highly prized men.” The yam operating in China, where it originated, seems to have been more effectual than the Persian system, but whatever the criticisms of the sources (whose authors so often had their own agendas), this network of fresh horses, couriers, supply houses, and escorts succeeded in establishing a remarkable degree of cohesion and communication over such a vast empire.
The network was run by the army, and therefore it crisscrossed the whole expanse of Mongol-controlled territory, from Eastern Europe to the Sea of Japan. Post-houses were established every three or four farsangs (somewhere between 9 and 18 miles) and each yam had at least 15 horses in good condition and ready to go or, if Marco Polo is to be believed, between 200 and 400 ready mounts. Rashid al-Din puts the figure at 500 mounts, but it can be assumed that different routes would have different requirements. IlchJs (messengers or representatives) would be authorized to make use of these waiting horses as well as replenish their supplies or seek shelter if their journey was to be continued by another waiting ilchi. Though the army was entrusted with operating and replenishing these numerous yam stations, it was the local peasantry who supplied the food, fodder, and generous provisions that were made available to the ilchis and others passing through. One of the abuses of the yam system that was rectified by later reforms was the frequent use made of these facilities by merchants. Officially only persons on official business and in possession of a tablet of authority, a paiza, made of wood, silver, or gold and engraved in the Uyghur script with a tiger or gerfalcon at its head were permitted to make use of the yam services. However, the heavy burden the yam stations inflicted on the locals suggest that many others benefited from the free horses, food, and provisions on offer. The frequent references in the sources to reforms of the system to curb misuse imply that such exploitation was widespread. Particularly urgent messages or documents could also be sent with runners who would also be on hand at the yam stations and at regular short intervals of a farsang or less in between. According to Marco Polo, they would wear belts of bells so that the runner at the next village would hear their approach and be able to make preparations to continue the relay. He further claimed that they carried not only urgent messages for the great khan but also fresh fruit. These runners or paykan would relay their packages from station to station, village to village, and they could cover between 30 to 40 parsangs in 24 hours. As with most figures recorded in medieval sources, numbers differ widely and cannot be relied on for accuracy. However, that the yam was a major institution and that it was crucial for the smooth and effective running of the empire cannot be questioned. The fact that someone of the prestige and status of Rashid al-Din, the grand wazir to the Il-Khan of Persia, Ghazan Khan (r. 1295-1304), was put in charge of the yam’s operation and reform program speaks of the significance attached to this institution. Rashid al-Din took responsibility for the yam stations away from the army and the burden of their financial upkeep from the local people and entrusted each yam to a great emir. Generous funds were allotted for maintenance, and strict regulations were laid down detailing exactly who was permitted use of the facilities. Documents requiring stamps and seals were issued to control unauthorized use of the horses, runners, and provisions of the yam stations. The yam under Ghazan Khan was a far more sophisticated institution than the improvised relay system that Chinggis Khan began adapting to his needs as his steppe empire began to emerge from its pastoralist past. It was certainly one of the more effective of the Mongols’ imperial institutions, and it lived on in the barld of the Egyptian Mamluks, the courier system found in the Delhi Sultanate, and even the ulak system of the Ottoman Turks.
World History
