A question closely connected with that of the ‘‘universals’’ was how to explain the production of a multiplicity by the highest level of unity, which is God. Most of the above-mentioned thinkers placed the ‘‘universals before the many’’ in God’s mind (an idea traced back to Middle Platonism, if not to ancient Stoicism). This solution, however, explains the multiplicity of the created beings away just by transposing multiplicity to the realm of God. In the first half of the fourteenth century (either in connection with the history of the Byzantine treatments of the question of the ‘‘universals’’ or not), Gregory Palamas, a monastic figure well trained in ancient Greek philosophy, formulated (probably inspired by Proclus) a peculiar doctrine of God as consisting of two levels, that is, essence (ousia), which is absolutely simple and totally unknown, and His eternal ‘‘energy’’ (energeia), which is participated by the created beings, the difference between these levels being not only more real than the merely conceptual rank of a logical relation but also no less than ‘‘infinite’’ (Triads III, 2, 8). Arguing that these levels are discernible not only in God but in every being, as well as that for all the real difference between these levels, God’s being is nevertheless ‘‘one,’’ Palamas believed that his doctrine did not clash with God’s simplicity. He also distinguished between the various ‘‘acts’’ themselves and identified God’s ‘‘eternal and without beginning acts’’ with the ‘‘reasons of beings,’’ which preexist eternally in God’s mind and according to which the world was created (Triads III, 2, 24). Palamas’ opponents, such as Gregoras, who was inspired by Christian and pagan Neoplatonism, as well as John Kyparissiotes, Demetrios Kydones, Prochoros Kydones, and Manuel Kalekas, who were inspired by Thomas Aquinas and Boethius, too, rejected any sort of distinctio realis in God. Palamas’ adherents, such as Neilos Kabasilas, Philotheos Kokkinos, Theophanes of Nicaea (second half of fourteenth century), and Markos Eugenikos (first half of fifteenth century), restated Palamas’ doctrine by describing his distinctions as drawn by the human mind (kat’ epinoian), that is as not implying any sort of separation between God’s ‘‘essence’’ and ‘‘energy.’’ And John VI Kantakouzenos (middle fourteenth century), influenced by Thomas Aquinas, regarded them as true only ex parte subjecti, that is, in the sense that our mind, since it is composite in this life, cannot help grasping the absolutely simple God in terms of multiplicity. Yet, all Palamites insisted, like Palamas himself (e. g., Triads III, 1, 24), that all beings, whether created or uncreated, consist not only of essence but also of act.
In the first half of the fifteenth century, George Scholarios - Gennadios II - subscribed to John Duns Scotus’ distinctio formalis (archetypal distinction between God’s various properties, notwithstanding their absolute unity), which he found to be very close to that of Palamas.
Palamas’ thought is also characterized by a peculiar doctrine of ‘‘light,’’ which may be deemed metaphysical. According to him, the stuff of the ‘‘rational beings,’’ that is, of God, angels, and the human mind, is ‘‘light’’ or, at least, beings of this sort manifest themselves and are perceived as light (Triads I, 3, 8).
In Late Byzantium, Augustine’s doctrine (De trinitate V-VII) of the inapplicability of Aristotle’s Categories on God found a place in the thought of authors such as Barlaam of Calabria and Gregory Palamas. It is not clear, however, if this testifies to an interest in metaphysical matters proper or forms part of a principally theological discussion.
World History
