When, in 1611, the 17 year old Gustavus Adolphus inherited a throne, an army, and three wars, his forces could not match the quality of the professional soldiers of Denmark or Poland, the recruitment of the Swedish forces was imperfect, and their battle-organisation on an improvised and temporary basis which did not conform to their administrative set up.
The young king, however, was already well-versed in the military lore of the ancients, and was also acquainted with, and influenced by, the Dutch example (especially after his meetings with John of Nassau in 1620). With the practical experience of his wars with the Russians, Poles and Danes, the king evolved by stages a highly effective system of organisation, equipment and training, which, with his own generalship and gallantry (he was wounded 13 times — an unusual record for a supreme commander, even in the 17th Century!), allowed the ‘Lion of the North’ and his national army to pursue a brief but brilliant, comet-like, career across the wider stage of the 30 Years’ War.
Like his predecessors, Gustavus built on the foundation of a national army, raised by the methods already described, from Sweden and Finland (the Finns in fact providing a disproportionately large contribution amounting to nine infantry and three cavalry field-regiments). However, he also hired mercenaries, predominantly Scots and Germans. The Scots provided a field marshal, at least six generals, nearly 30 colonels and some 13,000 men. By the time Gustavus entered the German war, some 40 per cent of all his forces, and over half his forces in Germany, were foreign. All, however, were trained and organised on the lines of the Swedish units.
For recruiting and administration, the Swedish army was organised in Provincial ‘Landsregements’, each of which by the 1620s provided three infantry ‘Field-Regiments’, each of which had eight companies (at least after the adoption of small Dutch-style companies in the 1620s). The tactical unit, established as early as 1618, was the ‘Squadron’, which had four of the new-style companies, containing in all 216 pikemen and 288 musketeers. 96 of the musketeers would normally be detached or ‘commanded’ as a forlorn hope, to support the cavalry, guard the baggage train or for similar duty. (This represents four
A Pikeman of Erik XIV’s reign in haif armour. b Crossbowman of the earlier 16th Century, c Arquebusier of Erik XIV’s reign. Note widely worn fur-trimmed hat. He may be wearing a 'jack', d Swedish soldier of early 16th Century. He wears a pot helmet and may /jave a breastplate. His odd trousers look almost like cowboy 'chaps’. As well as his peculiar ‘knavelspjut’ he bears a very large sword —probably a two-hander, e 30 Years’ War musketeer wearing a very wide-skirted buff coat, trimmed in red, and very floppy boots, f Early 16th Century soldier with spear and crossbow. Felt hat, trousers and boots black, coat white with green trim edged red, leggings white, quiver brown g
Musketeer of Gustavus Adolphus' period wearing sleeveless buff coat trimmed with ribbon, and boots, h Pikeman of the same period in morion and corselet. He wears a long-skirted buff coat and winter boots, i Scot in bonnet, I think trews, and sleeveless buff coat, j Pikeman, probably end of 16th Century although frilled sleeves seem to have lingered among the Swedes as late as the 30 Years’ War. k 'Swinefeather’ or Swedish Feather. Note attachment for resting musket barrel. I Swedish cavalry helmet, 30 Years’ War, from a contemporary drawing. Note 'lobster tail' neck guard, very large side flaps (much worn by Swedes), plume holder at rear, and single adjustable nasal.
‘Corporalships’ — a corporalship was either four six-man files of musketeers, or three of pikemen.) This corresponded to the Dutch battalion. In battle the Dutch normally drew up in three large groups — ‘battles’ or ‘brigades’, and Gustavus in the 1620s evolved the famous ‘Swedish Brigade’, originally of six, later of four or three squadrons. These brigades, rather than the regiments, were the higher tactical units. In the 30 Years’ War they were kept permanently together, and stood at seven brigades of three squadrons each, as follows:
The Yellow Brigade — this was named after its leading unit, the Yellow or Household Regiment, Teuffel’s Germans.
The Green Brigade — led by Hepburn’s Green Regiment, and including Mackay’s, this was largely or wholly of Scots.
The Blue Brigade — led by Winckel’s Germans, and chiefly German.
The Red Brigade — Hogendorf’s Red Regiment, Erik Hands’ Ostgota Regiment, Karl Hards’ Vastgota Regiment.
The White Brigade — led by Vitzthum’s Regiment.
The Black Brigade (?) — Thurn’s German regiment.
Ake Oxenstierna’s Brigade — all Swedes.
Though the organisation of squadrons and brigades was kept up fairly well, it must be realised that, as in all armies of the period, there was a gap between this paper organisation and reality. Thus, in Germany, Gustavus’ infantry regiments, though mainly of eight companies, were often down to a strength of only 500 to 600 men, and thus formed in practice one squadron rather than two. Seyeral German regiments had 12 companies (but again fell short of two squadron strength), a few 16 companies.
As usual, discipline and training were probably more significant than the precise type of organisation, and Gustavus’ army excelled in both respects.
The national basis gave a firmer foundation for discipline than in most contemporary armies, and religion reinforced this. Though all denominations were tolerated, the army had its own preachers and every man was issued with a prayerbook. Though there was no flogging, punishments were severe, including the ‘gatlopp’ (the origin of ‘running the gauntlet’) and death for such offences as ‘despising divine service a third time’. In these respects, as in others, the Swedes provided a model for the later armies of Cromwell and the Covenant.
The tactics of the Swedes were a further development from the Dutch model. The musketeers, drawn up only six ranks deep, were trained both to fire by countermarch, two ranks at a time, and to ‘double the files’, extending into three-deep formation to deliver concerted volleys, every man firing at once, the front rank kneeling, the second crouching and the third standing upright.
To the weight ot Tire which this gave (it enabled Scots musketeers at Leipzig, 1631, to break an attack by Imperial cuirassiers by their fire alone) was added the fire of up to 12 light regimental guns attached to each brigade — a much closer combination of artillery and the other arms than previously attempted. After abortive experiments with copper and leather 1V2 pounders had been dropped (unkind Germans accused the hungry Swedes of having eaten these weapons!), Gustavus’ Scots artillerist, Sandy Hamilton, evolved light 3 pounders which, with the aid of pre-loaded cartridges, could fire (usually ‘hail shot’) more rapidly than the musketeers, while keeping up reasonably well with an infantry advance (they were, incidentally, Bofors’ guns).
A ‘fire-shock’ was thus achieved, to be exploited by the Swedish pikemen, trained to charge in after a volley rather than passively defend the ‘shot’; they could then fall back to allow the musketeers a second volley (volley-firing of course meant a fairly long interval between bursts of fire). Michael Roberts, in Essays in Swedish History, points out that the offensively-minded Gustavus had actually increased the proportion of pikes compared to that in the essentially defensive Dutch army. However, it must be pointed out that the actual pike strength in the Swedish army was below the theoretical — in the 30 Years’ War by up to 25 per cent — whereas the musketeers were much closer to their establishment (perhaps the earlier Swedish anti-pike attitudes persisted?).
Infantry equipment was also improved, though some of the more radical innovations attributed to Gustavus appear to be mythical. So far as possible musketeers were given uniform weapons, probably firing a ball of ten to the pound, as in the Dutch army, and in the later part of Gustavus’ reign Swedish-made muskets were shortened (to 1.2 metres overall). This, with a lighter stock, cut the weight by about a third (judging by weapons in the Stockholm Armemuseum). Gustavus did not achieve total standardisation, nor did he go over to flint or wheel-locks, the majority of Swedish weapons retaining the matchlock, which was more reliable and more within the capabilities of Swedish lockmakers.
Though he abolished the ’swine-teather Gustavus did not, as is often said, abolish the musket-rest (though ‘commanded’ musketeers may have dispensed with it). Much the same applies to his reputed shortening of Swedish pikes to 11 feet. This error seems to arise from the 11 foot partisans which were carried by the King’s Lifeguard of Foot (one company), and possibly also by the Household Regiment, in place of pikes. Swedish regulations originally called for pikes over 18 feet long, and a 1619 Order only reduced them to 17 feet 6 inches, though some were probably unofficially shortened by those who had to carry them.
Musketeers were supposed to wear an open helmet, and carried the usual sword and bandolier with 12 cartouches, while pikemen had helmet, gorget, corselet, and originally thigh-pieces or short tassets, though these may have often been omitted. Officers carried partisans, and up to the 30 Years’ War were distinguished by gilded gorgets. Under-officers of pikes carried pikes; of musketeers, carried partisans.
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