The relationship between the Angevins and the Capetians illustrates the ambiguities and tensions inherent in the changing feudal structure of the twelfth century. Although the Capetians had held the French throne since 987, by the early twelfth century they had not noticeably expanded their influence beyond their family lands in the Ile-de-France. The great lords who held the neighbouring fiefs, although nominally their vassals, were often just as politically influential and as economically powerful. Indeed, with the invasion of England in 1066, the duke of Normandy became a king in his own right, independent in matters involving his new realm.
The Norman Conquest demonstrates that the Capetians operated within a political kaleidoscope in which dynastic ambition and the wheel of fortune might suddenly produce such unexpected agglomerations of territory that the theoretical superiority of the king of France at the apex of the social hierarchy might bear little relationship to the realities of political power. In the 1150s such a change did indeed occur, for in 1154, following the death of King Stephen, Henry of Anjou was crowned king of England. He had already been accepted as duke of Normandy in 1150 and had inherited from his father, Geoffrey (d. 1151), the lands in western France centred on Anjou, Touraine and Vendome. Moreover, his wife Eleanor, recently divorced from Louis VII of France, had brought him the duchy of Aquitaine on their marriage in 1152. Nor were these to be the limits of Henry's domains, for the king of Scotland was his vassal, he claimed authority over the Welsh princes and he had plans for the conquest of Ireland. When his brother Geoffrey died in 1158 he invaded Brittany, while, in 1173, he even received the homage of the count of Toulouse.
Under Henry II (d. 1189) and his son, Richard I (d. 1199), this collection of disparate territories was held together quite successfully, although at the cost of continuous vigilance and high expenditure. Despite their theoretical overlordship neither Louis VII (d. 1180) nor Philip II could make any substantial impact. However, the Angevin 'empire' was ultimately dependent on dynastic circumstances, especially when the lands concerned lacked any other real political coherence. Richard's early death left a succession disputed between his brother John and his nephew Arthur of Brittany, with John being accepted in England and Normandy, while Arthur gained adherence in Anjou, Touraine and Maine, forcing a wedge across the middle of the Angevin lands. Nevertheless, by 1200 a combination of energetic military action against Arthur and negotiations with King Philip had gained John recognition, which, although it left him in a relatively greater feudal subordination than that of his father or brother, did maintain most of the Angevin lands under his rule.
Yet by 1204 John had lost Normandy, and during the next two years Anjou, Touraine, northern Poitou and Brittany as well. In 1214 at the battle of Bouvines, ten years of strenuous fund-raising and careful alliance-building was brought to nothing, when Philip II defeated John's allies. John himself was not present, having been driven back to La Rochelle. Philip's shrewd exploitation of John's political and military errors had been enough to prise apart the lands which had been so fortuitously brought together, leaving him master of northern France with access to Norman resources and administrative expertise, a gain which lifted him into a different political league from that of Louis VII.
The limitations of a single map of these changes are evident. Contemporaries did not think in terms of clearly defined borders or of national entities, nor was their authority evenly spread throughout the lands which theoretically owed them allegiance. The constant itineracy of these rulers underlines their awareness of this last point, and the larger the territory the greater the problems. The map can convey the broad geo-political structure, but it is misleading without an awareness of twelfth-century political attitudes.
M. C.Barber