Thought

Gregoras, like Metochites, asserted the primacy of firmly holding Christian dogmas as absolutely true in terms of their having been revealed by the source of truth, that is, God. Like Barlaam, he combated the Filioque by declaring it illegitimate to use ‘‘apodeictic syllogisms’’ in theological matters, as the Latins audaciously and ignorantly did. On the grounds of this fideistic apophaticism, held by him as the only way of securing the transcendence of God, he also rejected Palamas’ pretension that God can be seen through the sensible eyes in this life and thus known in a way superior to that available to the conscious average member ofthe Christian folk. He likewise attacked Palamas’ distinctio realis between God’s ‘‘essence’’ and ‘‘energies’’ as being just a Christian adjustment of Proclus’ metaphysical doctrine of ‘‘henads.’’ At the same time, however, he confuted this doctrine both on theological and philosophical grounds. This offered to some strong opponents of his (apart from Palamas himself, Neilos Kabasilas and Philotheos Kokkinos) the opportunity to stick on him the label ‘‘philosopher,’’ by which they implied, according to a traditional Christian stereotype, ‘‘bad theologian.’’ In fact, Gregoras, like many other Byzantine theologians, built a philosophical conscience which he regarded compatible with the essentials of Christianity. In his philosophical works (Commentary on the ‘‘De insomniis’’ of Synesios of Cyrene, before 1330; Against Those Who Do Not Recognize the Vile Character of Human Nature, c. 1330; Lover of Learning or on Arrogant Men, 1332; Florentios or on Wisdom, 1332-1333 or after 1335; Solutions to the Physical Problems Posed by Helena Palaiologina; On the Form Visible Only Through the Intellect, and on the Form That Is Seen Along with Accidents) as well as in some special places in his theological writings, he elaborates the intellectual legacy of Theodore Metochites and proves influenced by Plato, Philo of Alexandria, Plutarch, and Sextus Empiricus. He describes God in a Neoplatonic way as the ‘‘One’’ that transcends everything and contains in Itself the immaterial archetypes (called by him ‘‘the secret and ineffable reasons’’) of all created beings. The realm of the sensi-bles as well as the sphere of human life is the region of mutability, instability, and corruption and forms an orderly whole only thanks to God’s power and wisdom. Even the heavens cannot, for Gregoras, be known with accuracy; for, as a matter of fact, all astronomical theories, instead of starting from observation data and setting forth this or that hypothesis, start from some preconstructed ideas about how heavens go and tend to adapt the observation data to themselves. The way he sometimes puts this idea borders on epistemological nihilism, which appeared for the first time in Byzantium with him. His strong taste for ‘‘Dogmatic Scepticism’’ caused the reaction of an anti-Skeptical Aristotelian, Nicholas Kabasilas (c. 1323-paulo post 1391), who wrote the only anti-Skeptical medieval work (On the Criterion of Truth, Whether It Exists or Not, Against the Accursed Pyrrho; 1354-1359). One of Gregoras’ beloved philosophical topics was that of the cognitive faculties of man (senses, ‘‘common sense,’’ phantasia, reason, intellect). Mingling his Neoplatonic and Skeptical views with Christianity, he held that the postlapsarian ‘‘ratio’’ (logos or dianoia) normally fails to reach truth (actually it may be regarded inferior even to the cognitive faculties of the irrational animals); whenever it succeeds, this is due to the fact that it was secretly guided by the scintilla that has remained from the light of truth possessed by man before his Fall. Radicalizing Metochites’ anti-Aristotelianism, he regards Aristotle as an arrogant man, who pretended to possess truth, whereas he knew that he lied (and tried to hide his ignorance behind sonorous but empty words and phrases) and that he contradicted himself at every point (especially in logic and physics). In contrast, Plato instantiated for Gregoras the true ideal of ‘‘wisdom,’’ because he was conscious of his ignorance and turned to the transcendental reality to attain truth. This reality is, for Gregoras, the Christian God. Studying the trivium and the quadrivium and then being deeply trained in philosophy was for him just a way to learn the lesson of ignorance and then take refuge to revelation, which is the highest mark of God’s providence. Every sort of secular knowledge must be placed in this context. For example, Gregoras, Christianizing a Stoic doctrine, stated that writing history (as he actually did) is a task pleasing to God, because in this way His providence both in nature and the human world is highlighted. Under this general stand toward heathen philosophy and literature, he felt as free as to integrate into Christianity any aspect of Greek thought he considered as admitting of such a usage; for instance, in a short but interesting allegorical introduction to Homer’s Odyssey he depicted Ulysses as the embodiment of the ideal sage, because he fully possessed all the ‘‘cardinal virtues.’’ Some influence of his philosophical ideas, especially his bitter anti-Aristotelianism, is traced in George Gemistos (Plethon).

See also: > Aristotelianism in the Greek, Latin, Syriac, Arabic, and Hebrew Traditions > Barlaam of Calabria > George Gemistos Plethon > Gregory Palamas > Platonism > Skepticism